Rob Parenteau

 

Recent Posts by Rob Parenteau

  • The G20 Votes for Global Depression

    Jun 7, 2010Marshall AuerbackRob Parenteau

    earth-150How global 'fiscal austerity' benefits bankers and wealthy, well-connected political insiders, while screwing the rest of us.

    earth-150How global 'fiscal austerity' benefits bankers and wealthy, well-connected political insiders, while screwing the rest of us.

    The Communiqué of the past weekend's G20 meeting illustrates that deficit hawks have gained ascendancy in global policy making circles. Great Depression II, here we come.

    "Those countries with serious fiscal challenges need to accelerate the pace of consolidation," the Communiqué noted. "We welcome the recent announcements by some countries to reduce their deficits in 2010 and strengthen their fiscal frameworks and institutions."

    European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet said fiscal tightening in "old industrialized economies" would aid the global economic "expansion" by shoring up investor confidence. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Germany was poised for a "decisive" round of budget cuts that would shape government policy for years to come.

    Although, the global economy has revived somewhat from its post Lehman collapse, it hardly merits Trichet's characterization of "expansion", given prevailing double-digit unemployment across the globe. And global recovery will be severely hampered if active fiscal policy support -- the kind of government stimulus required to sustain higher levels of growth and employment -- is completely abandoned, as the G20 discussions suggest. The new remedy for collapsing demand is "budget consolidation" -- a weasel term designed to mask more spending cuts in vital social services.

    Notwithstanding the US Treasury's attempts to mitigate the rise of hair shirt economics, the Obama Administration has contributed to this rising type of deficit reduction fanaticism through its own policy incoherence. The President and his main economic advisors -- Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers -- continue to accept the deficit hawk paradigm: they agree deficits are ‘bad' in the long term. But they argue for the necessity of tax cuts and higher government spending increases in the short term, and deficit reduction later. They also embrace the principle of "sound finance" -- the type you read about every day in the papers: balancing the budget over the course of the business cycle and only increasing the money supply in line with the real rate of output growth. They ignore the more crucial consideration: namely, that the government should maintain a reasonable level of demand at all times and that principles of "sound finance" should not be divorced from economic context.

    It's even worse in Europe. In Great Britain, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is under pressure to eliminate the UK government's deficits in spite of the fact that the previous Labour Government's aggressive deployment of fiscal policy arrested the prospect of an Iceland-style economic calamity. Yet with no unintended irony, British PM David Cameron had this particular gem of an insight:

    "Nothing illustrates better the total irresponsibility of the last government's approach than the fact that they kept ratcheting up unaffordable government spending even when the economy was shrinking." (Our emphasis)

    So we're supposed to ratchet up government spending when the economy is growing? When it can present genuine inflationary dangers? If this is the type of policy incoherence we have in store, then God help the United Kingdom. This statement would be funny if not so unintentionally destructive. The government will most certainly uphold the promise of "decades of austerity" with economic thinking of this quality.

    Meanwhile, within the rest of Europe, the so-called "PIIGS crisis" has merely further reinforced the now prevailing view that deficits are bad and destabilizing in the long term, thereby necessitating strong doses of fiscal austerity, even at the cost of more short term pain.

    They are all tragically mistaken.

    To get back to first principles, there is no meaning in the term "large deficit". As Bill Mitchell argues:

    "The budget deficit is the difference between what the government spends and what it receives in revenue (mostly from taxation collections). We call the extra spending above taxation revenue - net public spending. It is an accounting statement only (that is, records information about the flows of spending and revenue collections) but movements in the deficit do provide information about the state of the economy... the budget balance will move toward or into deficit when the economy is weak because tax revenue is falling and welfare payments are rising." (Our emphasis)

    In this circumstance, the government must increase spending (either directly or via tax cuts) to arrest the downward spiral of private spending. In basic accounting terms, government deficit spending is merely the counterpart of private sector saving. It is not some sort of financial vacuum that draws in government revenues into one big financial black hole over time. What government deficit spending does is to permit the private sector to achieve its level of desired saving. When the latter changes, government spending ought to be adjusting in the opposite direction to offset it (unless the current account balance also changes).

    The level of employment is the most obvious factor which affects the private sector's tendency to save. Higher unemployment induces a bigger desire (need) for more precautionary private sector saving. The fact that there is nearly 10 per cent official unemployment in the US at present and even higher unemployment in Europe means that the governments have not helped enough to offset this higher tendency to save by generating higher levels of employment.

    If the government ran budget surpluses for several years, then the private sector would have to run deficits for just as many years -- going into debt that totals trillions of dollars in order to allow the government to retire its debt. It is hard to see why households would be better off if they owed more debt, just so that the government would owe them less.

    We should think of the fiscal policy as a balancing wheel where spending financed by borrowing must offset the propensity to save (and the propensity to import) out a full employment level -- as long as private sector going into debt is not sufficient. Our position is, in effect, a 21st century version of the great post-Keynesian economist, Abba Lerner's "functional finance" as opposed to the misleading and destructive "sound finance" theory. Lerner explained the way we ought to decide on fiscal policy like this: "The central idea is that government fiscal policy...shall all be undertaken with an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound or unsound." ) Lerner's objective was to advance economic policy debate beyond what he called "sound finance" (which is the precursor to today's destructive neo-liberal thinking).

    Thinking along Lerner's lines, we suggest that the primary objective of fiscal policy must be to spend on productive job creation packages. It should not be driven by crony capitalism, which directs massive financial subsidies to a few wealthy, well-connected political insiders. This has been a crucial flaw in virtually all global fiscal packages. Bond holders continue to get paid back at par, whilst the sheer magnitude of these payments is being used as an excuse to slash vital public services, pensions and other government spending.

    As private spending recovers over time, the budget deficit starts to shrink automatically (via the automatic stabilisers). At some point, the government may have to cut back its discretionary net spending to avoid overall aggregate demand (the total spending in the economy) becoming excessive in relation to the capacity of the output side of the economy to produce. If demand outstrips that capacity, then we get inflation. Of course, when inflation happens, governments may choose to increase taxes to choke off some private spending. It all depends on the economic context in which these decisions are taken.

    With Lerner's ideas in mind, here's what we would consider an ideal statement from the G20:

    "A prosperous and sound economy is indeed one of the foundations of national security, if not the central pillar (or even the ground, for that matter) of any such foundation. Therefore, we demand that all G20 nations launch a new comprehensive employment security measure which entails a minimum or living wage job guarantee for all takers.

    In Europe, we urge suspension of the self-imposed fiscal rules embodied in the Treaty of Maastricht. Furthermore, we recommend the expansion of the European Investment Bank to become the funding mechanism through which the current account surplus nations, such as Germany, can recycle their surpluses in demand deficient deficit countries within the EU, so as to generate additional employment and thereby better facilitate debt service across the euro zone.

    In the US, pilot projects will be immediately authorized and put into action in Detroit and along the Gulf, preferably before a long hot summer gets too far underway. Gulf hiring will be devoted primarily to environmental restoration, including the largest scale roll out of Army Core engineers ever contemplated in civilian history to mitigate the emerging ecological disaster approaching our shores. Troop recalls and a significant slimming of the public trough upon which defense contractors have been engorging themselves since even before Eisenhower's famous "military industrial complex" confession will be completed to ensure budget "neutrality", which is an arbitrary and utterly useless thing, since the only sustainable fiscal balance is the one that ensures full employment with product price stability. The time for a new national security directive has indeed arrived, and we urge all national governments to reconsider what the true basis of national security really is - a sustainable and thriving economy, and not one picked over by global speculative capital or its sock puppets politicians within the Predator State."

    The more the bankers' interest is served, the worse and more debt-burdened the economy will become. Their gains have been bought at the price of domestic austerity. The G20 Communique irresponsibly and immorally ratifies this disgraceful state of affairs and we will all pay a severe price going forward.

    The G20 policy makers, and their allies in finanzkapital, are like vultures picking over a dying carcass. And the rest of us are helpless because the institutions designed to serve broader public purpose have become subverted. We are making bond holders and big bankers whole at the expense of impoverishing the entire society.

    It is hard to avoid drawing very dark conclusions. Our policy making elites have discovered that the underclass doesn't matter politically anymore, so why respond to it? That indifference is extending to the middle class. Ordinary, struggling folks are all becoming so demoralized that they present:

    1. No voting threat, because none of the major political parties in Europe or the US genuinely represent their interests (and haven't for years). There have been, as a result, no political price to pay for such shameless predatory capitalism.

    2. They present no power threat, because they have been systematically destroyed over the last 30 years and what is happening now in Europe represents the final assault on the residue of the 20th century welfare state (the US social safety net eviscerated well before this).

    The message from the G20 seems to be this: We're through with domestic spending to employ the underclass.

    There are decent jobs for about 20% of the working-age population in the west. And for the rest? Poverty a la South America. It is extraordinary that voters around the globe continue to tolerate this corrupt state of affairs, but it's getting increasingly hard to see a way out.

    Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Marshall Auerback is a market analyst and commentator.

    Rob Parenteau, CFA, is sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge, editor of The Richebacher Letter, and research associate at the Levy Economics Institute.

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  • The Hyperinflation Hyperventalists

    Mar 19, 2010Rob Parenteau

    panic attack

    Rob Parenteau explains why the the hyperinflationist deficit hawks need to take a deep breath.

    panic attack

    Rob Parenteau explains why the the hyperinflationist deficit hawks need to take a deep breath.

    After a two day blogging slugfest on fiscal deficits, I find that the question of hyperinflation now demands an answer.  And here it is: fiscal deficit spending may be a necessary condition of hyperinflation, but it is hardly a sufficient condition.

    Think this is yet another rant against the "deficit errorists?" Think again. Paul Krugman treated this question in his March 18th New York Times column:

    Hyperinflation is actually a quite well understood phenomenon, and its causes aren't especially controversial among economists. It's basically about revenue: when governments can't either raise taxes or borrow to pay for their spending, they sometimes turn to the printing press, trying to extract large amounts of seignorage - revenue from money creation. This leads to inflation, which leads people to hold down their cash holdings, which means that the printing presses have to run faster to buy the same amount of resources, and so on.

    Krugman locates the source of hyperinflation in what is termed the "monetization" of fiscal deficit spending. He then attributes its perpetuation to shifts in the liquidity preferences of people -- that is, the share of their portfolio that households and firms wish to hold in cash or cash like investment instruments (think Treasury bills, or money market mutual funds, for example). Krugman's logic means that even the liberal wing, or the saltwater contingent, of the economics world has a touch of deficit errorism. We would invite Paul to take a closer look at the UBS research on public debt to GDP ratios and inflation first released last summer, reprinted in a FT Alphaville note, and discussed on Naked Capitalism. The story of inflation and fiscal deficits is more ambiguous, or at least more complex than the deficit errorists would have you believe.

    Coincidentally, an investment manager friend forwarded me a letter that Ebullio Capital Management* allegedly sent to its clients after February's investment results, which took them down nearly 96% for the year - virtually wiping out their stellar gains of the prior two years. The letter reveals that Ebullio was so ebullient about the possibility (inevitability?) of hyperinflation emerging from recent policy excesses that they bet the ranch on hyperinflation plays in the commodity corner of the investing world (metals), and lost big time. While we still have questions as to whether this is a spoof or not, there are undoubtedly people sitting around in gold wondering whether the old yellow dog is going to get up and bark again anytime soon. Although hyperinflation hyperventilation has been catching on in recent months, especially amongst the deficit errorists, gold has been dead money since late November 2009.

    What gives? As a piece I wrote in the July issue of The Richebacher Letter explains, hyperinflation requires extreme conditions not just on the demand side, but on the supply side as well. A month after the Richebacher piece, Bill Mitchell published a similar conclusion. To summarize our findings: on the demand side, in order for household spending power to keep up with rising prices, household nominal incomes or credit access must be ratcheted up in synch with price hikes. Otherwise, the price hikes will not stick. Households will have to pull back less-essential spending areas to afford the same quantity of goods in essential items. So your gas, home heating oil, health care, or food bill goes up, and you cut back on your restaurant and entertainment spending, unless your paycheck also increases, or you can tap more credit. That is why hyperinflation episodes need more than just deficit spending. It is true, as Marshall Auerback and I explained in a recent New Deal 2.0 post, that fiscal deficits increase the net cash flow for the household sector as a whole. But we also usually observe some sort of escalator clauses or cost of living adjustment mechanisms built into wage contracts that allow this ratcheting up of household income pari passu with the inflation hikes. Take that element away -- and it is a recurring theme in historical episodes of hyperinflation -- and households cannot keep up with hyperinflation. The higher prices cannot get validated by higher consumer spending. The hyperinflation flares out.

    Beyond this demand side component, which is scarcely to be found in the US wage contracts these days (although we must mention it is built into some government benefit programs like social security), there is the supply side issue. Productive capacity must be closed or abandoned in order for the hyperinflation to really rip. There is a built-in dynamic that encourages this. As the hyperinflation gets recognized, entrepreneurs eventually figure out that they would be much better off speculating in commodities (like Ebullio), buying farmland, chasing gold and other precious metals, or more generally, repositioning their portfolios and reinvesting their profits in tangible assets with relatively fixed supplies. That is, goods that are fairly nonreproducible become stores of value, as it is their prices that tend to rise most swiftly, since higher prices cannot, by definition, elicit any new supplies. Hence, those of you who lived through the ‘70s (and still remember what you were doing) will recall high net worth households were busy hoarding ancient Chinese ceramics while the middle class was chasing residential real estate, and the stock market basically went sideways.

    In the case of the Weimar Republic following WWI, and Zimbabwe most recently, remember that war (civil or international), has an impeccable way of destroying productive capacity in a nation, or rerouting it to the production of war material. In the Weimar episode, the final back-breaking run up in hyperinflation accompanied the occupation by the French of the Ruhr Valley, which held a fair concentration of German production facilities. In solidarity with the workers who struck those plants in response, the Weimar Republic continued to pay the workers through fiscal measures. Cut production, but continue income flows, and you have the recipe for the kind of unresolved distributional conflict that often lies at the heart of the inflation process. Mainstream economics and popular lore refuse to see this.

    Suffice it to say that hyperinflation takes a very special set of conditions. It is not, contra Paul Krugman, all about fiscal deficits, nor is it only about fiscal deficits. That is why we do not see hyperinflation breaking out all over the place on any given day, despite the fact the governments have to first create the money that you and I use to pay taxes or buy Treasury bonds (because even though we "make" money, we cannot create it, without risking a spell in jail for counterfeiting). Know your history. Try not to pass out with the hyperventilating hyperinflationistas: they are a particularly virulent wing of the deficit errorists, and they may simply leave you in a state similar to the one alleged to have been experienced by Ebullio Capital Management's clients.

    P.S. I have a piece called "On Fiscal Correctness and Animal Sacrifices" appearing on several blogs that formed the basis for the March 2010 Richebacher Letter. It is crucial that this piece get into the hands of Paul Krugman. If anyone knows how to get to him, I would be much obliged. His July 15th, 2009 NY Times diagram, which I call the Krugman Curve, has planted a seed that he would benefit greatly from watering. I believe it would help him escape the trap of continually returning to the manipulation of real interests rates (now requiring that he advocate central banks push a credible plan to deliver higher inflation in perpetuity, since policy rates are near the zero nominal bound in many places) as the holy grail for all countries operating below potential output. Time for him to exit from the IS/LM straight jacket, which even Sir John Hicks, one of its fathers, had his sincere doubts about, as well as the intertemporal utility maximization straight jacket of his more orthodox contemporaries. He knows how to do it...he just does not know it yet, which is why this paper needs to get in his hands, and soon, before the deficit errorists claim him as one of their own.

    * You can go to Ebullio's website, but unfortunately, authorization is required to see their performance, their track record, and their client letters.

    Rob Parenteau, CFA, is sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge, editor of The Richebacher Letter, and research associate at the Levy Economics Institute.

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  • Coming to a Country Near You: Let a dozen Latvias bloom?

    Mar 8, 2010Marshall AuerbackRob Parenteau

    euro_banknotes-150Marshall Auerback and Rob Parenteau explain why self-imposed political constraints on economic policy is 'neo-liberal madness' that threatens countries around the globe. Are we next?

    euro_banknotes-150Marshall Auerback and Rob Parenteau explain why self-imposed political constraints on economic policy is 'neo-liberal madness' that threatens countries around the globe. Are we next?

    Want to see the real consequence of smash mouth economics? Forget about Greece and take a look at Latvia. Its 25.5 per cent plunge in GDP over just the past two years (almost 20 per cent in this past year alone) is already the worst two-year drop on record. The country recently reported a 12% decline in annual wages in Q4 2009 versus Q4 2008. The IMF projects another 4 percent drop this year, and predicts that the total loss of output from peak to bottom will reach 30 percent. The magnitude of this loss of output in Latvia is more than that of the U.S. Great Depression downturn of 1929-1933.

    Policies and systems built for failure

    Mainstream economics insists that one path to full employment is via lower wages. If you want to sell more labor services, lower the price of them, namely wages. This is a classic fallacy of composition argument. What might work for one firm is unlikely to work for all firms. Wage cuts in the aggregate simply destroy aggregate spending power, unless the lost demand is made up for in other ways.

    But even though Latvia's external balance is improving (largely through a collapse of imports as a result of the collapse of domestic demand), the country is unable to deploy fiscal policy effectively due to the external constraints of its monetary system, which is predicated on the existence of a currency board system. True, the current account is now turning positive, but to suggest that every single country can "internally deflate" its economy via wage destruction of this magnitude to achieve this state of affairs is another fallacy of composition argument. The whole world cannot run trade surpluses, especially not if policy is designed to destroy demand via massive wage destruction.

    More importantly, the very structure of a currency board is wrong. It requires a nation to have sufficient foreign reserves to facilitate 100 per cent convertibility of the monetary base (reserves and cash outstanding). Under this system, the central bank stands by to guarantee this convertibility at a fixed exchange rate against the so-called anchor currency. The government is then fiscally constrained and all spending must be backed by taxation revenue or debt-issuance. Pegging one's currency, then, means that the central bank has to manage interest rates to ensure the parity is maintained and fiscal policy is hamstrung by the currency requirements (which is why organizations like the IMF love them so much; it ties governments' hands). Latvia pegs its currency at 0.71 lat per Euro and joined the ERM in 2005 with the intent of qualifying for the euro zone. It operates a system similar to Argentina in the 1990s which ultimately collapsed and led to its default in 2001 (Argentina pegged against the US dollar).

    The country's debt is projected to be 74 per cent of GDP for this year, supposedly stabilizing at 89 per cent in 2014 in the best-case IMF scenario. A devaluation, however, would substantially raise the debt service ratios, given the high prevalence of foreign debt (about 89% of Latvia's debt is euro denominated). The currency peg, then, not only restricted the Latvia government's freedom of fiscal maneuver, but also created huge financial fragility because Latvians operated under the mistaken assumption that the peg was inviolable, encouraging borrowers to act with no sense of exchange rate risk. As in Argentina nearly a decade ago, a devaluation would, in all likelihood, lead to a default on external debt. Argentina did eventually manage a 25% recovery in output in the two years following Q1 2002, but only after a 190% devaluation (which was 300% at its maximum)

    As Michael Hudson and Jeff Sommers have noted, "these debt levels place Latvia far outside the debt Maastricht debt limits for adopting the euro. Yet achieving entry into the euro zone has been the chief pretext of the Latvia's Central Bank for the painful austerity measures necessary to keep its currency peg." They also point out that maintaining that peg has burned through mountains of currency reserves that otherwise could have been invested in its domestic economy. It has also precluded the use of fiscal policy, since (by virtue of Latvia's peg to the euro), the country operates under the same constraints as if it were already working within the Stability and Growth Pact rules.

    'Internal devaluation' is a toxic remedy

    With no room to adjust the exchange rate, the only other way to make the currency lose value is to engineer a real depreciation -- that is, reduce labor costs and prices in order to make its tradable products more attractive. This is euphemistically being described as an "internal devaluation" -- a one-off coordinated reduction of wages and prices across the board. It is, in reality, more like an "infernal devaluation". It amounts to a domestic income deflation as wages are crushed in order to get the prices of tradable goods down enough so the current account balance increases sufficiently enough to carry the next wave of growth. The hidden assumption is that a debt deflation spiral does not do the host country in as domestic private incomes are deflated. The argument to justify this toxic remedy is that a reduction in nominal wages and salaries can help Latvia accomplish a boom in net exports, thereby enhancing an economic recovery which would quickly attenuate or short circuit any accompanying debt deflation dynamics that might have been set off at the inception of the internal devaluation.

    Here, in a nutshell, is a country which shows us all of the misery that is enacted through the creation of self-imposed political constraints on policy. The Latvian government has voluntarily abandoned the policy tools that could make the lives of their citizens better. Policy makers have tied both their hands and their feet behind their backs so that markets could work their self-adjusting magic. They have pegged their currency; they are furiously slashing their net fiscal spending (under the IMF agreement they are due to cut their net position by 6.5 per cent of GDP -- a huge fiscal contraction), and the economy continues to deteriorate.

    This is something likely in store for Greece, which has recently introduced a new round of austerity measures in order to ensure the success of its latest bond offering. Greece and other countries now face the prospect falling private sector incomes - that is, after all, the direct and immediate result of higher taxes on businesses and households, and lower government expenditures. Euro area nominal GDP is already estimated by the OECD to have fallen over 3% in 2009. Unless the trade deficits of the nations pursuing fiscal retrenchment can swing sharply into surpluses (as lower domestic incomes lead to less import demand, and lower costs of production lead to higher exports), private debt defaults will now start to multiply and cascade through the system. Last week, as we mentioned, Moody's placed 4 Greek banks on downgrade watch. This is just the start - the fiscal retrenchment has only just begun to take effect. By taking these steps to avoid a public debt default, we would suggest these economies are now poised for more private debt defaults.

    We believe private investors do not yet get this connection, but it will be made very clear in the months ahead. Latvia, with a GDP collapse of nearly 25%, will become the poster child of the region in this regard. This private debt distress will back up into higher loan losses at German banks. Germany's hard won current account surplus will continue to fade Loan growth is already dead in the water in Europe, and if the above analysis is correct, banker perceptions of private sector creditworthiness are about to go "pear shaped", as they so delightfully put it in London.

    Paradox of public thrift

    But that's not all. Each of these countries are about to discover what we will call the paradox of public thrift. Argentina discovered this in 2001-2. Latvia and Estonia have recently rediscovered it. Ireland is rediscovering it, and within the next three months, Greece will no doubt discover it as well. We will let Bill Mitchell's comments depict the nature of this paradox for you, because it really does capture the essence of the dilemma at hand:

    From Ireland: Gov't took billions of €'s out of the economy in the form of public service pay cuts, pensions cuts, dole cuts + wave of private employees replaced by agency workers at minimum wage rates... Guess what? January tax receipts crashed yet again below projections.  After two systemic budget cuts, the tax receipts keep tanking. The mainstream consensus? We need more cuts (except for bankers and top civil servants who don't have to take wage cuts)! And the international bond market is happy with Ireland. One day we shall be able to compete with China on a level wage scale, and generous tax incentives for Multinationals. In the meantime, say hello to all the Irish immigrants for me.

    This is the future discovery awaiting Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy...and the UK...possibly Japan...and perhaps the US, although it could manage to skirt the issue for another year. In each of these nations, if the private sector is retrenching already, and the public sector tries to retrench on top of that, unless a massive swing in foreign trade can be accomplished, policy makers are unwittingly inviting falling private nominal incomes and private debt distress into the picture as they reverse fiscal stimulus.

    As private incomes fall, tax revenues fall. In order to hit fiscal targets promised to global bond holders, further expenditure cuts must be implemented, and further tax hikes must be rolled out. As the Irish blogger reveals above, this is not a theory -- it is already happening, but policy makers and investors are not willing to acknowledge it. Yet for those who understand the fiscal balance cannot be changed without influencing the cash flows and financial balances of the remaining sectors of the economy, the paradox of public thrift at this juncture is far too evident.

    We are by no means defending the generous pension benefit levels of euro zone government workers, the early retirement ages, the corrupt tax practices, etc. These are decisions the citizens of each nation need to make on their own, preferably in full awareness of their consequences, both short and long run. It is not our place to dictate the trade-offs citizens chose in each nation.

    The question we are raising, however, is whether the private leverage ratios in many of these countries will allow them to withstand the pressures of transitioning back to growth in the absence of fiscal autonomy. The now prevalent global quest for "fiscal sustainability" may place these economies on a path of private debt default, which is ultimately unsustainable for the economy as a whole. If fiscal retrenchment is to be enacted, then orderly private debt renegotiation and private asset liquidation must be accomplished at a large scale and in a timely fashion. Yet our experience is that this is no easy trick, as the near locking up of various financial channels following the Lehman debacle illustrated in no uncertain terms. Usually such a recipe delivers a financial implosion.

    Even the Honorable David Walker, CEO of the Peter G. Peterson Institute, former Comptroller General, and ardent foe of government waste and reckless spending is coming to understand the precarious nature of the current situation. In a February 24th piece on Politico.com with Larry Mishel, Walker insists on the primacy of job creation at this juncture, and recognizes this may actually serve his goal of reducing fiscal deficits in the long run:

    President Barack Obama is in a difficult position when it comes to deficits. Today's high deficits will have to go even higher to help address unemployment. At the same time, many Americans are increasingly concerned about escalating deficits and debt. What's a president to do?

    The answer, from a policy perspective, is not that hard: A focus on jobs now is consistent with addressing our deficit problems ahead.

    We have seen this movie before

    That, dear readers, is the real deal, and it is not being reported or openly discussed. We have seen this movie before in Argentina almost a decade ago. They eventually got out with a massive "external" currency devaluation of 300% and an equally massive swing in the trade balance. But the costs of delay were enormous: from 1998-2001, Argentina suffered its worst recession ever and pushed 42% of its households into poverty.

    And not every country can do what Argentina has done. Again, the whole world cannot run trade surpluses, the first mover has an advantage until the second mover moves, etc. Plus, Argentina had an explicit debt repudiation and a 300% "external" devaluation that was timed right with global recovery, hardly the sort of conditions that pertain today.

    The US has so far managed to resist anything of this magnitude. But as the voices of fiscal retrenchment intensify, a future not unlike Latvia, Greece and Argentina could await. It has taken the people of Iceland to make the first stand against this growing neo-liberal madness. In a historic referendum, over 90 per cent of the population has rejected a proposal for the repayment of billions of pounds lent by Britain and Holland to compensate depositors in a failed Icelandic bank.

    The deal would have saddled citizens of Iceland with an additional $16k in debt to compensate the UK and Holland with a $5.3 billion note for the failure of their local banks. This, in a country of a mere 300,000 citizens. The vote failure has already prompted the ratings agencies to downgrade the country to junk, as well as leaving an IMF-led loan in limbo. The "experts" are declaring this a disaster for Iceland, but they and their banking allies must secretly be dreading the result, demonstrating as it does that an international bailout watchdog is truly powerless when the people of the bailout recipient nation want to have nothing to do with a poisoned chalice of an economic "rescue", which does nothing but create a country of indentured serfs.

    It is now time for the rest of us to follow the Lilliputians of Iceland: to take the rentier juggernaut down before it completes the task. Time to pry the vampire squid off our faces so we can see the light of day again. Hopefully, Iceland represents the future, not Latvia.

    Roosevelt Institute Braintruster Marshall Auerback is a market analyst and commentator.

    Rob Parenteau, CFA, is sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge, editor of The Richebacher Letter, and research associate at the Levy Economics Institute.

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