Elizabeth Warren

 

Recent Posts by Elizabeth Warren

  • The Fight for Vital Consumer Protections

    Jan 19, 2010Elizabeth Warren

    elizabeth-warren-150As the fight for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency heats up, TARP watchdog Elizabeth Warren explains why the moment is critical.

    elizabeth-warren-150As the fight for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency heats up, TARP watchdog Elizabeth Warren explains why the moment is critical.

    The story of the financial crisis has a thousand twists and turns, but the basic narrative is easy to follow. The financial industry wrote rules that allowed it to act recklessly. The industry captured agencies that were supposed to regulate it, taking cops off the beat and funneling enormous resources into the political process to make sure there wouldn't be any new cops. Then, with no laws to hold them back, the banks made hundreds of billions of dollars on the sales of deceptive products.

    That went on for years, and the industry's tricks-and-traps pricing got more and more out of control. Eventually, the sale and re-sale of deceptive mortgages and other dangerous products made trillions of dollars for Wall Street while bringing down the American economy. When the industry's recklessness brought the biggest banks to the brink of collapse, Wall Street turned to the taxpayers for bailouts and guarantees, which put it right back into big profits and big bonuses. The industry got whatever it wanted.

    Now we are coming to the final chapter of this story.

    The final chapter will show whether we are going to let the industry continue to write the rules -- to keep the cops off the beat -- or whether the financial crisis actually changed something.

    The fate of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency will be the best way to follow the story moving forward because consumer products were the most abusive and because the CFPA has real muscle to stop those abuses. The CFPA would hire new cops and change the way big banks do business.

    We have all worked hard to make the CFPA into a reality, and the next few weeks will determine whether our hard work will make a difference for families or whether families will lose once again. The next few weeks will determine whether families will have to play by rules written by the banks and for the banks -- rules that let the industry get away with anything. In my view, we cannot let families lose again.

    Like you, I read last week that the consumer agency is dead. I also read the same thing last spring, last summer, last fall, and last month. And I've been warned about the power of the banks since I first developed this idea in 2007. We always knew this was a David v. Goliath fight, but I don't believe that Washington can or will let Wall Street act like nothing has changed.

    This is not the last important moment in the fight for the CFPA, but it is a critical one. You can count on me to do my part. Please help.

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  • Feminomics: Women and Bankruptcy

    Dec 17, 2009Elizabeth Warren

    elizabeth-warren-150Will 2010 be the year of the woman? We asked prominent thinkers to discuss women’s changing roles in the economy. How has the crisis affected them? Are women the key to reform? What economic impact will they have going forward? We’ll explore all this and more in a special ND20 12-part series.

    elizabeth-warren-150Will 2010 be the year of the woman? We asked prominent thinkers to discuss women’s changing roles in the economy. How has the crisis affected them? Are women the key to reform? What economic impact will they have going forward? We’ll explore all this and more in a special ND20 12-part series. Elizabeth Warren explains the pernicious effects of bankruptcy on middle class women.

     

    Why is bankruptcy an issue of equal justice and fairness to women?

    Bankruptcy exposes the economic vulnerability and insecurity of middle class women. The women in bankruptcy, like the men who file for bankruptcy, are a fairly representative cross-section of the American middle class. Their education levels are slightly higher than the population generally, with women in bankruptcy more likely to have attended college than their counterparts. Most are employed when they file. They work in a representative cross-section of industries and occupations. More than half are homeowners. By the most overt criteria, the women who file for bankruptcy are, as a group, solidly middle-class. But at the time they file for bankruptcy, their incomes tend to hover only slightly above the poverty level, and they are deeply mired in debt. The women who file for bankruptcy played by all the rules, but they are still in economic freefall.

    How has the financial crisis impacted women experiencing debt and insolvency?

    Based on projected figures, more than a million women will find their way to the bankruptcy courts this year-more women than will graduate from college, receive a diagnosis of cancer, or file for divorce. The numbers are staggering.

    How do current bankruptcy laws place special burdens on women?

    For many women, the on-time payments of domestic support obligations are essential to economic survival. Until 2005, the bankruptcy of those who owed the obligations actually helped women because the bankruptcy wiped out credit card debts and other obligations, while leaving domestic support obligations intact. This gave women a clear field to collect from their ex-husbands. But the credit card companies got the laws changed in 2005, making it harder for these men to declare bankruptcy and harder to discharge credit card debt. That puts women trying to collect domestic support obligations and credit card companies in direct competition for the ex-husband's resources. Credit card companies can hire lawyers and develop extensive debt collect departments, something that is really tough for women. When the credit industry controls the bankruptcy rules, women lose.

    Twenty-nine women's groups-a diverse collection that included the Y.W.C.A., Hadassah, American Association of University Women, Church Women United, the NOW Legal Defense Fund and the Feminist Majority-publicly opposed the bankruptcy legislation.

    What groups of women are especially at risk?

    Women with children are particularly vulnerable, both because of the economic challenges faced by single-parent households and because bankruptcy now gives credit card companies greater capacity to compete with women in collecting past-due debts.

    How can women protect themselves from bankruptcy?

    Most women file for bankruptcy in the aftermath of a serious medical problem, a job loss or a family break up. It is hard to protect against those. But women can help themselves if they keep their fixed expenses (rent, car payment, student loans) to half of their incomes, and if they put aside some savings. My daughter and I wrote a book with more detailed advice, called All Your Worth, that some women have found helpful.

    What legal reforms are necessary moving forward to ease the burden on women?

    Anything that eases the burden on hard-working, middle class American families will provide great help to women. One thing the financial crisis taught us, though, is the extent to which the broken consumer credit market has fueled the insecurity of the middle class. Today, lenders operate in what is really a Wild West environment. They face little regulation, and they can get away with almost anything that pushes up profits. In the years leading up to the crisis, the broken market affected women disproportionately. Women were 32 percent more likely than men to have received subprime loans and 41 percent more likely than men to have received higher-cost subprime loans, regardless of income.

    There are a number of causes of the rising insecurity of the middle class, but one of the biggest problems right now is that the largely unregulated consumer credit industry has preyed on customers by burying tricks and traps in the fine print and concealing true costs. This is why I believe it is so important for Congress to act on the President's proposal to create a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency. We need to make the market competitive again and to get rid of the tricks and traps. This will empower families to make good choices and will increase their economic security.

    Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren is currently chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee the banking bailouts and first proposed a new federal agency for consumer financial products in 2007.

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  • The Right Way to Regulate

    Nov 20, 2009Martha CoakleyElizabeth Warren

    idea 150Martha Coakley and Elizabeth Warren explain why we are in desperate need of a federal agency that protects consumer.

    idea 150Martha Coakley and Elizabeth Warren explain why we are in desperate need of a federal agency that protects consumer.

    In the weeks ahead, Congress may finally provide American families with a seat at the financial regulatory table in Washington, D.C. If Congress passes the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) Act of 2009, on which the House Financial Services recently reported favorably, it will establish, for the first time, a federal agency whose sole mandate is to evaluate financial products through the lens of consumer fairness. By putting the tools to evaluate loans in the hands of borrowers, it would also give families the chance, as well as the responsibility, to protect themselves.

    For years, the consumer credit market has been broken. Healthy markets depend on full information between parties to contracts, but lenders have systematically hidden the costs and risks of consumer credit products while burying a wide assortment of tricks and traps in the fine print. The result is that consumers can't compare the costs of different products or distinguish safe lenders from risky lenders. Because the costs and risks are so well-hidden, the broken market undermines real consumer choice, inhibits consumer-oriented innovation, and leads many borrowers to over-consume credit, putting themselves--and our whole economy--at risk.

    This broken credit market results largely from the fact that consumers lack the same sorts of basic safety protections that they enjoy in markets for virtually every product we touch, taste, or smell. While several federal agencies exist to regulate banks, the regulators themselves are competing for the banks' business. Today, financial institutions can "shop" for the regulator that regulates least, picking their regulatory agency by changing their charter. When a financial institution changes its charter and leaves a regulator, it takes substantial fees with it--paying them instead to the new regulator. Not surprisingly, the regulators understand the competitive environment they face. They have been quick to race to the bottom, offering the lightest touch in order to maximize fees and budgets. Even if they ignored these pressures, the regulators have other missions that take a higher priority. Banking examiners tend to focus on things like balance sheets and capital adequacy requirements, while the Chairman of the Federal Reserve focuses on monetary policy. For both, consumer protection is far down the list of priorities.

    For proof, just look at the record of the agencies over the past generation. The Federal Reserve had the power to outlaw the most egregious subprime practices, but it chose repeatedly not to enact stronger rules and not to enforce existing consumer protection laws. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has been more vigorous in its enforcement--but on the side of the banks instead of consumers. The agency worked hard to ensure that certain banks under its protective umbrella were shielded from state laws that might have averted some of the worst financial pain.

    The current crisis offers a case study for the need for change.

    In the years leading up to it, a huge industry thrived on a model of selling unsustainable loans to persons barely qualified, if at all, to pay the loan for a short term--typically two or three years. The business logic of the model relied on the high fees produced by serial refinancing, before the ARM "exploded" or the "Pay Option" Loan "recast." Over the long run, serial refinancing was a losing game for the borrowers; it was staggeringly expensive, and it required perpetual increases in property value to provide the equity necessary to fund the next refinance. If the market flattened, and refinancing was impossible, the homeowners could lose everything they had invested.

    As the signs of the coming crisis became clearer, federal agencies turned a blind eye to these practices. Despite calls from state attorneys general, housing experts, and academics, regulatory agencies took little interest in the ways the risks underlying these loans were repackaged and resold through mortgage-backed securities, derivatives tied to those securities, and credit default swaps of the type that ultimately swamped AIG.

    At no point did regulatory agencies consider whether the harm to borrowers of highly leveraged, unsustainable loan products outweighed the benefit of short-term home ownership, nor did they ask whether refinancing was used to move people out of affordable mortgages and, eventually, out of their homes. At no point did any federal regulatory agency consider the predictable harm to our communities and their tax bases if unsustainable loans began to fail en masse, as lenders knew they would if home values leveled off. And at no point, as tricks and traps pricing became a prominent part of large banks' revenue plans, did any regulatory agency consider how fee-gouging exacerbated the ongoing consumer debt crisis.

    The result of industry recklessness and regulatory failure was massive systemic risk that, once materialized, required equally massive government intervention that has cost at least a trillion dollars. While small businesses and families are left to fail when they take on unsafe risk or make bad decisions--1.5 million families and entrepreneurs will declare bankruptcy this year alone--we have been told we have no choice but to bailout the largest players in the financial sector.

    One of the most important lessons from the financial crisis is that we need a regulator who will create safety baselines in the consumer credit market and bring clarity to a market loaded with tricks and traps. Clearer financial products will come from clearer rules in Washington.

    The CFPA is designed to scissor through the existing consumer protection regulations, which are scattered among seven federal agencies and are as incoherent and ineffective as they are costly and cumbersome. The CFPA reported out by the U.S. House Financial Services Committee would create smart rules that would promote comprehensible, transparent products and, in turn, empower consumer choice and increase competition. This will be a welcome relief for many lenders--particularly community banks--that have been caught between the desire to offer clean products and the need to compete with the charlatans who promise lower prices, then boost their profits with consumer traps.

    Of course, a market that allows for real competition drives price closer to the marginal cost of production and won't be so profitable for some lenders. They want to hang on to their current business model. So, lobbyists have vowed to kill the agency and to make sure it never gets out of Congress. Others are furiously working to get exemptions and to dilute the agency's overall effectiveness. According to Common Cause, banks, financial houses, and credit card companies pumped approximately $42 million into their lobbying efforts over the first six months of 2009 so that they can continue business as usual.

    While the CFPA bill that emerged from the U.S. House Financial Services Committee is strong and has the potential to put an end to the Wild West era of consumer lending, the industry has already won some key concessions. A recent amendment weakened the ability of states to create rules that would go beyond the federal standards to protect their local citizens. This amendment grants discretion to the OCC to preempt state standards on a case-by-case basis when it determines that a state law prevents or significantly interferes with the business of a national bank. While this marks an improvement over current law, it is not as strong as the original CFPA proposal. Yes, compromise is the hallmark of the legislative process; however, states need plenty of room to maneuver to protect their own citizens.

    States are important leaders in combating unfair and deceptive practices. Massachusetts, Illinois, New York, and North Carolina took the initiative to protect consumers and to go after predatory lenders well before the federal government intervened. Allowing states to participate meaningfully in rule-writing and enforcement efforts can lead to early detection of fraudulent practices, swift action to stop violators of the law, and the promotion of honest competition.The states can be a resource and a partner in protecting consumers, which is why the large financial institutions want them leashed.

    Lobbyists have also succeeded at winning an ill-conceived exemption for auto dealers that originate consumer auto loans. The amendment would protect the ability of auto dealers to collect a fee for selling high-priced loans to customers--a practice that can cost families thousands of dollars. For moderate and lower income buyers, the high cost of these loans combined with limited other loan options makes these types of transactions ripe for predatory lending. (The abuses have been common and well-documented.) The exemption not only shields unscrupulous auto dealers from joint federal and state oversight, but it also gives those auto dealers a competitive advantage over community banks and other lenders.

    We have already paid the price for lax regulation and unbridled free market decision-making: hundreds of billions of dollars in government bailouts, millions of consumers tricked into deceptive financial contracts, blighted cities and towns, and a financial crisis worse than any in our lifetimes. This price is too high. The CFPA would help make sure that we don't repeat these mistakes in the future or ever again incur these enormous costs.

    Martha Coakley is the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Elizabeth Warren is the Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard University and is currently chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel.

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  • New Agenda for America: The Great Lesson

    Oct 29, 2009Elizabeth Warren

    lesson-150To mark the 80th Anniversary of the Great Crash of ‘29, we asked 15 progressive thinkers to write about lessons learned and what lies ahead.

    lesson-150To mark the 80th Anniversary of the Great Crash of ‘29, we asked 15 progressive thinkers to write about lessons learned and what lies ahead. Together, their reflections constitute a New Agenda for America — a message of how the ideals of a fair society should apply to the economic and social policies of our time.

    Historians generally focus on the October 29, 1929 stock market crash as the triggering event for the Great Depression. But the story has a longer arc.

    From 1792 through the Great Depression, booms and busts followed each other like day follows night. But President Roosevelt and the New Dealers had an innovative idea: regulation might tame the boom-and-bust cycle. So they created a new Securities and Exchange Commission to bring some discipline to the financial markets, established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to make it safe to put money in banks, and passed the Glass-Steagall Act to separate ordinary banking from high-risk financial speculation.

    America was protected from another financial crisis for almost 50 years. But in the late 1970s, we began to pull the threads from our regulatory fabric, overturning laws and cutting enforcement. The results were the S&L crisis, Long Term Capital Management, Enron, and now, the subprime mortgage meltdown.

    There are signs that we may have learned our lesson. Last week, the House Financial Services Committee voted for a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency that would consolidate scattered and ineffective consumer credit regulations and establish a home in Washington for policymakers dedicated to rebuilding the middle class. Other reforms are also starting to move.

    The banking lobby is as powerful and deeply entrenched as ever, but it was powerful in the 1930s, too. Nonetheless, the New Dealers learned the Great Lesson: Powerful insiders cannot be permitted to write the rules, and prosperity and security depend on a playing field that supports a vibrant middle class. Today, we face a similar set of questions as we faced then. Will the institutions that created the crisis continue calling the shots and writing the rules, or will Washington take the side of families? Have we learned the Great Lesson?

    Elizabeth Warren is chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee the banking bailouts and first proposed a new federal agency for consumer financial products in 2007.

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  • Real Change: Turning up the heat on non-bank lenders

    Sep 4, 2009Elizabeth Warren

    elizabeth-warren-150We know that big banks need reining in, but Elizabeth Warren argues that it is time for serious oversight of non-bank lenders -- like mortgage brokers or payday loan outfits -- as well.

    elizabeth-warren-150We know that big banks need reining in, but Elizabeth Warren argues that it is time for serious oversight of non-bank lenders -- like mortgage brokers or payday loan outfits -- as well. A strong, well-funded CFPA would not only protect consumers from the abusive practices of these largely unregulated businesses, but it would also benefit the small banks that are hurting from the current system.

    The big banks are storming Washington, determined to kill the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA). They understand that a regulator who actually cares about consumers would cause a seismic change in their business model: No more burying the terms of the agreement in the fine print, no more tricks and traps. If the big banks lose the protection of their friendly regulators, the business model that produces hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue -- and monopoly-size profits that exist only in non-competitive markets -- will be at risk. That's a big change.

    But there is an even bigger change in the wind: regulating the non-banks. Democrats and Republicans alike agree that the proliferation of unregulated, non-bank lenders contributed significantly to the financial crisis by feeding millions of dangerous financial products into the economic system. Non-bank institutions were active participants in the race to the bottom among lenders. From subprime mortgage loans to small dollar loans, they showed how to wring high fees and staggering interest rates out of consumer lending. Their fine-print contracts, and new tricks and traps, transformed the market.

    Despite widespread agreement about the problem, the U.S. has never made a sustained, systemic effort to regulate non-bank lenders. As lending abuses became more obvious, there was no effort to close regulatory gaps and loopholes or to devote federal resources toward the oversight of non-bank institutions. The reasons are many, but one of the most benign explanations is that policymakers for too long assumed that states could deal with the non-banks because the non-bank lenders are often small and often operate locally (although Countrywide showed that state-based organizations can metastasize rapidly). As it turns out, the states actually faced several limitations in reining in these lenders.

    States, just like the federal government, were subject to intense lobbying by creditors. In short order, many states changed their rules to undercut basic protections. For example, the consumer finance industry succeeded in rewriting state interest rate regulation to allow for massive increases in allowable effective rates -- even when the advertised rate looks far lower and obscures the true cost of credit. In many states, making an end run around local usury laws is now as easy as running around a single fencepost. At the same time, state legislatures face the perpetual lag-behind problem. They are unable to adjust to a rapidly changing financial services market, too slow to identify problems and not capable of changing the laws quickly enough to head off serious problems.

    Moreover, resources are always constrained at the state level, and the enforcement of consumer credit laws competes with a wide variety of other state obligations. When consumer credit laws were violated, states often lacked the capacity to undertake serious investigations or to prosecute offenders. Some states made heroic efforts, but others left consumer financial issues far down their priority list.

    The problem of enforcement has been exacerbated by a serious structural problem. When an abuse surfaced-for example, a local paper ran a news story about an unfair practice or a consumer group assembled evidence of sharp practices-local officials often responded by jumping on small banks. The non-banks were often scattered and difficult to find, while the biggest financial institutions were typically protected from local prosecution through pre-emption. That left the small banks holding the bag. These small banks, often those with state charters, were the easiest institutions to locate and the cheapest to prosecute -- even if they were only tangentially involved in deceptive practices. The result was that the worst offenders slipped away. Non-banks could shut down for a while, and then reappear when the heat was off. In effect, the state enforcement structure benefitted the big banks and the non-banks.

    The CFPA presents the first real opportunity to change that harmful structure.

    First, the CFPA will regulate consumer financial products across the board-using the same rules for all mortgages or for all small dollar loans, regardless of whether the mortgage or the loan is issued by a national bank, a state bank or a non-bank. The old practice of different sets of rules and different regulatory structures for the same products would disappear. Instead, the CFPA would create a coordinated set of baseline rules applicable across the board.

    Consolidated rule-making will also stop the practice of lenders shopping around for the regulator with the weakest rules. Bank holding companies have enjoyed an enormous advantage by having the freedom to structure their many business divisions to exploit regulatory weakness. They can operate a federally chartered bank when preemption is valuable to them. At the same time, they can purchase the products of non-banks in bulk, creating informal partnerships that exploit gaps in the state regulatory system. In fact, the Center for Public Integrity found that 21 of the 25 largest subprime issuers leading up to the crisis were financed by large banks. (Remember this the next time you hear a lobbyist blaming the crisis on non-banks and denying the role of the bank holding companies.) With consistent rules across the board, the CFPA would put an end to these practices.

    Consistent rules are important, but, as we now know, it isn't enough to have good rules on the books. There must also be a serious effort to enforce those rules. With the right sources of funding and some smart strategic thinking about how to force non-banks to follow the same rules as other lenders, the entire landscape of consumer lending would change.

    From history, we have learned that an agency's source of funding is critical to its success. By allowing the Agency to tax lenders directly -- perhaps a dime for every open credit card account, a quarter for every open mortgage, etc. -- Congress can make sure that the CFPA stays well-funded in the years ahead. The right funding structure will allow the Agency to develop the capacity to go after the non-banks and the dangerous products they originate, and it will insulate the Agency from political efforts to starve-the-regulators into inaction. Moreover, as we now know, the cost of even a well-funded agency is dwarfed by the cost to the government and the economy as a whole of bank failures. The cost of the failure of just one thrift -- IndyMac -- was almost ten times the annual budget of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    New forms of strategic thinking will also be needed. By creating a system for mandatory lender registration, for example, CFPA will be able to keep track of the consumer lenders out there -- something that no current regulators have the tools to do. To encourage compliance, the CFPA can work with other federal agencies -- like the Treasury Department or the Internal Revenue Service -- to identify unregistered lenders. In states that already register certain non-bank lenders, the CFPA can work off those registrations and collaborate with state officials. This is tough work, but a consumer agency with expertise and resources will rise to the challenge.

    The CFPA can also get smarter with enforcement by exploiting concentration points, places where small players are effectively grouped together. In the case of mortgage brokers, for example, without the large bank holding companies and their subsidiaries as customers for the loans they place, many would be out of business. Focusing regulatory attention on the buyers would create substantial leverage over the brokers as well. If the sponsors and funding mechanisms for the worst practices go away, so will the worst practices.

    There is more that we can do to deal with non-bank lenders, but only if Congress creates a strong CFPA. If we stick with the status quo -- which treats loans differently depending on who issues them and places consumer protection in agencies that consider it an afterthought - we know what will happen because we have seen it happen before. Lenders will continue their tricks and traps business model, the mega-banks will exploit regulatory loopholes, and the non-banks will continue to sell deceptive products. In that world, small banks will need to choose between lowering standards or losing market share, and they will still get too much attention from regulators while the non-banks and big banks get too little. Dangerous loans will destabilize both families and the economy, and we'll all remain at risk for the next trillion-dollar bailout.

    Regulating the non-banks hasn't been tried in any serious way. The CFPA offers a real chance to level the playing field, to add balance to the system, and to change the consumer lending landscape forever.

    Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren is currently chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee the banking bailouts and first proposed a new federal agency for consumer financial products in 2007.

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