Four Reasons We Still Need Equal Pay Day

Apr 14, 2015Andrea Flynn

Happy Equal Pay Day!

It would certainly be happier if we didn’t need an Equal Pay Day, wouldn’t it?

But it’s 2015 and the wages of U.S. women continue to lag behind those of their male counterparts of equal age, education, and professional experience.

Happy Equal Pay Day!

It would certainly be happier if we didn’t need an Equal Pay Day, wouldn’t it?

But it’s 2015 and the wages of U.S. women continue to lag behind those of their male counterparts of equal age, education, and professional experience. More than 50 years ago President John F. Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act, which prohibited discrimination “on account of sex in the payment of wages by employers.” At that time, women were paid 59 cents for every dollar paid to their male counterparts. In the half-century that has passed, that gap has shrunk by less than 20 cents; women today make approximately 78 cents for every dollar paid to their male counterparts. For women of color, the injustices are even starker. Black and Latina women are paid only 64 and 56 cents, respectively, for every dollar paid to white, non-Hispanic men, which represents an annual loss of nearly $19,000 for Black women and $23,279 for Latinas.

Conservatives like to scoff at this day. They argue away the gender pay gap by saying the data overstates the problem, and besides, women do things like have babies and step out of the workforce to take care of them, so it makes sense they would be paid less. This (il)logic ignores the fact that many women actually don’t ever step out of the workforce to take care of their children because they simply cannot afford to do so. Indeed, 95 percent of part-time workers and low-wage workers do not have access to paid family leave, and 2-in-5 U.S. workers (nearly 40 million people) are not guaranteed a single paid sick day. The conservative reasoning also suggests that it’s perfectly acceptable for women to be routinely penalized for having and raising their families, even though research shows that paid family leave makes it more likely that women will return to work and get paid at the same wage or higher.

Not only are women today still getting paid less than their male counterparts, but that pay inequity is compounding other circumstances that are driving U.S. families into a spiral of economic insecurity. Wages have been stagnant for roughly five decades. Out-of-pocket health care costs are on the rise. Conservatives are steadfast in their attempts (many of them successful) to dismantle the social safety net, weaken labor protections, and chip away at economic supports for working families. Minimum-wage jobs—two-thirds of which are held by women, including 22 percent by women of color—do not even begin to make middle-class life affordable in this country.

The rationale for equal pay seems obvious to many, but our continued inability to even make progress toward that end—let alone achieve it—is a clear indication that we still need to make the case. So here it goes.

1. It is the right thing to do. Period.

2. Guaranteeing pay equity would improve the lives of women and families.

According to a 2014 report released by the Institute for Women’s Policy Research (IWPR), implementing equal pay would mean an income increase for nearly 60 percent of women in the United States. Two-thirds of single mothers would get a 17 percent raise (equal to more than $6,000 a year), and the poverty rate among these families would drop from 28.7 to 15 percent. The increase in earnings would expand access to health care, food and housing security, and educational opportunities, and would have countless long-term benefits for children, who are especially vulnerable to the pernicious stresses of poverty.

3. Equal pay means a stronger economy.

The IWPR study found that if women were to receive equal pay, the U.S. economy would generate $447.6 billion in additional income—growth equal to 2.9 percent of the 2012 gross domestic product (GDP).

Pay equity would reduce poverty among working women by half and would therefore reduce the need for safety net programs that have become a lifeline for working families that cannot make ends meet. The total increase in women’s earnings as a result of pay equity would be 14 times greater than combined federal and state expenditures on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).

4. It’s 2015. If not now, when?

If the gender pay gap continues to shrink at the snail’s pace of the past few decades, it won’t actually close until 2058. 2058! At this rate hover boards and moon vacations will be in vogue before women are paid an equal wage.  

The increased focus on inequality and growing support for progressive economic policies like paid sick and family leave and minimum wage hikes—not to mention an election cycle in which conservatives will need to prove they aren’t actually waging a war on women—provide a window of opportunity to push for equity once and for all.

I, for one, would like this day to be obsolete before another half-century passes by. 

Andrea Flynn is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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Predatory Finance Has Hurt Our Universities, But Students Can Fight Back

Apr 13, 2015Dominic RusselRyan Thornton

Our tuition checks shouldn't be going to pay off debts from Wall Street's bad deals.

Our tuition checks shouldn't be going to pay off debts from Wall Street's bad deals.

The last few decades have not been kind to America’s local public institutions. Cities that once built state-of-the-art infrastructure are now struggling to fix potholes in the street. Public schools that were once the best in the world are lagging behind. Even our universities, which used to be gateways to a shot at a better life, are increasingly becoming too expensive for much of the population.

There’s no shortage of explanations for these problems, ranging from globalization to government waste to an aging population. These answers, however, all overlook the role that a growing Wall Street has played in changing the picture for public institutions.

In 1950, the financial sector accounted for about 3 percent of U.S. GDP; it now accounts for more than 6.5 percent. This financialization has given the big banks on Wall Street immense wealth and power, allowing them to extract greater and greater earnings from public and private borrowers. While the financial industry is reaping huge profits, it is individuals, not corporations, who pay an increasingly large share of the taxes that are supposed to support our public institutions. Since 1950, corporate tax contributions have dropped from 32 percent to only 17 percent despite corporations claiming a growing share of GDP. In contrast, individuals now pay 63 percent of taxes, up from 45 percent in 1950.

Our cities and schools—and all public institutions that rely on taxes to provide essential services—have felt the impact of this change. Facing slashed budgets, they have been forced to turn to the financial industry for loans. Undoubtedly, borrowing is necessary for financing extensive long-term capital projects; however, public institutions are increasingly compelled to secure loans for their short-term spending as well. Big banks are more than happy to accept the business of cities and universities desperate for funding, especially when the banks get to write the terms of the deal.

Wall Street’s profits are no longer solely built on interest from traditional “vanilla” loans. Instead, its banks have turned to high-risk, high-cost, and unnecessarily complex deals to further inflate their profits. Take interest rate swaps, for example. Swaps are a financial instrument devised by banks that allows cities and universities—those issuing bonds to finance long-term projects—to “swap” a variable interest rate for an agreed-upon fixed interest rate.

These interest rate swaps were deceptive from the very start. They were sold as protection from changing interest rates, but because exorbitant termination fees made refinancing extremely costly, they were essentially dangerous bets that would have only worked out if interest rates rose. And the deck was stacked against the cities and universities making these bets.

Banks illegally manipulated the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which was tied to many deals, and helped precipitate a financial crisis that led to near-zero interest rates that continue today. Because banks had negotiated the swaps contracts so that they would be paying the variable market rates, cities and universities ultimately ended up locked into deals in which they were paying as much as 50 times what the banks were paying—all of which went to Wall Street as profit.

Both of the schools we attend—the University of Michigan and George Mason University—entered into swap deals that have costs them millions. One swap at Michigan even protected banks by allowing them to terminate the deal if variable rates hit just 7 percent, while offering no protection for the university when rates actually sank near zero.

The current imbalance in power need not be the case. Increased transparency surrounding the fees and terms of public finance deals would allow students and taxpayers to oversee the officials and banks who use their money and hold them accountable. When university regents, trustees, or other executives receive or have received compensation from the financial institutions their school does business with (as was the case in a series of University of California swaps), they should immediately recuse themselves from financial decision making to avoid conflicts of interest. Cities, states, and universities can work together to bargain with banks or create public options for bond underwriting and borrowing.

In situations in which our public entities have been targeted by banks, we can organize and pressure our public leaders to regain the money we lost. The city of Detroit was able to reduce its bank payments from $230 million to $85 million by exposing the invalidity of a swap.

Because swaps were often marketed to public institutions as a safe protection from variable interest rates—not as risky bets—it may be possible to pursue legal action to reclaim some of the losses. One avenue to reclaim public funds is the regulatory framework of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, which mandates that municipalities be made fully aware of the risks and possible costs of entering into financial deals.

As students, we feel the impact of Wall Street every time we pay tuition. We put ourselves in thousands of dollars of debt to pay for school, but because most university borrowing is backed by student tuition, this personal debt simply begets institutional debt. All this borrowing means huge profits for the banks that finance debt, much of it coming from hidden fees and inflated payments on long-term deals with our schools.

However, as students we also have the unique opportunity to band together and make our collective voice heard. For a few years our well-being is the primary focus of a massive anchor institution, and our dollars are often the main source of its funding. We can demand better than the status quo by pressuring our schools to reclaim that money from wealthy bankers and put it back into our institutions.

If borrowing from the big banks was on fair terms and intended for long-term capital projects, it wouldn’t be a problem. Unfortunately, instead of using our nation’s wealth to pay for education, increase our human and physical capital, and build our long-run potential for growth, we are using it to increase incomes for the wealthiest bankers.

We've reached a worst-case scenario, but it doesn't have to stay that way. By holding Wall Street accountable for how it plays with tuition and tax dollars, we can bring things back around so that public investment means improving society, not improving Wall Street's balances.

Dominic Russell is a sophomore at the University of Michigan and the Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network's Policy Impact Coordinator for the Midwest. Ryan Thornton is a junior and Campus Network chapter head at George Mason University.

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Dissent Masthead and Also Sign Up For My New Newsletter!

Apr 10, 2015Mike Konczal

Two bits of exciting news this week.

First, I'm starting a biweekly newsletter. It'll have what I'm up to, including all the things I've been writing, collected into one place. It'll also have my favorite stuff I've read, random personal stories, and more. (Blame Google Reader for this I suppose.) Oh, and pictures of my dog too. Given the rate at which I'm writing it's probably more of an every other week update; we'll see how it goes. But for now, sign up!

Second, I'm joining the masthead at Dissent as a contributing editor. Here is the annoucement; I was happy to join even before I knew the excellent people they were bringing on board. Nothing much changes for me, I just get to formalize my relationship with the brilliant team they've built over there and help make it a standard for left thought going forward.

I also have a review of Naomi Murakawa's new book on liberal punishment in the latest issue. This newest issue is excellent, but the piece on the assistant economy by Francesca Mari is one of the most bizarre and enlightening business pieces I've read recently. Also check out Sarah Jaffe on punk rock feminism and the left once it's out from the paywall (or better, subscribe!).

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
 
  

 

Two bits of exciting news this week.

First, I'm starting a biweekly newsletter. It'll have what I'm up to, including all the things I've been writing, collected into one place. It'll also have my favorite stuff I've read, random personal stories, and more. (Blame Google Reader for this I suppose.) Oh, and pictures of my dog too. Given the rate at which I'm writing it's probably more of an every other week update; we'll see how it goes. But for now, sign up!

Second, I'm joining the masthead at Dissent as a contributing editor. Here is the annoucement; I was happy to join even before I knew the excellent people they were bringing on board. Nothing much changes for me, I just get to formalize my relationship with the brilliant team they've built over there and help make it a standard for left thought going forward.

I also have a review of Naomi Murakawa's new book on liberal punishment in the latest issue. This newest issue is excellent, but the piece on the assistant economy by Francesca Mari is one of the most bizarre and enlightening business pieces I've read recently. Also check out Sarah Jaffe on punk rock feminism and the left once it's out from the paywall (or better, subscribe!).

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
 
  

 

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How the End of GE Capital Also Kills the Core Conservative Talking Point About Dodd-Frank

Apr 10, 2015Mike Konczal

News is breaking that GE Capital will be spinning off most of its financing arm, GE Capital, over the next two years. Details are still unfolding, but, according to the initial coverage, “GE expects that by 2018 more than 90 percent of its earnings will be generated by its high-return industrial businesses, up from 58% in 2014.”

It’s good that our industrial businesses will be focusing more on innovating and services rather than financial shenanigans, but this also tells us two important things about Dodd-Frank: it confirms one of the stories about the Act and disproves the core conservative talking point about what the Act does.

Regulatory Arbitrage

A very influential theory of the financial crisis is that there were financial firms acting just like banks but without the normal safeguards that traditionally went with banks. There was no public source of liquidity or backstops through the FDIC or the Federal Reserve, a public good capable of ending self-fulfilling panics. There was no mechanism to wind down the firms and impose losses outside of the bankruptcy code. There weren’t the normal capital requirements or consumer protections that went with the traditional commercial banking sector.

Though we now call this regulatory arbitrage, at the time it was seen as innovation. GE Capital was explicitly brought up as a poster child for deregulation. You can see it in Bob Litan  and Jonathan Rauch’s 1998 American Finance for the 21st Century, which lamented the “twentieth-century model of financial policy” that, using transportation as an analogy, “set a slow speed limit, specified a few basic models for cars, separated different kinds of cars into different lanes, and demanded that no one leave home without a full tank of gas and a tune-up.” GE Capital was explicitly an example of a firm that could thrive with a regulatory regime that “focuses less on preventing mishaps and more on ensuring that an accident at any one intersection will not paralyze traffic everywhere else.”

This was very apparent in the regulatory space. The fact that GE owned a Utah savings and loan allowed it to be regulated under the leniency of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), so it was able to work in the banking space without the normal rules in place. It was also able to use its high-level industrial credit rating to gamble weaker positions in the financial markets, arbitraging the private-sector regulation of the credit ratings agencies in the process.

How did that work out? First off, there was massive fraud. As Michael Hudson found in a blockbuster report, one executive declared that “fraud pays” and that “it didn’t make sense to slow the gush of loans going through the company’s pipeline, because losses due to fraud were small compared to the money the lender was making from selling huge volumes of loans.” Then there were the bailouts. The government backstopped $139 billion worth of GE Capital’s debts as it was collapsing and essentially had to manipulate the regulatory space to allow it to qualify for traditional banking protections. So much for not paralyzing traffic, and so much for the old rules not being important.

Dodd-Frank looked to normalize these regulations across both the shadow and regular banking sectors. It eliminated the OTS and declared GE Capital a systemically risky firm that has to follow higher capital requirements and prepare for bankruptcy with living wills just like we expect a bank to do, regardless of what kind of legal hijinks it is using to call itself something else. And GE Capital, faced with the prospect of having to play in the same field as everyone else, decided it should go back to trying to bring better things to life rather than making financial weapons of mass destruction. That’s pretty good news, and a process that should be encouraged and continued.

The Collapse of the Conservative Argument

But there’s one ask GE has as it spins off GE Capital, one that actually disproves the core conservative argument on Dodd-Frank. In the coverage, GE Chairman and CEO Jeff Immelt states directly, “GE will work closely with [the regulators at the Financial Stability Oversight Council] to take the actions necessary to de-designate GE Capital as a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI).”

Dodd-Frank designates certain financial institutions, mostly over $50 billion in size, as systemically important. Or as the lingo goes, they get designated SIFI status. Those firms have stronger capital requirements and stronger requirements to be able to declare themselves ready for bankruptcy or FDIC resolution if they fail.

Conservatives, from the beginning, have made this the centerpiece of their story about Dodd-Frank. They argue that SIFI status is a de facto permanent bailout and claim that firms will demand to be designated as SIFIs because it means they will have a favored status. This status gives them easy crony relationships with regulators and allow them to borrow cheaply in the credit markets.

This has become doctrine on the right; I can’t think of a single movement conservative who has said the opposite. Examples of the mantra range from Peter Wallison of AEI writing “[t]he designation of SIFIs is a statement by the government that the designated firms are too big to fail” to Reason’s Nick Gillespie repeating that “everyone agrees [Dodd-Frank] has simply reinscribed too big to fail as explicit law.” (I love an “everyone agrees” without any sourcing.)

It’s also the basis of proposed policy. The Ryan budget cancels out the FDIC’s ability to regulate SIFIs, stating that Dodd-Frank “actually intensifies the problem of too-big-to-fail by giving large, interconnected financial institutions advantages that small firms will not enjoy.”

If that’s the case, GE should be desperate to maintain its SIFI status even though it is spinning off its GE Capital line. After all, being a SIFI means it gets all kinds of favored protections, access, and credit relative to other firms.

But, instead GE is desperate to lose it. This is genuine; ask any financial press reporter or analyst, and they’ll tell you that GE is very sincere when it says it doesn’t want to be designated as risky anymore, and is willing to take appropriate measures to remove the designation.

If that’s the case, what’s left of the GOP argument?

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
 
  

 

News is breaking that GE Capital will be spinning off most of its financing arm, GE Capital, over the next two years. Details are still unfolding, but, according to the initial coverage, “GE expects that by 2018 more than 90 percent of its earnings will be generated by its high-return industrial businesses, up from 58% in 2014.”

It’s good that our industrial businesses will be focusing more on innovating and services rather than financial shenanigans, but this also tells us two important things about Dodd-Frank: it confirms one of the stories about the Act and disproves the core conservative talking point about what the Act does.

Regulatory Arbitrage

A very influential theory of the financial crisis is that there were financial firms acting just like banks but without the normal safeguards that traditionally went with banks. There was no public source of liquidity or backstops through the FDIC or the Federal Reserve, a public good capable of ending self-fulfilling panics. There was no mechanism to wind down the firms and impose losses outside of the bankruptcy code. There weren’t the normal capital requirements or consumer protections that went with the traditional commercial banking sector.

Though we now call this regulatory arbitrage, at the time it was seen as innovation. GE Capital was explicitly brought up as a poster child for deregulation. You can see it in Bob Litan  and Jonathan Rauch’s 1998 American Finance for the 21st Century, which lamented the “twentieth-century model of financial policy” that, using transportation as an analogy, “set a slow speed limit, specified a few basic models for cars, separated different kinds of cars into different lanes, and demanded that no one leave home without a full tank of gas and a tune-up.” GE Capital was explicitly an example of a firm that could thrive with a regulatory regime that “focuses less on preventing mishaps and more on ensuring that an accident at any one intersection will not paralyze traffic everywhere else.”

This was very apparent in the regulatory space. The fact that GE owned a Utah savings and loan allowed it to be regulated under the leniency of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), so it was able to work in the banking space without the normal rules in place. It was also able to use its high-level industrial credit rating to gamble weaker positions in the financial markets, arbitraging the private-sector regulation of the credit ratings agencies in the process.

How did that work out? First off, there was massive fraud. As Michael Hudson found in a blockbuster report, one executive declared that “fraud pays” and that “it didn’t make sense to slow the gush of loans going through the company’s pipeline, because losses due to fraud were small compared to the money the lender was making from selling huge volumes of loans.” Then there were the bailouts. The government backstopped $139 billion worth of GE Capital’s debts as it was collapsing and essentially had to manipulate the regulatory space to allow it to qualify for traditional banking protections. So much for not paralyzing traffic, and so much for the old rules not being important.

Dodd-Frank looked to normalize these regulations across both the shadow and regular banking sectors. It eliminated the OTS and declared GE Capital a systemically risky firm that has to follow higher capital requirements and prepare for bankruptcy with living wills just like we expect a bank to do, regardless of what kind of legal hijinks it is using to call itself something else. And GE Capital, faced with the prospect of having to play in the same field as everyone else, decided it should go back to trying to bring better things to life rather than making financial weapons of mass destruction. That’s pretty good news, and a process that should be encouraged and continued.

The Collapse of the Conservative Argument

But there’s one ask GE has as it spins off GE Capital, one that actually disproves the core conservative argument on Dodd-Frank. In the coverage, GE Chairman and CEO Jeff Immelt states directly, “GE will work closely with [the regulators at the Financial Stability Oversight Council] to take the actions necessary to de-designate GE Capital as a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI).”

Dodd-Frank designates certain financial institutions, mostly over $50 billion in size, as systemically important. Or as the lingo goes, they get designated SIFI status. Those firms have stronger capital requirements and stronger requirements to be able to declare themselves ready for bankruptcy or FDIC resolution if they fail.

Conservatives, from the beginning, have made this the centerpiece of their story about Dodd-Frank. They argue that SIFI status is a de facto permanent bailout and claim that firms will demand to be designated as SIFIs because it means they will have a favored status. This status gives them easy crony relationships with regulators and allow them to borrow cheaply in the credit markets.

This has become doctrine on the right; I can’t think of a single movement conservative who has said the opposite. Examples of the mantra range from Peter Wallison of AEI writing “[t]he designation of SIFIs is a statement by the government that the designated firms are too big to fail” to Reason’s Nick Gillespie repeating that “everyone agrees [Dodd-Frank] has simply reinscribed too big to fail as explicit law.” (I love an “everyone agrees” without any sourcing.)

It’s also the basis of proposed policy. The Ryan budget cancels out the FDIC’s ability to regulate SIFIs, stating that Dodd-Frank “actually intensifies the problem of too-big-to-fail by giving large, interconnected financial institutions advantages that small firms will not enjoy.”

If that’s the case, GE should be desperate to maintain its SIFI status even though it is spinning off its GE Capital line. After all, being a SIFI means it gets all kinds of favored protections, access, and credit relative to other firms.

But, instead GE is desperate to lose it. This is genuine; ask any financial press reporter or analyst, and they’ll tell you that GE is very sincere when it says it doesn’t want to be designated as risky anymore, and is willing to take appropriate measures to remove the designation.

If that’s the case, what’s left of the GOP argument?

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Is the Solution for Jamie Dimon's Next Financial Crisis a Larger US Deficit?

Apr 10, 2015Mike Konczal

In JPMorgan’s latest shareholder newsletter (p. 30-34), Jamie Dimon walks through a narrative of the next financial crisis and why we should be worried about it. But instead of worrying, I think it points to interesting details of what we’ve learned from the last crisis, what we evidently haven’t learned, and where we should go next.

Here’s Matt Levine’s summary. Dimon makes two arguments: First, the new capital requirements, especially the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) that requires banks to fund themselves with enough liquidity to survive a 30-day crisis, will be procyclical. This means they will bind the financial sector more tightly in a crisis and prevent it from being a backstop. This is made even worse by his second argument, which is that there’s a safe asset shortage. Each individual bank is much safer than before the crisis, but using safe assets to meet the LCR means there will be fewer out there to provide stabilization when a crisis hits.

To use Dimon’s language, “there is a greatly reduced supply of Treasuries to go around – in effect, there may be a shortage of all forms of good collateral” in a crisis. Meanwhile, new capital requirements, especially the LCR, mean that in a crisis banks won’t want to lend, roll over credit, or purchase risky assets, because they would be violating the new capital rules. As such, “it will be harder for banks either as lenders or market-makers to ‘stand against the tide’” and to serve as “the ‘lender of last resort’ to their clients.”

What should we make of the fact that Dimon’s target is the LCR, an important new requirement under constant assault by the banks? Four points jump out.

The first is that the idea that we should weaken capital requirements so banks can be the lender of last resort in a financial crisis is precisely what was disproven during the 2008 panic. One reason people use the term “shadow banking” to describe this system is that it has no actual means of providing liquidity and the backstops necessary to prevent self-fulfilling panics, and that was demonstrated during the recent crisis.

Rather than financial firms heroically standing against the tide of a financial panic, they all immediately ran for shelter, forcing the Federal Reserve to stand up instead and create a de facto lender-of-last-resort facility for shadow banks out of thin air.

It’s good to hear that Dimon feels JPMorgan can still fulfill this function in the next crisis, if only we weakened Basel. But we’ve tried before to let financial firms act as the ultimate backstop to the markets while the government got out of the way, and it was a disaster. Firms like AIG wrote systemic risk insurance they could never pay; even interbank lending collapsed in the crisis.

This is precisely why we need to continue regulating the shadow banking sector and reducing reliance and risks in the wholesale short-term funding markets, and why the Federal Reserve should actually write the rules governing emergency liquidity services instead of ignoring what Congress has demanded of it. No doubt there needs to be a balance, but if anything we are counting too much on the shadow banking sector to be able to take care of itself, not too little.

As a quick, frustrating second point, it’s funny that regulators bent over backwards for the financial industry in addressing these issues with LCR, and yet the industry won’t give an inch in trying to dismantle it. That LCR is meant to adjust in a crisis and that the funds would be available for lending was emphasized when regulators weakened the rule under bank pressure, and it is explicitly stated in the final rule (“the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework indicates that supervisory actions should not discourage or deter a banking organization from using its HQLA when necessary to meet unforeseen liquidity needs arising from financial stress that exceeds normal business fluctuations”).

If risk-weighting is too procyclical, which requires several logical leaps in Dimon’s arguments, the solution is to adjust those rules while raising the leverage ratio, not to pretend that the financial sector would be a sufficient ultimate backstop. Bank comments on tough rules like LCR are less give-and-take and more take-and-take.

But the third point is more interesting. Beyond whether or not the rules are too procyclical and unnecessarily restrictive in a crisis, there’s Dimon’s claim that there aren’t enough Treasuries to go around. If that’s the case, why don’t we simply make more Treasury debt? If the issue is a shortage of Treasuries needed to keep the financial sector well-capitalized and safe, it’s quite easy for us to make more government debt. And right now, with low interest rates and a desperate need for public investment, strikes me as an excellent time to do just that. Dimon is correct in his implicit idea that the financial markets, with enough financial engineering and private-market backstopping, can produce genuinely safe assets is a complete sham. This is a role for the government.

And for fun, a fourth point from Ben Walsh: Dimon says one of the biggest threats to the financial markets is that there isn’t enough U.S. debt. From January 2011: “Dimon Says Government Deficits, Spending Are New Global Risk.” We are risking a major rise in interest rates in the years following 2011 if we have trillion-dollar deficits, Dimon warned. How did that turn out?

Imagine how much worse shape we’d be in if we’d listened to Dimon.

So just as a friendly reminder: not only would more federal debt issued at incredibly low rates do cool things like rebuild schools, fix bridges, and give money to poor people, it would also serve as an important element of reducing the risks of the next financial crisis. This federal debt seems like a pretty useful thing to have around.

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In JPMorgan’s latest shareholder newsletter (p. 30-34), Jamie Dimon walks through a narrative of the next financial crisis and why we should be worried about it. But instead of worrying, I think it points to interesting details of what we’ve learned from the last crisis, what we evidently haven’t learned, and where we should go next.

Here’s Matt Levine’s summary. Dimon makes two arguments: First, the new capital requirements, especially the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) that requires banks to fund themselves with enough liquidity to survive a 30-day crisis, will be procyclical. This means they will bind the financial sector more tightly in a crisis and prevent it from being a backstop. This is made even worse by his second argument, which is that there’s a safe asset shortage. Each individual bank is much safer than before the crisis, but using safe assets to meet the LCR means there will be fewer out there to provide stabilization when a crisis hits.

To use Dimon’s language, “there is a greatly reduced supply of Treasuries to go around – in effect, there may be a shortage of all forms of good collateral” in a crisis. Meanwhile, new capital requirements, especially the LCR, mean that in a crisis banks won’t want to lend, roll over credit, or purchase risky assets, because they would be violating the new capital rules. As such, “it will be harder for banks either as lenders or market-makers to ‘stand against the tide’” and to serve as “the ‘lender of last resort’ to their clients.”

What should we make of the fact that Dimon’s target is the LCR, an important new requirement under constant assault by the banks? Four points jump out.

The first is that the idea that we should weaken capital requirements so banks can be the lender of last resort in a financial crisis is precisely what was disproven during the 2008 panic. One reason people use the term “shadow banking” to describe this system is that it has no actual means of providing liquidity and the backstops necessary to prevent self-fulfilling panics, and that was demonstrated during the recent crisis.

Rather than financial firms heroically standing against the tide of a financial panic, they all immediately ran for shelter, forcing the Federal Reserve to stand up instead and create a de facto lender-of-last-resort facility for shadow banks out of thin air.

It’s good to hear that Dimon feels JPMorgan can still fulfill this function in the next crisis, if only we weakened Basel. But we’ve tried before to let financial firms act as the ultimate backstop to the markets while the government got out of the way, and it was a disaster. Firms like AIG wrote systemic risk insurance they could never pay; even interbank lending collapsed in the crisis.

This is precisely why we need to continue regulating the shadow banking sector and reducing reliance and risks in the wholesale short-term funding markets, and why the Federal Reserve should actually write the rules governing emergency liquidity services instead of ignoring what Congress has demanded of it. No doubt there needs to be a balance, but if anything we are counting too much on the shadow banking sector to be able to take care of itself, not too little.

As a quick, frustrating second point, it’s funny that regulators bent over backwards for the financial industry in addressing these issues with LCR, and yet the industry won’t give an inch in trying to dismantle it. That LCR is meant to adjust in a crisis and that the funds would be available for lending was emphasized when regulators weakened the rule under bank pressure, and it is explicitly stated in the final rule (“the Basel III Revised Liquidity Framework indicates that supervisory actions should not discourage or deter a banking organization from using its HQLA when necessary to meet unforeseen liquidity needs arising from financial stress that exceeds normal business fluctuations”).

If risk-weighting is too procyclical, which requires several logical leaps in Dimon’s arguments, the solution is to adjust those rules while raising the leverage ratio, not to pretend that the financial sector would be a sufficient ultimate backstop. Bank comments on tough rules like LCR are less give-and-take and more take-and-take.

But the third point is more interesting. Beyond whether or not the rules are too procyclical and unnecessarily restrictive in a crisis, there’s Dimon’s claim that there aren’t enough Treasuries to go around. If that’s the case, why don’t we simply make more Treasury debt? If the issue is a shortage of Treasuries needed to keep the financial sector well-capitalized and safe, it’s quite easy for us to make more government debt. And right now, with low interest rates and a desperate need for public investment, strikes me as an excellent time to do just that. Dimon is correct in his implicit idea that the financial markets, with enough financial engineering and private-market backstopping, can produce genuinely safe assets is a complete sham. This is a role for the government.

And for fun, a fourth point from Ben Walsh: Dimon says one of the biggest threats to the financial markets is that there isn’t enough U.S. debt. From January 2011: “Dimon Says Government Deficits, Spending Are New Global Risk.” We are risking a major rise in interest rates in the years following 2011 if we have trillion-dollar deficits, Dimon warned. How did that turn out?

Imagine how much worse shape we’d be in if we’d listened to Dimon.

So just as a friendly reminder: not only would more federal debt issued at incredibly low rates do cool things like rebuild schools, fix bridges, and give money to poor people, it would also serve as an important element of reducing the risks of the next financial crisis. This federal debt seems like a pretty useful thing to have around.

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Felicia Wong: To Build a Better Economy, We Must Close the Racial Wealth Gap

Apr 9, 2015Laurie Ignacio

Our ongoing series about the good economy continues with a video featuring Roosevelt President and CEO Felicia Wong. When asked about what she would do to ensure a good economy in 25 years, she says her top priority is closing the racial wealth gap. After examining wealth over generations, she finds that wealth, more than income, is the most important factor that determines whether people can make it to the middle class and succeed.

Our ongoing series about the good economy continues with a video featuring Roosevelt President and CEO Felicia Wong. When asked about what she would do to ensure a good economy in 25 years, she says her top priority is closing the racial wealth gap. After examining wealth over generations, she finds that wealth, more than income, is the most important factor that determines whether people can make it to the middle class and succeed.

To learn more about the racial wealth gap, check out the following articles:

The Racial Wealth Gap Is Three Times Greater Than the Racial Income Gap

Today’s racial wealth gap is wider than in the 1960s

Wealth inequality has widened along racial, ethnic lines since end of Great Recession

Felicia Wong is the President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute, which seeks to re-imagine the social and economic policies of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt for the 21st century. Felicia came to the Institute from the Democracy Alliance, where she led the development and assessment of the organization’s strategic investment portfolio. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Her doctoral dissertation on the role of race and framing in K-12 public education politics received the 2000 American Political Science Association award in Race, Ethnicity, and Politics.

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The Austerity Agenda Was Unopposed in the Chicago Mayoral Election

Apr 9, 2015Saqib Bhatti

Rahm Emanuel's victory shows Chicago's progressive movement still needs to do more to advance a real alternative to austerity economics.

Rahm Emanuel's victory shows Chicago's progressive movement still needs to do more to advance a real alternative to austerity economics.

On Tuesday night, Chicago voters reelected Mayor Rahm Emanuel in a race that was widely perceived as a showdown between the neoliberal and progressive wings of the Democratic Party. However, the election outcome should not be seen as a rejection of a real progressive agenda with alternatives to austerity. Emanuel defeated Jesus “Chuy” Garcia at the ballot box by turning the election into a referendum on Garcia’s financial chops. Even though voters were weary of Emanuel’s “tough medicine” approach to the city’s financial problems, Garcia failed to lay out a fundamentally different view of the problems underpinning the city’s budget and the solutions needed to get the city back on a solid financial footing, and voters opted for the devil they knew over the one they didn’t.

When Moody’s downgrades the credit ratings of a city and its mayor-controlled school and park districts less than six weeks before a mayoral election, as it did with Chicago, it should typically spell disaster for the incumbent. But Emanuel managed to turn it around on Garcia and hammered away at him for not having a concrete plan to fix the city’s financial crisis. It was true—Garcia did not clearly articulate a financial plan to fix the city’s budget and merely hinted that he might have to enact his own set of painful cuts if he were elected. However, this line of attack papered over the fact that the financial problems that the next mayor would have to tackle were inherited from Emanuel.

The Emanuel administration has closed 50 schools and six mental health clinics, slashed the libraries budget, hoarded funds intended for public housing, overseen privatization schemes that increased user costs, and installed red-light and speeding cameras in order to bring in additional revenue. Not only has Emanuel tried to plug budget holes by cutting services working people rely on, but those policies have actually failed to get the city’s finances back on track. After all, the credit rating downgrades came after these policies were enacted. Meanwhile, he has let the city’s corporate elite off the hook by refusing to take actions like cutting tax subsidies to large, profitable companies downtown or filing legal claims against banks that illegally sold predatory financial deals to the city and school district.

Chicagoans’ dissatisfaction with the mayor’s downtown-first approach led to the historic runoff, but Garcia seemed reluctant to put forth proposals that would have forced big downtown corporations to pay their fair share. He held a series of press conferences challenging predatory financial deals and costly gimmicks like toxic interest rate swaps and social impact bonds, and he announced his support for a financial transactions tax on Chicago’s financial exchanges, but these proposals were never part of a coherent strategy to change the terms of the budget conversation in the city.

Garcia’s failure to put forward a strong plan allowed Emanuel to take his greatest weakness—his financial record of making Chicago’s most vulnerable residents pay for tax breaks for his biggest campaign donors and their businesses—and turn it into his greatest strength. Even though Emanuel himself did not put forth any real financial plan either, he was able to slam Garcia for having a weak and insufficient one, and amplified his message with a relentless onslaught of attack ads on TV.

The austerity agenda that marked Emanuel’s first term came to be seen as the only viable framework for fixing the city’s budget woes. Garcia’s plan was not strong and comprehensive enough to pull the public discourse in the other direction, so Emanuel and the monied interests downtown were able to successfully advance a narrative that Chicago had no choice but to enact painful cuts, especially to city workers’ pensions, and that Emanuel was the only candidate willing to make the unpopular decisions necessary to save the city from a Detroit-style bankruptcy. This theoretical framework, pitting teachers against students and city workers against the communities they serve, went large uncontested by Garcia. But under that paradigm, Chicago’s richest 1 percent got a free pass.

Chicagoans need a new paradigm that unites working families across the city behind a financial plan that puts neighborhoods first. This includes taking legal action to recover up to $1.2 billion from toxic swaps. It includes demanding that banks share in the sacrifices that all Chicagoans are being asked to make by reducing fees by 20 percent. It includes hiring in-house investment managers to invest pension fund dollars instead of overpaying private equity firms like Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner’s GTCR Capital and hedge funds like Ken Griffin’s Citadel Investment Group. It includes ending the practice of diverting tax dollars from struggling neighborhoods to subsidize profitable downtown corporations.

The city also needs to work toward longer-term structural solutions to shift the balance of power in Chicago back toward the neighborhoods. This includes enacting a financial transactions tax on speculative trading at the financial exchanges on LaSalle Street and making Chicago’s millionaires pay their fair share by implementing a graduated city income tax. It also means establishing a public bank that is owned by taxpayers, can provide fair banking services to municipalities, and can stimulate local economic development in Chicago’s neighborhoods.

Finally, Chicago also needs to partner with other cities to form a consumers’ union to bargain with Wall Street for substantially lower banking fees. Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York together do nearly $600 billion of business with Wall Street every year. That is more than the GDP of Sweden. If they flexed their muscles, they could change the landscape of municipal finance.

It says a lot about our national economic discourse that in a historic election that revolved around a major city’s finances, neither candidate even began to challenge the assumptions underlying the austerity paradigm. Of course, candidates for elected office rarely define the political discourse in a vacuum, but rather respond to and try to shape the issues that are percolating. In that sense, it is unfair to simply say that Garcia failed to present a compelling alternative to Emanuel’s austerity agenda. The reality is that while Chicago’s progressive movement has grown more sophisticated and organized over the past four years, it has yet to successfully push back on the prevailing narrative advanced by the mainstream press and Chicago’s political and business elite. That narrative holds that what’s good for downtown is also good for the neighborhoods, and that the city cannot afford to upset the wealthy or they will pack up their bags and move to Indiana (yes, Indiana), taking thousands of jobs with them.

If we want to see real change, then we need to change the budget conversation in Chicago and elsewhere in the country. We should not be talking about what cities should cut to make ends meet, but rather about how cities can raise enough money to pay for the quality services that residents need. Only then can we put cities like Chicago on a path toward long-term fiscal sustainability while also paving the way for shared prosperity in working-class communities.

Saqib Bhatti is a Roosevelt Institute Fellow and Director of the ReFund America Project.

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Why Is Lehman Brothers Suing Georgetown from Beyond the Grave?

Apr 9, 2015Alan SmithAditya Pande

The ghost of Lehman Brothers is still haunting colleges and universities around the country, continuing to extract money from institutions even though the financial firm itself is long dead.

The ghost of Lehman Brothers is still haunting colleges and universities around the country, continuing to extract money from institutions even though the financial firm itself is long dead.

When Lehman Brothers Holdings declared bankruptcy in 2008, it was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States. The giant’s collapse was felt in all corners of the global economy, but at least that collapse was thought to be a thing of the past. Now, it turns out that Lehman Brothers lingers on as a bankruptcy group trying to collect debts from the schools it already fleeced in 2008.

In St. Louis, the haunting is public: Lehman is suing St. Louis University because it doesn’t feel the school paid a fair market value (equivalent to the termination fee at a given time) on some interest rate swap derivatives in 2008.

Let’s look at that transaction: the school paid about $25 million in early termination fees on its interest rate swaps.* SLU didn’t necessarily want to bail out of these swaps, even though they were costing the school millions; it had to terminate them because Lehman Brothers, the counterparty to the deals, was going belly up. But in a lawsuit filed in December 2014, Lehman alleges that SLU’s termination payments were short of market value and that Lehman is in fact owed another $17.5 million on these swaps. 

Let's say that again: These swaps triggered in 2008 because of the Lehman bankruptcy. The school had to pay a termination fee because the firm that owned the swaps had effectively ceased to exist. And now that firm is suing the school because it wasn’t adequately compensated for its own failure.

Here’s where the story (and related research by the Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network) gets really interesting: The ghost of Lehman isn’t just in St. Louis. Looking at the financial records of Georgetown University, there appears to be a similar story playing out in private but with even larger stakes.

Georgetown’s financials from 1998 onward are rife with big bond projects, but for now let’s focus specifically on auction rate security (ARS) bonds. These are economic devices where the interest rate paid on the bond is regularly reset through a public auction. The theory was that these auctions would allow the market to drive the interest rates to the lowest possible bidder each period; some even reset every week. These bonds were being marketed (sometimes by Lehman Brothers) as a highly liquid way to get some safe cash.

We’ve since learned that nothing could be further from the truth, as the rate markets for ARS bonds locked up in 2008 and borrowers like Georgetown were stuck paying double-digit interest rates. These bonds were more than simply investments that didn’t pan out; banks that sold the ARS bonds were also propping up the market by bidding on the rates in their own auctions, which created a false impression for buyers that the market was stable. These were bad deals made worse by illegal activity, and universities and municipalities across the country were suckered into them. When the banks eventually stopped keeping the market afloat, most such auctions failed, and the ARS market has been largely frozen since.

Although Georgetown is now almost entirely out of the ARS market and has brought down its variable-rate debt, getting rid of these increasingly expensive ARS bonds appears to have cost the schools millions in fees and even more in borrowing to pay off that debt.  Some of those bonds were underwritten by Lehman; some by other investment banks.

None of this even begins to capture the costs of the swaps, which is where this story started. The ARS bonds were cheap but had highly volatile interest rates. To mitigate these risky fluctuations, Georgetown bought interest rate swaps with Lehman Brothers. But like SLU, Georgetown did not realize it had made a deal with a potentially catastrophic downside. As the economy went into a tailspin in 2008, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to the bone and has kept them low since; money became available for next to nothing in an attempt to keep banks from freezing up completely. This also served to drive the fair value of interest rate swaps through the roof. The worse the economy got, the more the fair market value of Georgetown’s debt hedges grew. A final insult: As the ARS rates locked up ever higher, the floating index rates that the swaps were indexed to went down, so Georgetown was losing money on every part of every deal.

And finally, finally, Lehman Brothers, which had sold swaps to so many different colleges and universities around the country, went out of business, which resulted in Georgetown having to pay Lehman more than $53 million to terminate the seven swaps it had on May 12, 2009—again, swaps that were meant to hedge against the risky ARS bonds that were also, in some cases, sold by Lehman.

Fast forward to 2012, and a lawsuit from Lehman Brothers appears on Georgetown’s financial documents. This lawsuit is only mentioned in the financial statements and has not yet gone public, so we cannot say with certainty that the story is the same as in St. Louis. However, it appears as if the disparity between the “fair market value” calculation of what the swaps were worth in 2008 and the eventual payment Georgetown made to Lehman is about the same as in the SLU case.

For those keeping score at home, this means that Georgetown was hemorrhaging money to Lehman Brothers in at least four different ways:

  1. ARS bonds marketed by Lehman cost the university $6 million in interest rates and $8.34 million in debt restructuring costs.
  2. Approximately $77.8 million in payments on the seven interest rate swaps terminated in May 2009.
  3. More than $53.4 million in swap termination fees.
  4. Though still unconfirmed, all signs point to a lawsuit from Lehman to recoup what it claims are underpayments on the “market rate” of its swaps.

The full cost is probably even higher, as these calculations do not account for the fees Georgetown paid each time it got into a bond deal, nor for other deals that Lehman did not underwrite. Still, the bill is already north of $140 million, and we’ve only been looking at publicly available records.

It certainly seems as though Georgetown was hard done by in this case, and we plan to continue our research until we can present a full tally of how much Georgetown has lost and is continuing to lose to Wall Street.

Why does this matter? After all, Georgetown is a stable institution—not like Sweet Briar or liberal arts schools, where losses in the hundreds of millions could mean the difference between solvency and closing their doors. Neither is this a public institution, where public tax dollars are being funneled into Lehman’s grave. But even a storied private institution like Georgetown is feeling the pinch of millions of dollars being extracted, and that pinch is being passed on to students.

Tuition and fees will increase 4 percent at Georgetown next year, contributing to a nearly 40 percent increase since 2006 that shows no signs of slowing down. While there are many factors in the rapid rise of education costs borne by America’s students, including the “amenities arms race” and administrative bloat, the massive debt private colleges like Georgetown have accrued and the unbelievably expensive financial engineering that has come with it deserve a lion’s share of the blame. Lehman Brothers, having already managed to scrape more than $140 million from Georgetown’s coffers, is audacious in asking for more from beyond the grave. We must be equally audacious in demanding that Wall Street pay some part of the bill it’s left students since 2008.

Is your college or nonprofit involved in an ongoing lawsuit with Lehman Brothers? Let us know!

*Interest rate swaps are a type of derivative that allows an institution to lock in a loan at a fixed rate by “swapping” its existing variable-rate loan with a bank, an idea that becomes particularly toxic when the market crashes and interest rates plummet like they did post-2008. It’s the equivalent of taking out a mortgage at 5 percent a year and then finding out the next day that mortgages are now available at 1 percent. But, unlike mortgages, swaps cannot be refinanced or even “paid off” at will. To do so, one must pay an expensive termination fee equal to the total amount the bank expects to make over the entire life of the swap. It was a lose/lose proposition for the school once its bet that interest rates would stay high didn’t work out. 

Alan Smith is the Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network's Associate Director of Networked Initiatives.

Aditya Pande is a freshman in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he studies international economics.

Thanks to Carrie Sloan and Alexandros Taliadoros for their contributions to this post.

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What Policies Do Young People Want? Let Them Tell You.

Apr 8, 2015Joelle Gamble

As another presidential campaign season heats up, and candidates scrambled to create messaging, structures, and even gimmicks and swag in an attempt to engage young people, I can’t help but think about why we do what we do here at Roosevelt.

As another presidential campaign season heats up, and candidates scrambled to create messaging, structures, and even gimmicks and swag in an attempt to engage young people, I can’t help but think about why we do what we do here at Roosevelt.

Young people on college campuses are often asked to make phone calls, knock on doors, and campaign for existing agendas, but they’re rarely asked about their own policy ideas. Since 2004, we have been working to change that norm. At its core, the Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network seeks to defy the public’s expectations of young people in politics today.

Over the past 10 years, we have built an engaged, community-driven network of students who are committed to using policy to transform their cities and states now and build the foundation for a sustainable future. We believe that broader participation in the policy process will not only improve representation but produce more creative ideas with the potential for real impact.

In this year’s 10 ideas journals, we present some of most promising and innovative ideas from students in our network. With chapters on 120 campuses in 38 states, from Los Angeles, California, to Conway, Arkansas, to New York City, we have the potential to effect policy ideas that transcend the parameters of our current national debate. Our student authors push for practical, community-focused solutions, from using pavement to improve sanitation in Louisville, Kentucky, to creating community benefit agreements for publicly funded stadiums in Lansing, Michigan, to building workforce development programs for agricultural literacy in Athens, Georgia. 

Policy matters most when we take it beyond the page and bring it to the communities and institutions that can turn it into reality. Many of the students in this year’s publication have committed to pressing for impact. They’re connecting with decision-makers in city halls and state capitols, armed with the power of their own ideas. 

The next generation of innovative minds and passionate advocates is here, and it’s changing this country one idea at a time.

Check 'em out!

Joelle Gamble is the National Director of the Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network.

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Tobacco Settlement Funds Should Be Used to Fight Smoking in North Carolina

Mar 31, 2015Emily Cerciello

North Carolina continues to risk the health and economic wellbeing of its residents by refusing to use Master Settlement Agreement funds for tobacco prevention and control.

North Carolina continues to risk the health and economic wellbeing of its residents by refusing to use Master Settlement Agreement funds for tobacco prevention and control.

Over the last 50 years, more than 20 million Americans have died prematurely as a result of smoking or exposure to second-hand smoke. In the same time period, however, societal attitudes towards smoking have shifted from acceptance of its regularity to disapproval of the behavior as a harmful addiction. Driven largely by a growing body of research illuminating the adverse health effects of smoking and the implementation of widespread interventions that discourage tobacco use, the United States has experienced significant declines in the prevalence of smoking since the 1960s. Despite these successes, one in five adults in North Carolina continues to smoke cigarettes regularly, making North Carolina the 14th highest in smoking prevalence nationwide.

Every year, North Carolina receives $140 million in state funds from the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, which requires tobacco companies to compensate tobacco-producing states for tobacco-related illnesses. These funds were intended to be used for youth tobacco prevention and control, but due to flexibility in the wording of the agreement, North Carolina has been able to send most of this money to a general fund. North Carolina even sent $42 million in settlement funds to tobacco farmers for marketing and equipment improvements. In 2014, North Carolina was the leading tobacco-producing state, followed by Kentucky, Georgia, and Virginia.

In the past, $25 million of this $140 million went to a Health and Wellness Trust Fund that invested in tobacco prevention and cessation programming. In 2012, however, the North Carolina General Assembly (NCGA) abolished the Health and Wellness Trust Fund and spent only $17 million on tobacco prevention. By 2014, this number had dropped to $1.2 million, or just 1.1 percent of the minimum recommended for tobacco prevention programs by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). North Carolina ranks 47th among the states for reaching CDC-recommended funding levels.

The health and economic impacts of this decision to cut state funds are substantial. In North Carolina, tobacco use costs nearly $2.5 billion in total medical costs and $3.3 billion in lost productivity annually. North Carolinians face an annual tax burden of $564 per household for smoking-related state and federal government expenditures.

North Carolina can look to examples from other states to improve its strategy for spending settlement dollars. Oklahoma, which reaches more than 50 percent of CDC-recommended tobacco prevention funding levels annually, amended its constitution in 2000 to create the Tobacco Settlement Endowment Trust (TSET), which receives no less than 75 percent of annual settlement payments. Oklahoma ranks among the worst for smoking behaviors, but has seen significant improvements in adult smoking rates with the percentage of smoke-free households reaching over 75 percent in 2010, up from 55 percent in 2001.

We’ve seen from other states that funding for youth tobacco prevention works. In Florida, where the state is required to spend at least 15 percent of its yearly settlement award on tobacco prevention, the high school smoking rate dropped to just 7.5 percent in 2014 – one of the lowest rates ever reported by any state. North Carolina’s high school smoking rate remained at over 15 percent in 2014.

While using the money as North Carolina does is not illegal, the state should end this poor practice of using settlement money for unrelated projects. North Carolina has the enormous opportunity and responsibility to use settlement funds to reduce the prevalence of smoking and improve the health and economic wellbeing of millions of residents across the state.

Emily Cerciello is the Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network Senior Fellow for Health Care, and a senior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

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