Robert Johnson

Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on Global Finance

Recent Posts by Robert Johnson

  • Ah, Wall Street. Seeing the real you at last.

    Jul 30, 2009Robert Johnson

    math-wizard-200Robert Johnson, director of the Economic Policy Initiative of the Roosevelt Institute, argues that Wall Street can no longer dazzle Americans with fancy "innovations." Instead It must prove those innovations are good for (all of) us.

    Well, I sailed through the storm

    math-wizard-200Robert Johnson, director of the Economic Policy Initiative of the Roosevelt Institute, argues that Wall Street can no longer dazzle Americans with fancy "innovations." Instead It must prove those innovations are good for (all of) us.

    Well, I sailed through the storm

    Strapped to the mast,

    But the time has come

    And I'm seeing the real you at last.

    Bob Dylan- Seeing the Real You at Last

    Innovation.  It is a lovely word that teases the mind with the notion of expansive possibilities. Pushes out the frontier.  A win-win game.  Just as Americans once expanded westward to relieve social tensions, we are now exhorted to have a rather imprecise faith in the notion of technological change to deliver us from our current troubles.  Embracing that starship to unlimited possibility and deliverance requires a faith that cannot be easily refuted:  Who, after all, is against progress?

    David Noble, who has written so powerfully about this in his series of books including America by Design, Religion of Technology and Beyond the Promised Land, has explored this mythology of redemption and salvation through changes in technique and deference to undefined dreams of "possibility."  It is time to apply his perspective to the religion of financial innovation.

    We have seen the financial sector,  with its massive resources and access to the best minds of public relations, work to create what Stuart Ewen calls "spin."  The sector has busied itself with presenting new financial techniques, gilded as glories of 21st century innovation. In the deregulatory era of finance, we have been ever-so-persistently encouraged to draw the comparison between developments in financial products and the great leap forward in social uses of computers and the Internet, or advances in biomedical research. Former mathematicians, physicists, and computer scientists redirected their energies and Ph.D. tenacity to the domain of finance.  Financial innovation was presented to us in a way that suggested that great things were happening for mankind.  The presentations were usually vague. To understand them, we had only the power of our own imaginations, or perhaps, failing that, our awe in the face of this powerful expertise, confidently propelling us to a greater future.

    Skeptical questioning--"Where are the benefits to be found?"--was frowned upon or ignored.  "Just doesn't get it," the whisperers would say.  The skeptic was discredited with the insinuation that he or she was either 1) jealous of those who were making money and progress at the same time, or 2) had fallen down like a tired horse and just could not keep up with the new breed of thoroughbreds on Wall Street.  After all, what kind of human spirit  would get in the way of progress?

    The reason I bring forward the notion of "spin" is that I sense that the great benefits of financial innovation were not self-evident, and that some form of intimidation or coercion was needed to keep the genie of doubt in its bottle.  If a great Wall Street luminary were actually forcefully questioned, could he really convince grandma and you and me that he was making the world a better place?  The point of the exercise, the spin, was to create deference to this process, to deter questioning and create social license, to make what those rocket scientists were doing appear as though their work was not merely profitable but something that would benefit us all.   It was presented like a free option to the public: Wall Street pays these guys and "shazam!" They do things that make us all better off.   No reason to get in the way of that, or even suggest that your Congressman or friendly bank regulator keep an eye on the proceedings.  The subtle message was, "Get out of the way."  Such was the Kool-Aid poured into our glass by the financial press and pundits. That capital avoidance and tax avoidance and regulatory evasion were involved in offshore and off- balance-sheet methods was rarely emphasized, as the notion of innovation was paraded like a badge of valor.

    Then we had the crisis.  The side effects and spillovers and bailouts reminded us that what we had allowed to unfold was not a free option on progress but something that had a downside, too.  It's funny how a crisis changes your perceptions.  Derivatives are weapons of mass destruction, said Mr. Buffett, who owns large blocks of stock in many of the financial weapons manufacturers.  Paul Volcker claims now that the only worthwhile innovation he can cite is the ATM machine. (And the banks have doubled the fees for using them post bailout!).

    Despite these recent protestations, I am witnessing the lingering hangover of deference to so-called "innovation."  It permeates the debate on regulation.  We hear that getting in the way of new technique may cause more problems than it solves.  Or that the innovators can always outrun the regulators.  Or, and this is my favorite, that nothing you do to stifle these new derivative products like credit default swaps will (ominous music in the background) lead to "systemic risk."   Systemic risk is the new stun-gun phrase to impart dread to those who would tamper with this delicate machine.

    Malarky.  This is all code for defer to the wishes of those who make money from these techniques.

    Financial engineers on Wall Street are employed to make money for Wall Street firms and themselves.  There is no hidden code that says they will design their products to align private and social benefits and costs.   That is precisely where a healthy role for regulation and laws and enforcement can be envisioned.  At the same time, it is important not to be romantic about that vision, though. Regulatory policy often does not live up to the romantic appeal, as theories of collective action and regulatory capture have illuminated.

    My takeaway is distinctly unromantic.  It is that, devoid of these religious-like connotations, innovation simply implies the use of a new method or technique. It can be harmful or it can be helpful.  Let's keep score.   It can benefit us both, or it can harm us both, or it can make you better off and me worse off, or vice versa.  That sober reality, and the notion that we are a society, sets the stage for critical thinking about these methods.  If credit default swaps serve a purpose and are economically viable when proper capital and margin requirements are in place, then let the proponents bear the burden of proof in convincing us of the benefits to society according to some real social goals, rather than the vague myth of intangible progress.   Protecting the profit margins of large investment firms is not a social goal.

    We have a serious and  real problem right now as a society that employs complex technique.  Experts in the financial, nutrition, energy, and health realms have been found wanting when the curtain is pulled back and their behavior examined.  Trust, particularly in financial expertise,  has been shattered.   Early in the 20th century, the so-called  Progressive Era was an attempt to bridge the gap  between the oligarchs of industry and the populists.  Deference to expertise was said to be in the interest of all.  Delay gratification and let the experts allocate capital so that in the future we would all be better off was the mantra.  It had a religious-like psychic resonance.   Experts on economics and social planning were custodians of our future, not unlike the role that priests played in earlier times.  Restrain yourself now to achieve the promise of the afterlife. The linchpin was the experts vision and integrity.  They were trusted to make sure we all got to economic heaven together.

    We just got handed a big bill and the perpetrators that led to the bailouts are back getting large bonuses.   If experts cannot be trusted and governments are unwilling to change the rules, then we will once again be heading toward popular reaction.  The cooperative game is breaking down.  The population showed us a hint of that over the AIG bonuses. A volcano that is still today may yet explode tomorrow.

    As I watch the stories of this newest revelation on the wonders of  financial innovation, so-called high frequency trading (HFT), I scratch my head and wonder how we got to this place: That most profound mystical deity which we are asked to worship, "the market," can now be rigged so that a few get to see orders beforehand.  As Charles Duhigg wrote last week in the New York Times, "While markets are supposed to ensure transparency by showing orders to everyone simultaneously, a loophole in regulations allows marketplaces like Nasdaq to show traders some orders ahead of everyone else in exchange for a fee."

    This "innovation"--employing monster computing power and the apparent ability to buy your way to the front of the line--looks like old fashioned front-running to me.  How can that contribute to the integrity of our marketplace?  Bob Kuttner has written an illuminating piece on this subject.  For my part,  I just hope that our society can demystify (unspin?) this process.   It is time to build a financial system that serves the real economy for the next generation.  To do so, we may need to sweep aside some of the so-called innovations in financial practice that were born of this foolish era of market fundamentalism  and its supervisory and enforcement laxity. Surely there are techniques that we should adopt. Yet in the aftermath of the crisis the burden of proof is on those who advocate them. Where are the benefits to society? What are the costs? To answer those questions, we must come out from the well spun power cloud of Wall Street and ask real questions. Regarding financial innovation,  I am fond of  the lyrics of Michael Stipe.  It is time we start losing our religion.

    Rob Johnson is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Project on Global Finance at the Roosevelt Institute.

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  • Ben Stein Blows a Gasket

    Jul 27, 2009Robert Johnson

    tantrum-kid-200If you haven't already seen it, check out Ben Stein's recent piece, 'We've Figured Him Out' on Obama's healthcare bill. And brace yourself.

    tantrum-kid-200If you haven't already seen it, check out Ben Stein's recent piece, 'We've Figured Him Out' on Obama's healthcare bill. And brace yourself.

    Until I saw that this was published last Friday I was tempted to believe that Ben Stein had a bad weekend. This man, who publishes in leading newspapers, appears to have flipped out.

    Seriously, how can an intelligent person who looks at American healthcare and our shattered post crash economy really just throw critical thinking overboard and smear the President like this? He invokes fears about race relations, Middle East conspiracies, the President's patriotism, the notion that global warming is a fiction, Hillary Clinton selling "freedom" out to Iranian nuclear ambitions under Obama's leadership, and the notion that healthcare reform will take away your basic "freedom".

    One wonders so many extreme notions can be packaged into one article. This may be close to a record.

    It is also a wonder that he never explores that glorious freedom of choice of healthcare includes the freedom to be defenseless when insurance companies cut you off after you have an accident or major illness.

    Ben has, it appears, blown a gasket. I hope his insurance coverage includes a provision for mental health.

    Rob Johnson is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Project on Global Finance at the Roosevelt Institute.

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  • Taibbi's Scream: Stop the political system that lets Goldman Sachs and others run roughshod over society

    Jul 7, 2009Robert Johnson

    thescream-edvard-munch-200Braintruster Robert Johnson, Director in the Economic Policy Initiative of the Roosevelt Institute, explores why outrage is vital to reform of the financial system.

    thescream-edvard-munch-200Braintruster Robert Johnson, Director in the Economic Policy Initiative of the Roosevelt Institute, explores why outrage is vital to reform of the financial system.

    I hold my hands in front of me to block my line of sight

    It seems my eyes are growing tired of staring in the light

    The more I see the more I feel the less I want to know

    Because if you think to much you'll blow your mind

    You might just lose control and scream

    --Lyrics to "Scream," by Seven Nations

    (Kirk McLeod)

    In Matt Taibbi's vivid and provocative new article in Rolling Stone, "The Great American Bubble Machine," the man absolutely screams. Evoking the image in Edvard Munch's famous Norwegian painting, Taibbi sounds the alarm to American readers as he explores the sordid story of Goldman Sachs and Co. Tracing 90 years of political and market history, Taibbi colorfully describes the firm headquartered at 85 Broad Street as: "a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money."

    Such evocative imagery will surely be discounted by some as hysterical or exaggerated, particularly by those whose senses are deadened by the business press or CNBC-style babble. Rather than engage in a dissection of the details, I would like to explore why Taibbi is screaming and ask why he is screaming for all of us in a way we are not seeing elsewhere in the media. In addition to screaming for us, I wonder whether he is also screaming at us. One thing is certain: he is screaming in a way that a healthy press would do in a hysterical time. Goldman Sachs' uncontested success blurring the boundaries between market and state is symbolic of a tremendous malfunction in finance, politics and civil society. That the firm is well-managed by all measures and that some fine, well-meaning individuals work there is beside the point. Taibbi is telling us that the rules are rigged. That we are being abused.

    This is a time for vivid outrage.

    Taibbi's rage is filling an emotional void. It is a reaction to what is missing after this profound speculative episode that the IMF suggests will cost over $4 trillion in losses on balance sheets and untold trillions in lost output. It is fury over a crisis that is, by any measure, the most profoundly damaging episode since the 1930s (and the Bank for International Settlements Annual Report released this week strongly suggests that the burden on stockholders is far from over).

    What is it that leads to screaming? A wonderful passage in John Kenneth Galbraith's A Short History of Financial Euphoria helps explain. Dr. Galbraith seeks to identify the common elements that recur organically in the buildup and aftermath of every financial boom-bust episode:

    "The final and common feature of the speculative episode--in stock markets, real estate, art, or junk bonds--is what happens after the inevitable crash. This, invariably, will be a time of anger and recrimination and also of profoundly unsubtle introspection. The anger will fix upon the individuals who were previously most admired for their financial imagination and acuity. Some of them, having been persuaded of their own exemption from confining orthodoxy, will, as noted, have gone beyond the law, and their fall and, occasionally, their incarceration will now be viewed with righteous satisfaction.

    There will also be scrutiny of the previously much-praised financial instruments and practices--paper money; implausible securities issues; insider trading; market rigging; more recently, program and index trading that have facilitated and financed the speculation. There will be talk of regulation and reform."

    Note the elements: anger, recrimination, introspection, law breaking, incarceration, regulation and reform.

    Despite the fact that our news media have been filled with financial stories from Bear Stearns failure in March '08 to the present, the elements listed above seem neglected, muted, or in short supply (Gretchen Morgenson is the exception that proves the rule). This is disturbing, particularly given the scale of losses that the taxpayer has been forced to absorb, along with disappearing funds for future roads, bridges, healthcare, schools and a tax drag on wealth creation. It is into the void created by the tepid media coverage of this horrid and costly episode that Mr. Taibbi has screamed.

    There is an age-old tension that emerges in situations like this. You can feel it yourself. We know things are not right but do not exactly know why. Finance is complex. Since the progressive era, trust in "experts" has often been suggested as the best way for society to handle such complex phenomena. We are encouraged to delegate to the likes of leading academics, the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Secretary, and financiers themselves to keep an eye on the public interest. Public officials are explicitly employed to undertake this task on behalf of society. Those in the private sector often appeal to experts, encouraging public. deference to their superior knowledge. Experts are thought to be the custodians of the nation's health.

    As theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once described in Moral Man and Immoral Society:

    "The stupidity of the average man will permit the oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide his real purpose from effective control..... Since the increasing complexity of society makes it impossible to bring all those who are in charge of its intricate techniques and processes, and who are therefore in possession of social power, under complete control, it will always be necessary to rely partly upon the honesty and self-restraint of those who are not socially restrained."

    The problem now is that the experts and leaders from finance have failed us miserably. They have let us down and we know it. We do not trust in the system. No one thinks the Federal Reserve did a bang-up job in the years preceding this crisis. The failure is much more profound in the private sector, yet for the most part that failure goes unacknowledged. Even with losses and bailouts, we have to fight over bonus payments to those who feel entitled, despite the cost they have imposed on their stockholders and, more importantly, society.

    What we are witnessing, as I have written elsewhere, is a perverse form of insurance pay off. Let's call it political insurance. Ordinarily when insurance is offered, a premium is paid and, over time, the provider of insurance sets the rate on the premium so that they make a bit of money despite periodic payouts for accidents. What we have here is different. The financial sector, and other large patronage donors, spend billions of dollars on lobbyists and campaign contributions. Politicians then run their expensive election marketing campaigns with the proceeds. And finally, the contributors buy downside loss protection from the politicians and their appointees.

    Who provides that downside protection? You and me. The taxpayer. The body politic. We get used by this refracted process, and our system is mislabeled as a representative democracy. And, to add insult to injury, we are forced to endure the the horror of the awful marketing campaigns of politicians using the their payoff money to protect donors with our the tax base. The media is on the take, too, collecting advertising revenue from financial companies and from political campaigns. Far be it for them to step outside this circular flow of funds that impedes our political system from incorporating feedback from evidence of its own dysfunction.

    We are amidst a crisis of political legitimacy. The leaders of our complex financial firms have failed. They have failed as stewards of our nation's future. They have failed as protectors of our public Treasury. Now, with trillions guaranteed, hundreds of billions of bailouts paid, and very little in the way of investigation, firings, or prosecution of the perpetrators, we are all being asked to calm down, move on, and stop acting like populists (a pejorative term when used by elite media or financiers). In the mean time, the perpetrators of this disaster confidently pay their political soldiers for another round of lobbying/campaign contribution money. (For more detail on the numbers and firms involved see "Sold Out: How Wall Street and Washington Betrayed America". See also Thomas Ferguson's fine work collected in his book, Golden Rule.)

    Returning to Taibbi's startling article, there are many reasons for the amplified language he chooses to confront us with in rendering the social experience of Goldman Sachs (an experience that is certainly not unique to that firm). Perhaps it is illumination that Goldman Sachs and the leaders of finance have failed us as stewards and experts and that makes him mad. Or it could be that he is angry at the American people for trusting the financiers and enduring this abuse with little visible reaction. Or that the Bush and Obama Administrations and Congress have shown such little interest in investigating what happened, who did wrong, or who should be fired after drawing on the public purse to the tune of several hundred billion dollars!

    It is hard to know what is in a writer's head and heart, but the Goldman Sachs piece is so intense in comparison to Taibbi's recent offerings that I sense a message of personal revulsion. For clues to what may have triggered this revulsion, I look back to his writings when he first returned to America and the book that acquainted me with his work: Spanking the Donkey: Dispatches from the Dumb Season. The book concerns the absurd carnival of the 2004 Democratic primaries. In the introduction, Taibbi describes how he had worked in Russia as a journalist for 10 years. He details the atrocities he saw, along with his sense of sympathy and fascination for the terrible things before his eyes. In Russia, he was an observer and not an accomplice, but when he returned to the USA in 2002, Taibbi felt less detached looking at his home country: "We are a country that has a large majority that on some level knows something is terribly wrong, but can't find any positive idea that it can follow and build upon..." He describes how he had no idea how to cover the Presidental election but found the need to develop a strategy to move ahead: "...I did not see much that suggested to me that a groundswell of change is on the way. But I do believe there is a strategy to pursue in the meantime, and that is TO REFUSED TO BE LIED TO...." On the strength of that insight, Taibbi set out to write a book about lies - how to recognize them and stop believing in them.

    Taibbi's look at Goldman Sachs illuminates what is missing in our political energy as we prepare, as he suggests in the article, to get our lunch eaten again in the energy trading market. What's missing is a recognition that we have been violated by experts and leaders. What's needed is a proper cleansing of social misdeed through outrage.

    It causes me great pain to think that this sensitive and brilliant young writer, who had a ringside seat for the grotesque rape of the body politic in 1990s Russia by rapacious private oligarchs, is sickened by what he sees in the USA now! Let me say that again. He watched the rape of the Russian people up close and he is sickened by what is happening in the USA right now.

    Maybe when you see it happen in a foreign country, tragedy can be seen as comedy. Perhaps when it happens in your own country and devastates the people you love, things take on a darker tone. Or maybe it really is as objectively bad here as his scream indicates. Or at least becoming so. Whatever your interpretation, we all owe thanks to Taibbi for screaming. He is warning us, and it will do us all some good to feel his rage and connect it to the rage that resides within each of us.

    Feeling Taibbi's outrage will help us refuse to be lied to by the experts in media, politics and finance. It will help us see through them when they pretend that they have not let us down or play the same old dysfunctional political patronage game to insure that things do not change. It will help us force them to give up some of their advantage to restore some balance and better serve the American people.

    Rob Johnson is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Project on Global Finance at the Roosevelt Institute.

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  • Risky Business: Conjectural Guarantees and PPIP

    Jun 25, 2009Robert Johnson

    money-and-dice-200Robert Johnson, Director in the Economic Policy Initiative of the Roosevelt Institute, asks large scale bank bondholders like Bill Gross a simple question: Why the sudden interest in the integrity of public finances? Where was your concern in September/October of 2007?

    money-and-dice-200Robert Johnson, Director in the Economic Policy Initiative of the Roosevelt Institute, asks large scale bank bondholders like Bill Gross a simple question: Why the sudden interest in the integrity of public finances? Where was your concern in September/October of 2007?

    Questionaire, What did U stand 4?

    Questionaire, Who did U save?

    When it gets right down to-wait a minute

    When it gets right down to the nitty of the gritty

    When it gets right down to it U take more than U gave

    --From "The Truth" by Prince

    The Slippery Slope of Conjectural Guarantees

    In finance, there's something called moral hazard, and it occurs when people have an incentive to take big risks because they feel they are going to be protected from the consequences of their actions. For example, if you're behind the wheel and you have insurance, then you might just turn up the Metallica, put the pedal to the metal, and drive yourself right off a slippery slope. Your insurance company is then going to get over-sized claims that are hard to pay for. Nice for you. Not so nice for the insurance company and the other insurees.

    On Wall Street, moral hazard happens when a company has an implied guarantee (not explicitly in the contract) - known as a ‘conjectural guarantee' - that it's going to get bailed out by the government if it screws up. So, Mr. Investor tells himself, why not just invest in those who take huge risks with other people's money? The government will be there with the bailout. Nice for Mr. Investor. Not so nice for the government and the taxpayers.

    The recent New York Times puff piece on PIMCO's William Gross gave a lot of detail about the financier's yoga practice and the way he brings a lawyer with him to say "Merry Christmas." But what it fails to explore, somehow, is the elephant in the room: that Gross' entire career is one long dance of reading the probabilities of the implied guarantees, and at times, using the size and the power of his fund, to change the probabilities and induce the realization of non-contractural guarantees. It is in this respect that he is both skillful and at odds with the U.S. taxpayer. He is an investor who fosters the system of anesthetizing creditors of banks from the consequences of bad bets by those financial institutions. He is, in essence, and in fact, an enabler of moral hazard.

    It is somewhat difficult to digest the fact that for rendering these sophisticated and anti-social services, he is rewarded by the government who chose involve him in the proposed Public Private Investment Partnership (PPIP) program which give guarantees to investors, at public expense, to buy toxic assets from those financial institutions who made the mess.

    Bubble Deflated, Bubble Reflated: Is this a Crisis Gone to Waste?

    Over the years, as economic policy makers stretched themselves to great lengths to ensure that finance experienced as little downside as possible, markets responded by blowing up an ever-larger bubble on the belief that the government would always come to the rescue if trouble unfolded. This dance of moral hazard between government and the markets spiraled higher and higher, until finance eventually created a bubble so big the officials could not support it. This was evident near the end of 2007.

    That bubble of expectations and blanket guarantees was slowly deflating at the time of Bear Stearns' failure, but it violently burst with the Lehman Brothers failure and WAMU's downfall in a largely unanticipated shock to investors in bank credit. Clumsily, violently and abruptly, the presumed protection was removed, and real risk was restored to those who invested in the unsecured debt of financial instiutions. By reintroducing risk into the liabilities of Too Big to Fail Institutions (TBTF), the excessive leverage and gambling that financial institutions practiced would be curtailed. The downside,in the short run, was that this accelerated the pace of de-leveraging and spilled over onto the real economy, surely. But unlike Gross' claims, this was a problem of execution on the part of the Bush Administration, not of policy. In other words, the clumsy execution by former Treasury Secretary Paulson and the Bernanke/Geithner team at the Fed does not negate the benefits of re-introducing risk into the thinking of those who extend credit to financial institutions for the long-term balance of the financial sector and the diminution of risks to the taxpayer who ultimately backstop the financial system.

    At the time of the BofA and Citigroup worries in early 2009, Obama policies began to take shape and we might have had government restructuring of Too Big to Fail banks. But also at this time, the price of bank debt and of credit default swaps suggested that government protections for unsecured bank debt were no longer ironclad. That didn't sit well with Gross. It was at this time that he made his claims that the financial world would melt down a la Lehman if Citi or BofA were restructured. Would it? One can never be certain. But I would argue that the price structure of bank debt and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) suggest that a restructuring of these behemoths would not have been an extreme shock to the system like the Lehman and WAMU episodes were. We had already largely paid that price in September of 2008. We had already digested the disruptive surprise. No one priced Citi or Bof A debt like it was risk free after the inauguration.

    In the end, the Obama team did not go the way of restructuring and Administration officials appeared to heed Gross' advice/threat. The Geithner/Summers team have reinvigorated those old -- and dangerous -- conjectural guarantees with their capital assistance program and forbearance. They offered protection to creditors that will anesthetize their concerns and subsidize those who engage in risky behavior at the large financial institutions.. Once again, bank debt is overpriced and leverage subsidized.

    This scenario is just what the Too Big to Fail financial institutions and their creditors would like: Insurance coverage with no premium. Again. I wonder if Rahm Emanuel thinks the reapplication of anesthetic to unsecured creditors of our TBTF institutions was necessary? From my perch, it looks like they blinked and wasted the financial crisis potential to catalyze meaningful structural change.

    PPIP is a Win Win Win: All for PIMCO

    In terms of lessons for the future, the most candid and interesting portion of the New York Times article is where Mr. Gross discusses -- quite openly -- the benefits of PPIP (Public Private Investment Partnership) for his firm. He once said this approach would be a "win-win-win" for the government, taxpayers and investors. Well, it is surely is a "win-win-win" for PIMCO. They make money managing government programs for the Treasury in the ring-fence structures surrounding assets at troubled financial institutions. They make money on PPIP investments in distressed assets, and they make still more money indirectly by vacuuming assets off of the balance sheets of banks at subsidized prices and making sure they won't be forced in the future to restructure their existing holdings of unsecured bank debt at those troubled institutions. That last side effect should trouble the Treasury: it gives PIMCO a motive to drive prices higher than any fair market value.

    Warren Buffett (along with PIMCO and Goldman Sachs) had recommended a PPIP-like structure to the government in 2008. He has said that this financial crisis is the economic equivalent of Pearl Harbor, and that the American people must band together like they did in response to the Japanese attack. What concerns me about PPIP is that it looks like the American people are being asked to band together and use their tax dollars to enrich firms like PIMCO, Goldman Sachs, and Berkshire Hathaway as they rebuild the Japanese bomber fleet -- in this case the large banks and investment banks that did the damage.

    PPIP is demoralizing for the taxpayers and believers in fairness. The subsidy structure is extreme.  But perhaps the most toxic aspect of the plan to clean up the mega financial institutions toxic balance sheets is that it fortifies the Too Big Too Fail market structure that produced this crisis in the first place. As if that weren't enough, it invites the moral hazard and regulatory timidity that large institutions are often able to inspire. Again the crisis appears to have been wasted and we have fostered structures that set the stage for the next disaster.

    As we look to the future and the long-term consequences of our bailout policies, I anticipate that Mr. Gross will, like most bondholders, be a strong voice for deficit reduction and anything that alleviates fears of potential inflation. Now that bank creditors have taken theirs, we will see them return to their traditional role as disciplinarian deficit hawks who work very hard to see that the full force of "opportunity cost" of the bailouts is visited upon the body politic.

    I hope they will be called upon to answer why exactly they took a vacation between September of 2007 and April of 2008, before resuming their defense of the integrity of public finances. They should be forced to explain to the American people why their priorities -- like bailing out their bond investments in the reckless and risky behavior of mega finance -- were so much more important than the priorities of those who want schools, roads, bridges, hospitals and healthcare.

    Braintruster and economist Robert Johnson is former managing director of Soros Fund Management. Dr. Johnson served as Chief Economist of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee under the leadership of Chairman William Proxmire and before that, as Senior Economist of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Pete Domenici.

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  • The Government Plays Blackjack with the Bond King

    Jun 23, 2009Robert Johnson

    blackjack-200Are the interests of PIMCO and its CEO Bill Gross at odds with those of the American taxpayer? Braintruster Rob Johnson explores the questionable business of the government/private investor handshake.

    Merry Christmas, Mr. Gross

    blackjack-200Are the interests of PIMCO and its CEO Bill Gross at odds with those of the American taxpayer? Braintruster Rob Johnson explores the questionable business of the government/private investor handshake.

    Merry Christmas, Mr. Gross

    Bill Gross, founder of PIMCO, the world's largest and most influential bond investment house, embodies a crucial dimension of this financial crisis -- the enrichment of questionable financiers at taxpayer expense. Just yesterday, the New York Times gave Mr. Gross a Christmas present: a puff piece which failed to ask important questions about this celebrity bond trader and his influence on government.

    The bailout, you'll recall, was done with taxpayer money - not, as Joe Stiglitz, Luigi Zingales, John P. Hussman and I suggested, through the debt of the unsecured creditors (debt/equity swaps). That decision dealt out billions of dollars from taxpayers to bank bond holders like PIMCO investors. It also made Mr. Gross (a self-described fan of blackjack) a big winner in the public policy design that will impact US public finances for years to come. In his June 20 New York Times profile, "Treasury's Got Bill Gross on Speed Dial," Devin Leonard picked the right subject, but he missed the point entirely. His discussion revealed neither the scope of the ethical questions surrounding Mr. Gross nor the resulting opportunity cost for society.

    When I say ‘opportunity cost,' I mean the portions of the $800 billion taxpayer contribution to unsecured bank bond holders that could have been used to support education, roads, bridges, and healthcare provision. Instead of society coming out ahead, we rewarded the wealth-holders that made bad bets on bank debt when asset quality on bank balance sheets deteriorated and wiped out equity. Future generations are the losers, forced by our policy officials to support the existing unbalanced distribution of wealth.

    At PIMCO headquarters in Newport Beach, CA, the mortgage trading operation is on one floor, and on the floor below, traders are working on behalf of the Federal Reserve. Leonard recounts a curious episode showing Mr. Gross taking great care to separate himself and the bond funds from the department at that deals with the government. When Mr. Gross wishes to bestow a holiday greeting upon the troops down at the government desk, he brings a lawyer who speaks on his behalf: "Mr. Gross said ‘Merry Christmas.'" This bizarre ritual is ostensibly evidence that 1) Mr. Gross has a heart, which is on display during the holidays, and 2) conflicts of interest are being handled ethically. Actually, both these inferences are both beside the point. Despite the corny portrait of ethical compliance, this not where the conflict between large, influential bond investors and the government lies, and Mr. Gross knows it.

    But does the New York Times know it? Leonard does not question the false purity of having a lawyer present to bear witness to the wishing of Merry Christmas, and that is perhaps the most curious fact of all.

    Mr. Gross Plays Bailout Chicken

    Timothy Geithner likes dialing him for advice. Alan Greenspan works as his consultant. But who is Mr. Gross? Is he a financial architect and a communicator? Or is he a pontificator and an intimidator? And what exactly has he been doing to benefit society that the government should be working so closely with him?

    Not everyone agrees with my view that debt restructuring at large banks was the correct policy direction -- certainly not Mr. Gross. Some critics say that the game between taxpayers and bank bond holder is not zero sum. According to this argument, a restructuring of Citi or BoFA could have sent world capital markets into a tailspin and our real economy would suffer along with the diminished bond holders. We would all go down with the bankers' ship. Mr. Gross, for one, alleges that restructuring would have ignited another Lehman Brothers-scale crisis -- or more.

    Leonard quotes Gross's ominous comments in a monthly newsletter: "If you thought Lehman Brothers was a mistake, just stand by and see what nationalizing Citi of B. of A. would do"

    Simon Johnson, quoted in the Leonard piece, is among those who question the credibility of warnings about systemic meltdown by financiers who benefit from bailouts. Public observations made by someone referred to as the leader of the largest fixed income fund in the world -- a person economic historian Niall Ferguson has called "The Bond King" -- can be construed as threats when heard by government officials. Such officials may respond with what was once called a "capital strike" -- changing policies to benefit a powerful investor.

    Leonard's article contains another telling passage on bank nationalization:

    "Such nationalization, Mr. Gross insists, would be an unmitigated disaster. 'There are two grand plans,' he said this spring at a meeting of his firm's investment committee. 'One is the Krugman-Roubini plan. They think the banks have so much garbage they are beyond hope. The other side is the administration's side. That's the one we're on. If the other side should ever gain credence, then we'll have something to worry about."

    Who exactly is the "we" in the statement "we'll have something to worry about"? Given that Gross was speaking to the investment committee and the scale of the losses are estimated at trillions of dollars -- beyond what any government could be expected to put forth in a bailout -- I would guess that the "we" was PIMCO rather than the nation. In other words, the resolution of Too Big to Fail was tantamount to losses Too Big for PIMCO.

    But PIMCO's potential windfalls don't stop there. Stay tuned for analysis of the firm's involvement in other government financial business. Such involvement certainly qualifies the company for scrutiny alongside Goldman Sachs and their adventures in the realm of AIG that Gretchen Morgenson has illuminated. A deeper dig than Mr. Leonard conducted is certainly still worthy of pursuit.

    In any case, no man should ever need a lawyer standing by in order to wish you Merry Christmas.

    Braintruster and economist Robert Johnson is former managing director of Soros Fund Management. Dr. Johnson served as Chief Economist of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee under the leadership of Chairman William Proxmire and before that, as Senior Economist of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Pete Domenici.

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