Mike Konczal

Roosevelt Institute Fellow

Recent Posts by Mike Konczal

  • Welcome to the 1% Recovery

    Mar 5, 2012Mike Konczal

    As the 1% reap 93 percent of the income gains from the recovery, we're rapidly returning to pre-New Deal levels of inequality.

    As the 1% reap 93 percent of the income gains from the recovery, we're rapidly returning to pre-New Deal levels of inequality.

    There was a brief debate focused on the following question: would the gains of the economy continue to accrue to the top 1% once the recovery started, or would they have a weak post-recession showing in terms of raw income growth as well as income share of the economy? The top 1% had a rough Great Recession. They absorbed 50 percent of the income losses, and their share of income dropped from 23.5 percent to 18.1 percent. Was this a new state of affairs, or would the 1% bounce back in 2010?

    We finally have the estimated data for 2010 by income percentile, and it turns out that the top 1% had a fantastic year. The data is in the World Top Income Database, as well as Emmanuel Saez’s updated "Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States" (as well as the excel spreadsheet on his webpage). Timothy Noah has a first set of responses here. The takeaway quote from Saez is, "the top 1% captured 93% of the income gains in the first year of recovery.”

    First off, let’s get some absolute numbers here. Here is income by important percentiles, as well as the change from 2009-2010. I include the change with and without capital gains to make it clear that this is a phenomenon both in and independent of a strong stock market (click through for larger image):

    The bottom 90 percent of Americans lost $127, the bottom 99 percent of Americans gained $80, and the top 1% gained $105,637. The bottom 99 percent is net positive for the year due to around $125 in average capital gains. They can take comfort in efforts by the right to set the capital gains tax to 0 percent, which would have netted them an additional couple dozen bucks.

    (Also, just to show "the top 1% captured 93% of the income gains in the first year of recovery” isn’t some sort of stats juke, you can take $105,637 and divide it by the the number you get when you add $80 times 99 to $105,637 times 1. That number is 93 percent, which is the share of income gains the 1% took home.)

    Check out “The 99 Percent Plan,” a new Roosevelt Institute/Salon essay series on the progressive vision for the economy.

    And if this wasn’t obvious, you can see the gains become quite high the farther you walk up the inequality ladder. When we discuss things like the Buffett Rule or taxing capital gains as ordinary income, it is important to see how top-heavy that capital gains distribution actually is.

    This should also be put in the historical frame of looking at 2002 onward. I’m going to normalize some percentiles by their average income in 2002 and show how they have moved going into and out of the recession. This takes the income distribution in 2002 as granted -- and any movements from there on out reflect changes from that income. I’m going to exclude capital gains for this chart to show it’s a deeper phenomenon than the stock market, though the effects are the same in either case (click through for larger image):

    The Great Recession dropped income for the bottom 99 percent by 11.6 percent, completely wiping out the meager gains of the Bush years. And crucially, while 2010 was a year of continued stagnation for the economy as a whole, the 1% began to show strong gains even when capital gains are excluded.

    As you can imagine, this has increased the percentage of the economic pie that the top 1% takes home. As Saez notes, “excluding realized capital gains, the top decile share in 2010 is equal to 46.3%, higher than in 2007.”

    There are two things worth mentioning. There’s an interesting debate within left-liberal circles about whether or not elite economic interests benefit from a weak recovery, benefit more from a strong recovery, are vaguely indifferent to the United States economy, are impotent during the recession, or are more interested in pursuing other agendas during the instability caused by mass unemployment. These numbers are certainly a point for the argument that the rich are doing just fine, and to whatever extent they’d be doing better with more robust growth and employment, it isn’t putting a damper on their earnings.

    It’s also worth mentioning that, pre-recession, inequality hadn’t been that high since the Great Depression, and we are quickly returning to that state. It’s important to remember that a series of choices were made during the New Deal to react to runaway inequality, including changes to progressive taxation, financial regulation, monetary policy, labor unionization, and the provisioning of public goods and guaranteed social insurance. A battle will be fought over the next decade -- it’s already been fought for the past three years -- on all these fronts. The subsequent resolution will determine how broadly shared prosperity is going forward and whether our economy will continue to be as unstable as it has been.

    Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

    Share This

  • Has the White House Changed Its Tune on the Nature of the Recession?

    Feb 24, 2012Mike Konczal

    It may be coming around to what's really driving weak demand three years too late, but better late than never.

    It may be coming around to what's really driving weak demand three years too late, but better late than never.

    There's a mini-debate going on over the relationship between the housing crash and weak demand. As Cardiff Garcia of FT Alphaville recently summarized it: "This reminded us of the debate last year about whether the sluggishness in consumer spending was the result of households wanting to deleverage or was caused by the big negative wealth effect caused by the huge crash in home prices." See this from James Surowiecki on the wealth effect and the Q&A I did with Amir Sufi on deleveraging. Which is the main driver, deleveraging balance sheets or a wealth effect?

    I'm more on team balance sheet. It must seem like an esoteric debate, but it has some consequences. If it's about deleveraging balance sheets, the problem is an income/debt issue. It can be solved by reducing debt through forgiveness, lower interest rates and refinancing, equity swaps, a jubilee, and many other options. The models used in these stories indicate that any kind of transfer from creditors to debtors will make the economy better off. If it's a wealth effect, forgiving debt is likely to be less important -- it's not the root of the problem. Redistribution between creditors and debtors is unlikely to have a major impact outside of marginal propensities to consume. You'd need to get housing prices back up for there to be a significant adjustment.

    (When Jim Bullard made two meta-conservative cases against additional monetary and fiscal stimulus recently, he switched between these narratives. The first case was about how the collapse of the housing bubble represents a technology loss. Though he didn't specify it, people could refer to the collapse of the securitization model, the inability to use housing as collateral, and the now idle Wall Street machine --results from weak balance sheets -- as a type of technology that has been destroyed. I don't think that's a particularly useful way to look at it. The second argument was pure wealth effect: we feel poorer, and the only solution is to beg policymakers to "please reinflate the bubble."  That's a pretty significant change in the underlying theory.)

    Garcia noted that the Federal Reserve looks like it is considering joining team balance sheet. It discussed three studies at its most recent meeting, all credit and balance sheet related. One of the studies "used data on borrowing, debt repayments, and other credit factors for individual borrowers; this study found that movements in leverage -- resulting from voluntary loan repayments and from loan charge-offs -- have had a substantial effect on the cash flow of many households over time, and thus presumably on their spending." I'd really like to see that study!

    Check out “The 99 Percent Plan,” a new Roosevelt Institute/Salon essay series on the progressive vision for the economy.

    The White House also looks to be on team balance sheet. See the latest Economic Report of the President (pages 110 to 114).

    The standard approach in economics has been to assume that households consume about the same fraction of the increase in their wealth each year, regardless of its source... The severity of losses experienced during the recession that began in December of 2007 in both national output and in labor markets makes these estimates appear too small...

    A growing economics literature highlights the importance of household debt balances in influencing the severity of economic slumps... A series of empirical papers attempts to quantify the effect of such deleveraging on consumption (Mian and Sufi 2010; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2011). These papers broadly suggest that the levered nature of household housing assets amplified the effect of pure wealth losses from the crash in housing prices.

    The report even includes this iconic chart of team balance-sheet:

    When Noam Scheiber wrote about how the administration viewed the economy in late 2010, he explicitly contrasted its wonks' opinions with that of the balance sheet recession theorist Richard Koo. So is this a revolution within the administration? Is this why it is now pushing for writedowns and refinancing, after having left housing on the side for the past three years? Let's hope so, since I consider being three years late to the party better than never showing up.

    Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

    Share This

  • An Interview with Occupy the SEC About Their Volcker Rule Comment Letter

    Feb 16, 2012Mike Konczal

    February 13 was an important deadline for comment letters relating to the implementation of the Volcker Rule. One group that submitted a comment letter was Occupy the SEC, an Occupy Wall Street-affiliated working group that has an excellent web presence outlining their objectives.  The site also includes their comment letter (available as a pdf here) -- all 325 pages of it.

    February 13 was an important deadline for comment letters relating to the implementation of the Volcker Rule. One group that submitted a comment letter was Occupy the SEC, an Occupy Wall Street-affiliated working group that has an excellent web presence outlining their objectives.  The site also includes their comment letter (available as a pdf here) -- all 325 pages of it.

    Felix SalmonMatt YglesiasSwamplandThe NationJosh Harkinson, and Dave Dayen, among many others, have all said great things about it. I was most impressed with the point-by-point, aggressive answering of the regulators' questions -- the stuff that can make a difference. Felix suggests reading the introduction if nothing else, particularly pages 3-6, and I agree.

    Since this blog is a fan of all things financial reform, Volcker Rule, and the Occupy movement, I was very fascinated with the backstory on this letter. I was able to speak with two members of Occupy the SEC, Alexis Goldstein (@alexisgoldstein), a former Wall Street technology VP, and Caitlin Kline, a former credit derivatives trader.

    Mike Konczal: What is Occupy the SEC? And what is the Volcker Rule?

    Alexis Goldstein: Occupy the SEC is a working group inside Occupy Wall Street, which has been focused on writing a comment letter on the Volcker Rule.

    The high-level overview is that the Volcker Rule is meant to keep federally-backed banking entities from proprietary trading and from owning more than 3 percent of any given hedge fund or private equity fund.

    MK: How did you end up getting involved in Occupy the SEC?

    AG: I was going down to Occupy Wall Street every day and one day Naomi Klein came and gave an open forum talk. And I asked a question, over the people's mic, on whether we should bring back Glass-Steagall, and she said yes.

    Afterwards, all these people came up afterwards and asked me "What's Glass-Steagall?" And I thought I could help out and do a teach-in. After announcing an upcoming teach-in at a General Assembly, Akshat emailed me and asked if I was interested in forming a group to write a comment letter.

    Caitlin Kline: A friend of mine who was involved in the movement called me up one day and told me that he had just seen a teach-in, and that the woman “spoke about derivatives the way you do!” So he put me in touch with Alexis, and I started attending the book club meetings.

    MK: How much of the group are people currently or formerly in the financial industry?

    AG: Probably a slight majority. Not everyone -- we had people who were leaders or people who wanted to learn and get up to speed. But it definitely had a strong industry contingent.

    MK: How did you start focusing the letter?

    CK: It took a long time to get our minds around all the different elements of the Volcker Rule and what kind of comment letter we wanted to write. We decided early that we wanted to write about the nitty-gritty of the rule and focus on the specifics, so it required a really deep dive into the material to leverage everyone’s expertise. Right off the bat, we decided that this rule was a good idea, and it has to actually be meaningful. That's how we attacked it -- we wanted to strengthen it as much as possible.

    MK: Some people (usually not in the movement) complain about the General Assembly and consensus-driven procedures as not workable for a complex task, like writing hundred of pages responding to regulatory rules. What was your procedure and how well did it work?

    AG: There were two tasks. The first task was much like a book club. We treated the Volcker Rule as our book, and we'd assign readings and times for discussion. At first we were meeting once a week, then later twice a week for marathon sessions. During those marathon sessions we'd go through all the questions the agencies asked about the rule.

    MK: How many questions were there?

    AG: 395. But each of those questions had around three or four questions in it. But 395 numbered questions.

    CK: So a total of around 1,200 to 1,400 individual questions.

    AG: It's easiest to visualize this. So we are all there in the atrium with our laptops. We are going through this question by question, discussing them, debating what we think the answer should be. Once we all agree on something we put it in a bullet or several bullets. And sometimes we'd go off on these huge tangents and have debates on the best way to address the topic. We'd often have to say "let's move on to the next topic," but we always tried to work from consensus.

    Check out “The 99 Percent Plan,” a new Roosevelt Institute/Salon essay series on the progressive vision for the economy.

    When we went to try and write the initial draft of the letter we'd work collaboratively on these online documents that everyone could see at all times. That way if there was something someone didn't agree with they could leave a comment or send an email to the group and we could talk it out. For the most part we tended to agree -- though there were many instances where we clashed horns.

    After that initial pass we broke it up section by section so everyone had their focus area. From there we could embellish those central consensus bullet points we had come up with.

    MK: How many people are involved?

    AG: There was a core group of seven people, with a variety of people coming in and out. There were many experts in an area who couldn't commit to all the meetings but wanted to work on very narrow areas. They'd drop in and drop out.

    There was one person who was very interested with the metrics section. So she attended one meeting where we were going to talk about that and she gave us some great ideas. There was a gentleman who used to work at a special purpose vehicle and was really involved with securitizations. He did a really great job writing and giving insights on those topics via e-mail, even though he couldn't make the groups.

    CK: In a lot of cases we pooled our resources to find people with certain expertise on issues we wanted to address in the letter.

    MK: What are you worried about with the implementation of the Volcker Rule?

    CK: The one that comes up often is that liquidity is going to evaporate overnight, crippling markets. This is the base of the lobbyists' efforts. We spent a while debunking that argument.

    MK: How do you respond to that?

    CK: Well the whole theory is predicated on the idea that these federally-backstopped banks are the only institutions that can provide liquidity. It is a profitable business, especially the market-making end of it, and any number of firms will step in in order to take this.

    MK: Were the members of Occupy the SEC involved broadly with the movement?

    AG: It depends on the person. For me I was highly active in the woman's caucus. I would go to the General Assembly often, I'd go to the Spokes Council meetings. I was very involved in the day-to-day. When this letter got started I had to take a step back and focus on that instead.

    We had some people that weren't involved with the letter but they'd help us by coming to the meetings, organizing and planning direct actions. Others were involved in the Politics and Electoral Reform group, the Direct Action working group, and the Think Tank, which conducts open air discussions on various topics.

    CK: This was the first time that I thought that I could jump in and get involved. Particularly as an ex-trader, I could do this, and be involved with the movement in a meaningful way. Since we started, I've met so many smart people and encountered so many issues that I'm going to continue to be involved with, and I think most of the group has had a similar experience.

    MK: There's a saying that goes "Occupy Everything, Demand Nothing." You've written a document giving very technical advice to regulators. Part of Occupy is about creating alternatives instead of making demands, yet your group set out to reform a system very resistant to reform. How do you handle that tension?

    AG: There's two points. The first is that all working groups at Occupy are autonomous. Since no one can speak for Occupy Wall Street, each group can choose their own goals that they want to work for as long as you don't say you speak for Occupy Wall Street (without going to the New York City General Assembly). So there's a lot of freedom to work on Occupy Wall Street on whatever projects you want.

    The second thing is that though the system is broken and difficult to repair, you don't have to choose between abandoning it or reforming it. I think you can do both -- try to reform it from within while building a new system. This particular effort is about reforming the current system, but that doesn't mean, at all, that we aren't interested in alternative systems. There's another group called Occupy Bank thinking through a completely new banking system from scratch.

    CK: From those of us who saw how big and screwed up the financial system is, it's very difficult to know, or even understand, what it would take to fix it. Some people would say to us "why are you even bothering with this? Why not go back to Glass-Steagall?" Well, that's not on the table right now, but this is. And the Volcker Rule is something very real and concrete. It's good intellectual work to think through alternative systems and I want to be a part of it and see where it goes, but in an immediate way there's ways to clean up things right in front of us. A lot of people I know get stuck on this -- "it's really screwed up and there has to be another way" -- and you end up thinking about that other way forever.

    MK: Quick question: did your group do the twinkles during meetings?

    AG: Yes. In fact when Caitlin was just talking with you I was twinkling.

    MK: Over the phone?

    AG: Yes, it is such a habit I can't break it.

    MK: What are you excited about for Occupy in 2012?

    AG: As an activist you are often isolated to your particular cause. Let's say you are an environmental activist and your cause is sustainability. You fight the same fights with the same people, you go against the same industries, and it is easy to burn out. You are stuck in this little bubble. My favorite thing about Occupy Wall Street is that there is this cacophony of causes. You come together for the things that matter the most to you, but you are surrounded by all these other people fighting for all these other causes, with their own expertise, and all those passions amplify each other. If you need a break from your topic, you can jump into another one. And there's so many new people, fresh faces all the time, it gives you courage and the strength of purpose to continue. Because it's so tough to fight a fight and think you are the only one who cares.

    Also, I really hope we can retake more public spaces.

    Share This

  • The Economy Sucks for Those Who Have Jobs, Too

    Feb 7, 2012Mike Konczal

    New JOLTS data show that people are quitting their jobs less and less and getting hired at a similarly slow rate.

    Last week's job numbers were generally positive. Now if those numbers pick up steam, if the housing market begins to recover, if Europe doesn't sink the U.S. economy, if the situation in the Middle East and especially Iran doesn't cause oil prices to spike, and if we don't immediately disrupt government spending through premature austerity, we could see some major job growth in 2012.

    New JOLTS data show that people are quitting their jobs less and less and getting hired at a similarly slow rate.

    Last week's job numbers were generally positive. Now if those numbers pick up steam, if the housing market begins to recover, if Europe doesn't sink the U.S. economy, if the situation in the Middle East and especially Iran doesn't cause oil prices to spike, and if we don't immediately disrupt government spending through premature austerity, we could see some major job growth in 2012.

    What about those who still have a job? We focus on the unemployed for many good reasons. Economists do this because of it is so miserable to be unemployed in this country and because they function as a good barometer for the health of the economy. We "see" changes in unemployed in the data much quicker than movements in GDP and other aggregates.

    But the economy also has major problems for those with jobs. Be honest: how many of you spent the past two months thinking, "I'm going to quit this job I have now"? Personally, many friends of mine have discussed how they want to move on and quit their current jobs and were putting in the energy to find new ones. They've mostly failed and are taking it as a personal failure.

    Except it's less a personal failure than a macroeconomic one.

    Click here to buy Senior Fellow Richard Kirsch’s new book on the epic health care reform battle, Fighting for Our Health.

    This morning the Bureau of Labor Statistics put out their Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data for December 2010. The "quit rate" -- how many people are walking out of their jobs -- was flat for the month at the very low 1.5 percent rate, and still significantly lower than it's been over the past decade. The quit rate for those with jobs plummeted during the the recession and it's never recovered. And it's remained stagnant even as there's been some encouraging signs for the unemployed. Here is how the rate looks historically:

    I also have a few friends -- both employed and unemployed -- who have been strung along by potential new jobs, and I imagine this is happening to many people. They hear a lot of "we'll let you know soon" over the course of several months with no actual offer or hiring on the horizon. Again, think macroeconomics -- the job hire rate also plummeted and has stayed flat recently.

    The problem isn't just that there are so many people who have been unemployed for over 99 weeks -- the problems exist for everyone, even those with jobs.

    Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

    Share This

  • How Government Decides Which Workers Deserve Rights

    Feb 1, 2012Mike Konczal

    It used to be that white men had steady employment and all the government protection that came with it while minorities and women were stuck with precarious jobs. Now we're all vulnerable.

    It used to be that white men had steady employment and all the government protection that came with it while minorities and women were stuck with precarious jobs. Now we're all vulnerable.

    Malcolm Harris has a New Inquiry essay on the movie Sleeping Beauty (2011) and the feminization of precarious labor. A lot has been written on precarious labor recently, including both John Schmitt's book review in Dissent and Bhaskar Sunkara's critical response. I want to elaborate on this, since looking at gender and precarious work leads to an examination of a favorite topic -- the relationship between pity-charity liberalism and unconditional, universal programs related to economic security. A perfect example is how labor in the New Deal was treated differently by gender. The wedge between the two groups illuminates the difficulty in bringing economic justice to the 21st century. Precarious, vulnerable work was once relegated solely to women, but in this day and age more and more of us will fall into that category.

    For Harris, the precarious worker is "indebted, insecure, vulnerable." If the classic notion of a worker "relies on having a bargaining place at the table with the boss," then precarious workers aren't workers (even though all they do is work or try to cobble work together).

    How is the work gendered? Harris focuses on gendered affect: "passivity and her eagerness to please, her vulnerability and blank demeanor would look incredibly strange on a young man. Her willingness to keep treading water without the promise of anything better to come, her ability to communicate nonthreateningly and stay quiet at the right times are parts of what Nina Power describes in the chapter 'The Feminization of Labor.'"

    But there's an institutional way to think about how the precarious nature of gender and work is both reflected in and amplified by governmental regulatory regimes, and how the future looks bleak in terms of bending those regimes toward just ends. Suzanne Mettler's Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy (1998) is useful for this conversation. (Mettler, a political scientist and recent author of The Submerged State, is a favorite around here -- III, -- and recently joined our think-tank neighbors at the Century Foundation as a fellow.)

    To set up the problem, Seth Ackerman has recently discussed universal programs in the context of the Tea Party's war against the state:

    ...[I]t’s indisputable that Tea Partiers make some kind of conceptual distinction between universal programs like Social Security and Medicare and other government programs. But this says less about the Tea Party than it does about universal social programs. It is easy for liberals to point to the Tea Partiers and call them bigots because they make a distinction between 'people on welfare' and 'normal people.' But in fact it’s the state that made the distinction first. When the state operates a means-tested or other conditional program, it inspects each citizen and stamps him or her as belonging to one category or the other... Political scientists have long known that something almost alchemical happens to public opinion when a universal, as opposed to a mean-tested, welfare program is established.

    Mettler argues that this distinction comes out of the dual administrative nature of the New Deal. Part of the New Deal was to be administered by newly created federal government programs, while another part was to be administered by local and state authorities. It just so happened that the federal government's role regulated the work and lives of white men, while the state and local role retained authority over women and minorites. Keeping part of the New Deal's welfare state and floor of economic security administered at the state and local level was predicated intellectually on Brandeis' notion of the states as laboratories of democracy and politically on getting Southern white supremacists to endorse the New Deal. This meant that how people realize economic freedom could be maintained and expanded through illiberal means.

    Remember that just three years after the Lochner case, with a Supreme Court hostile to all economic regulations, it made an exception to maximum hours regulations for women. Why? In 1908, the Court ruled in Muller v. Oregon, "That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious...as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." These are the terms on which economic regulation could exist -- protecting essentialist visions of a women's place.

    Mettler argues that "programs geared toward men became nationally administered programs and those aimed toward women retained state-level authority." This welfare state led to citizens becoming "divided by gender between two different sovereignties that govern in very different ways." As she says:

    Click here to buy Senior Fellow Richard Kirsch’s new book on the epic health care reform battle, Fighting for Our Health.

    What it meant to be an "American citizen" meant very different things to the retired male breadwinner, who came to expect his monthly social security check from the national government, and to the poor mother who hoped that the social worker assigned to evaluate her eligibility for a meager welfare check would find her child-rearing and housekeeping efforts worthy. The first was treated with dignity and respect, as an entitled person; the latter, with suspicion and scrutiny.

    Mettler maps out a 2X2 grid, dividing out New Deal programs:

    The crucial point is that liberal inclusion was based on long-term, full-time work for a single employer. If you had a job along those lines --and these jobs were held by white men at that time -- then you were included in a regime of universal economic security. Short-term, part-time work for multiple employers -- work done by women and minorities -- falls through the cracks into a patchwork of state and local governance. That governance bases inclusion on hierarchical ideals invoking republican notions of where a person stood in his or her community. The notion of the "deserving poor" comes out of this relationship. Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), for instance, was predicated on single mothers being able to retain their "natural" work as housewives and child-raisers. ADC's spot inspections of single mothers for "male callers" gives you a sense of how this played out -- as Mettler notes, "officials monitored and regulated women's moral character."

    Progress was made on these New Deal programs up through the 1970s. But there's been significant rollback over the past 30 years. The call to "means-test" social insurance programs, Ending Welfare as We Know It by block-granting welfare's administrative role back to the states, the battles over block-granting Medicaid and privatizing Social Security and Medicare -- all have shifted the momentum in the opposite direction. But where does this leave us now, especially in regard to precarious labor?

    I asked Dorian Warren, Columbia political scientist, Roosevelt Institute Fellow, and union expert, about where this stands. As he puts it:

    Add up the Mettler argument with Hacker's notion of "policy drift," and most New Deal social policies (especially the FLSA and the NLRA) are outdated and obsolete. They were crafted with assumptions about work and the nature of the economy in mind: an agricultural and industrial economy, where workers had long-term attachments to one employer. That's no longer the case, and labor and employment laws haven't caught up to the new employment relationship. Long story short, we don't have the adequate legal structures to deal with this new employment environment.

    The battle to move the welfare state to the federal level, where it could be administered inclusively and universally, was an intellectual and political battle waged within the New Deal. How is this playing out in the Obama administration? I'll eventually build a full case against the "nudge" theory of the administrative state, but for now a theory of using subtle and unconscious government techniques to help people work better within "choice architectures" isn't up to the challenge of recreating a regulatory environment for a new age.

    For insight into how the current administration's approach is playing out in this model, take a look at the administration of health care reform. I asked Richard Kirsch, recent author of Fighting for Our Health and Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow, about the federal/local administration of health care reform. He responded:

    The House bill set up a strong federal exchange and let the states do their own only if their exchanges had stronger consumer protections. However with the Senate bill -- the law we have now -- states can set up very weak exchanges. And the insurance industry has lots of clout at the state level. The best hope is that there will be a strong federal exchange for states that don’t set up their own. But that will only be true if HHS creates one.

    So we have an outdated regulatory regime, an intellectual climate geared towards local, illiberal control, and the application of economic freedoms designed to keep women yoked to essentialist and moralistic discoures. A "polarizing" workforce means that the labor market, without significant reform, will take on an exaggerated version of the split we saw in the New Deal, with the precarious work falling into a patchwork administration system of moralizing and without opportunities to organize.

    Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

    Share This

Pages