Assessing Yet Another Round of the Structural Unemployment Arguments

May 8, 2012Mike Konczal

No matter how much elites insist that our unemployment problem is structural, they don't have the data on their side.

David Brooks has the 2012 version of the structural unemployment argument in his editorial today, "The Structural Revolution." Here's rooting for this one, as the previous arguments haven't held up all that well.

No matter how much elites insist that our unemployment problem is structural, they don't have the data on their side.

David Brooks has the 2012 version of the structural unemployment argument in his editorial today, "The Structural Revolution." Here's rooting for this one, as the previous arguments haven't held up all that well.

The 2010 version of the argument had to do with an increase in JOLTS "job opening" data, data that turned out to be incorrectly estimated by the BLS (as we learned in 2011). The 2011 version focused either on the idea that the unemployed had bifuricated into a normal unemployment market and a long-term, zero-marginal productivity market (it hadn't) or that the "regulatory uncertainty" of the Obama administration was holding back the economy (which, as Larry Mishel found, wasn't backed by the data).

There's been a ton of situations where these structural unemployment arguments came charging down the runway only to hit a cement wall of data. One "oops" moment was Raghuram Rajan citing Erik Hurst in claiming that unemployment would be three points lower if it wasn't for "structural" reasons, and Hurst having to publicly point out his preliminary research said nothing of the sort. Another was Rajan arguing, in June of 2011, against monetary policy. Why? Because "one view is that corporate investment is held back by labor-market rigidities (wages are stubbornly too high)....There is, however, scant evidence that the real problem holding back investment is excessively high wages (many corporations reduced overtime and benefit contributions, and even cut wages during the recession)." Empirically that means that there shouldn't be any bunching of wage changes at the zero mark. Here's what the San Francisco Fed found early this year:

Whoops.

Apparently none of that changed anything for anyone. So what do we have now? I want to address three specific points in Brooks's essay which I think are wrong in a very useful way. First, Brooks argues that "Running up huge deficits without fixing the underlying structure will not restore growth." The argument here is that a larger deficit will not help with short-term growth. I'll outsource this to Josh Bivens, addressing a similar argument from Adam Davidson:

This is the reverse of the truth – there is wide agreement that debt-financed fiscal support in a depressed economy will lower unemployment. Now, it’s true that there are holdouts from this position. And others who think the benefits of lower unemployment are swamped by the downsides of higher public debt (they’re wrong, by the way). But, the agreement is much more widespread – ask literally any economic forecaster, in the public or private sector, that a casual reader of the Financial Times has heard of if, say, the Recovery Act boosted economic growth. They will all tell you “yes.”

You won’t find anywhere near such a consensus on long-run tax or education or health care policy. In fact, public finance economists can’t get unanimous agreement on if, in the long run, income accruing to holders of wealth should be taxed at all (it should, by the way). In short, anybody waiting for the current unpleasantness to pass and for economists to unite in harmony in future policy debates shouldn’t hold their breath...

Lastly, Davidson notes that there is a rump of economists (he calls them, reasonably enough, the Chicago School) that argue that debt-financed fiscal support cannot help economies recover from recessions. But, it’s important to note that there is pretty simple evidence that can be brought to bear on this Keynesian versus Chicago debate. Nobody denies, for example, that the government could borrow money and just hire lots of people – hence creating jobs. What the Chicago school argues is that this borrowing will raise interest rates (new demand for loans will increase their “price,” or interest rates) and this increase in interest rates will dampen private-sector demand. But interest rates have not risen at all since the Recovery Act was passed and private investment has risen, a lot.

Second, Brooks argues that "there are the structural issues surrounding the decline in human capital. The United States, once the world’s educational leader, is falling back in the pack." If this is the case -- that our problems are a lack of education and investment in human capital -- then recent college graduates would have significantly lower unemployment rates than most, or they would be the same, or if they were higher then they'd come down even faster. Also from EPI, Heidi Shierholz, Natalie Sabadish, and Hilary Wething, "The Class of 2012":

Young people with recent college degrees have high unemployment rates. That's not good, either for Brooks's argument or for the huge number of young people being devastated by the weak economy and the weak response of elites.

Third, we have Brooks arguing that there are issues "surrounding globalization and technological change. Hyperefficient globalized companies need fewer workers. As a result, unemployment rises, superstar salaries surge while lower-skilled wages stagnate, the middle gets hollowed out and inequality grows." Some occupations require high skills and have sufficient demand, but some occupations require mid-skills and are disappearing. (Low-skill jobs should be fine on unemployment, but low on wage growth, in most versions of this "job polarization" theory.)

Let's take BLS CPS unemployment data by occupation, March 2007 and March 2012, and see if you can tell me which occupations require these high-end skills from their low 2012 unemployment rates:

I'm having trouble seeing them in the data.

So here's the important thing about the demand-side recessions: If I wanted to come up with a "supply" theory for Brooks, I'd say, looking, at the data above, that we have too many college graduates and too many business and professional workers. I'd also say we have too many non-college graduates and too many service workers. I'd also say we have too many of all ages, all educations, and all occupations. Something is weak at a fundamental level in the economy, which is impacting everything, even before we get to the pressing issues related to job polarization or education. That weakness is demand, and that is where the policy response should be. Don't tackle it, and the longer-term problems are even harder to manage.

As David Beckworth noted, "[t]his evidence in conjunction with that of downward wage rigidity excess money demand, and the Fed handling the housing recession just fine for two years should remove any doubt about there an aggregate demand problem. The real debate is how best to respond to this problem." The evidence he referred to was the SF data noted above along with the tracking he found between sales being reported as the "single most important problem" by small businesses and the unemployment rate:

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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FDR's New Deal Shattered the Austerity Myth

May 7, 2012David Woolner

FDR understood that prosperity would be created through growth, not austerity, and today's leaders may finally be learning the same lesson.

To balance our budget in 1933 or 1934 or 1935 would have been a crime against the American people. To do so we should either have had to make a capital levy that would have been confiscatory, or we should have had to set our face against human suffering with callous indifference. When Americans suffered, we refused to pass by on the other side. Humanity came first.

FDR understood that prosperity would be created through growth, not austerity, and today's leaders may finally be learning the same lesson.

To balance our budget in 1933 or 1934 or 1935 would have been a crime against the American people. To do so we should either have had to make a capital levy that would have been confiscatory, or we should have had to set our face against human suffering with callous indifference. When Americans suffered, we refused to pass by on the other side. Humanity came first.

…This debt is not going to be paid by oppressive taxation on future generations. It is not going to be paid by taking away the hard-won savings of the present generation. It is going to be paid out of an increased national income and increased individual incomes produced by increasing national prosperity. — Franklin Roosevelt, 1936

The recent news that the U.K. and other major European economies have officially entered a double dip recession has led many observers to argue, as the New York Times did last week, that the economic policies followed by the Obama administration have been better than the austerity measures pursued by his European counterparts. Indeed, most mainstream economists now agree with the voters in France, who, in electing François Hollande as their next president, have endorsed the idea that “austerity need not be Europe’s fate.”

There is a growing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that President Obama's approach, which has combined stimulus spending, capital injections, and quantitative easing, is largely responsible for the fragile yet steady recovery the United States has been experiencing since 2010. Granted, the U.S. economy remains weak, and as such there is real concern that the downturn in Europe might drag the U.S. back into recession. But there is another, perhaps greater risk to the U.S. recovery that emanates from our own shores: the incessant demand for European-style federal budget cuts from American austerity hawks.

As evidenced by last summer’s debt ceiling debacle or the draconian budget proposed this spring by Rep. Paul Ryan, the right wing of the Republican party will seemingly stop at nothing to achieve its goal of cutting the size of government. Moreover, its unremitting sky-is-falling rhetoric—which is based largely on fear—has become so pervasive in our political discourse that the question of cutting the federal deficit receives nearly equal footing with the issue of job creation in the media and on the campaign trail. We are told again and again that the way to create jobs is to reduce spending and cut the size of government. Never mind that these policies have failed in Europe over the past two years, while President Obama’s rejection of austerity has resulted in sustained economic growth over exactly the same period.

Roughly three-quarters of a century ago, a similar argument raged between Franklin Roosevelt, who firmly believed that it was right and proper for the government to intervene in the economy during a time of crisis, and those on the extreme right who insisted the way to end the Great Depression was to reduce the federal deficit and balance the budget, no matter what the short-term costs.

FDR had little time for such arguments, which he viewed as not only selfish, but un-American. In his view, most Americans, “if they know both sides of a question and are asked to support the public good, will step forward and lay aside selfishness.” But, he went on:

…we must admit that there are some people who honestly believe in a wholly different theory of government than the one our Constitution provides.

You know their reasoning. They say that in the competition of life for the good things of life “some people are successful because they have better brains or are more efficient; the wise, the swift and the strong are able to outstrip their fellowmen.” And they say that that is nature itself and you cannot do anything about it and it is just too bad if some, the minority of people, get left behind.

For Roosevelt, however—and the vast majority of Americans who voted for him over the course of four terms in office—such an attitude was unacceptable. They understood that there were times in the life of a nation when government had a duty to intervene in the economy, even if it meant going into debt. Thanks to their efforts, and to their faith in government, we continue to enjoy Social Security, unemployment insurance, Federal Deposit Insurance, and a host of other beneficial programs that came from the New Deal.

Conservative commentators today are fond of arguing that the New Deal did not work, that it was the war, rather than New Deal spending, which finally got the United States out of the Great Depression. What they fail to mention, of course, is that New Deal spending did work, just not enough to pull us out of the deep trough we were in. For that we needed much more spending, the kind of spending—and borrowing—that occurred in World War II. According to the logic of today’s budget hawks, such a massive level of deficit and debt should have brought the U.S. economy to a screeching halt once the war was over. But that did not happen. On the contrary, the period of economic growth that occurred in the United States after the war was the largest and longest the world had ever seen.

Much like the 1930s, our slow climb out of the Great Recession has been made all the more difficult and painful thanks in large part to the unwillingness of austerity hawks in Congress to pass the president’s ill-fated jobs bill and other pieces of stimulus legislation. Sadly, they seem far more interested in promoting the myth of austerity and the evils of short-term deficit spending than they do in confronting the overwhelming evidence from Europe and our own history that now is the time not to cut the federal budget, but to expand it.

David Woolner is a Senior Fellow and Hyde Park Resident Historian for the Roosevelt Institute. He is currently writing a book entitled Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden and the Search for Anglo-American Cooperation, 1933-1938.

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Mark Schmitt: Are Think Tanks Too Politicized?

May 3, 2012

In the latest episode of our weekly Bloggingheads series, "Fireside Chats," Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Mark Schmitt sat down with Tevi Troy from the Hudson Institute to talk about the history of think tanks and whether or not they've become too politicized.

In the latest episode of our weekly Bloggingheads series, "Fireside Chats," Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Mark Schmitt sat down with Tevi Troy from the Hudson Institute to talk about the history of think tanks and whether or not they've become too politicized. Tevi thinks they are, but Mark points out that there are different types of think tanks and not all are out to buttonhole politicians into switching their votes five minutes before they walk onto the floor of Congress. However, in the clip below, he argues that those that do intend to shape policy play an increasingly important role in our national debate.

Mark notes that the recent Cato Institute controversy has drawn attention to the politicization of think tanks, but how did they become politicized in the first place? Tevi points to 1984, when Democrats' loss to Ronald Reagan inspired the creation of the Progressive Policy Institute, which would eventually develop many of President Clinton's ideas and policies. Once the Democrats won in 1992, Republicans responded by creating their own think tank, Project for the Republican Future. Tevi calls this the "Lose an Election, Gain a Think Tank" pattern that has developed over the past 30 years. 

Are these politicized versions of think tanks healthy? While Tevi argues that we have gotten further and further away from the original non-partisan think tanks that value expertise over politics, Mark points out that there is a place for both the advocacy-focused think tank and the ones more involved with influencing policies, and that most are actually not involved with policy outcomes. Mark talks about his time on Capitol Hill and remembers that some think tanks were very open about the fact that they solely wanted to influence legislation. He saw firsthand that many Republican think tanks were incrediblly influential with politicians, which led progressives think tanks to decide that they needed to offer their own legislative response. Mark agrees with Tevi in the changing nature of think tanks that "part of it may be the simple polarization of American politics, but that for example, "in the founding of the Heritage foundation" they decided that they needed "something that's in the game." It's hard to not play the game if that is the only road to success.

The question remains, as Mark and Tevi discuss, how much of an effect the various sources of funding for each think tank shape the way the research is done and the final outcomes of proposed legislation. For more of this conversation, check out the full video:

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A Majority of Those Who Claim EITC Are on it for Less Than Two Years

May 2, 2012Mike Konczal

Here's a datapoint I was surprised to learn. From a footnote by Bob Greenstein of CBPP, there's a paper titled 

Here's a datapoint I was surprised to learn. From a footnote by Bob Greenstein of CBPP, there's a paper titled Income Mobility and the Earned Income Tax Credit: Short-Term Safety Net or Long-Term Income Support, by Tim Dowd and John B. Horowitz.

Is the safety net a hammock?  And is the system fundamentally broken if some 40 percent of American don't pay an income tax? This is the brunt of the conservative attack on the welfare state.  As Paul Ryan notes, his plan will make sure the government doesn't "turn the safety net into a hammock that lulls able-bodied people to lives of dependency and complacency, that drains them of their will and their incentive to make the most of their lives." Ryan's plan is focused on cutting spending through the tax code.  Most tax code spending benefits the top 20 percent of Americans, with one exception - the set of refundable credits including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  Those mostly go to those in the bottom 40 percent of Americans.  If you have the concerns mentioned above, the EITC is the place you'd cut.

But does the EITC represent a "hammock," a permanent class of the poor living lives of "depenency and complacency"?  For one, EITC is connected to those who work, so one would think that it would be excluded from the assault on the welfare state.  But beyond that, it appears that those claiming EITC are people going in and out of working poverty with a surprising turnover frequency.  From the Dowd/Horowitz paper (my bold):

Sixty-one percent have spells of one or 2 years. However, at the same time, we find that 20 percent of EITC recipients starting a spell, conditional on observing the taxpayer in 1989, claim the credit 5 or more years. Therefore, for some taxpayers, the EITC acts as a temporary safety net during periods of either anticipated or unanticipated income or family structure shocks. But the EITC also acts as a long-term mechanism of providing assistance to taxpayers with children who are entrenched in the lowest- income brackets.

Indivar Dutta-Gupta at CBPP has more on the study, also noting that (my bold):

The EITC goes to working people — the overwhelming majority of them families with children — with incomes up to roughly $49,000.  Earlier unpublished research from Dowd and Horowitz found that EITC users pay much more in federal income taxes over time than they receive in EITC benefits.  Taxpayers who claimed the EITC at least once during the 18-year period from 1989 through 2006 paid several hundred billion dollars in net federal income tax over this period, after subtracting the EITC and any other refunds.

Dowd and Horowitz’s new study also found that EITC use is highest when children are youngest — which is also when parents’ wages are lowest.  (Working parents’ wages rise, on average, as their children grow up.)  This finding is particularly important given the importance of income for young children’s learning and the evidence that poverty in early childhood may reduce children’s earnings as adults.

Rather than a permanent class of non-taxpayers, EITC users do, in fact, pay more in federal taxes over time than they get in EITC benefits, which represents how many of them move in and out of working poverty over the course of several years.  The study finds that mobility is lower on the whole for this group, which makes a safety net even more of a necessary thing.  But perhaps we can cut with the hammock language, and focus on the metaphor of a trampoline, providing people much needed support when there's a sudden shock to the economy or their lives that drops their ability to provide for themselves, and also a mechanism that promotes the kind of risk-taking we want in our society.  The question is how to make that stronger.

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Will Ryan's Budget Take a Page From the 18th Century and End Progressive Taxation?

May 1, 2012Mike Konczal

Jonathan Chait has a great article on Paul Ryan in New York Magazine, which includes an important quote from anti-tax adovcate Grover Norquist: "We don’t need a president to tell us in what direction to go. We know what direction to go. We want the Ryan budget...

Jonathan Chait has a great article on Paul Ryan in New York Magazine, which includes an important quote from anti-tax adovcate Grover Norquist: "We don’t need a president to tell us in what direction to go. We know what direction to go. We want the Ryan budget... Pick a Republican with enough working digits to handle a pen to become president of the United States.” Earlier in the year Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein walked readers of the Washington Monthly through what it would look like to have a Republican House, Senate, and president -- and the likelihood that they would pass the Ryan budget through reconciliation.

Degressive Taxation

One of the centerpieces of the Ryan budget's Path to Prosperity is tax reform. The tax overhaul will cut tax expenditures (without naming any) while also reducing the current set of six tax brackets to just two. One bracket will have a tax rate of 10 percent and the other will be 25 percent. Here's a question: should we think of these two rates as a special form of a flat tax? Would this budget be the end of progressive taxation in the United States?

There's an excellent 1908 book called Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice (you can download a copy at that google books link). Written by Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman for the American Economic Association, it set out to catalogue every argument in history for and against progressive taxation as well as proportionate taxation (or what we'd now call a flat tax). While walking through all the arguments, he has to classify a set of arguments that aren't strictly either -- something he calls "degressive taxation."

Degressive taxation is where you have two tax rates: Below a certain income it is one rate, and above that income it is a second, higher rate. Typically it is a zero rate of taxation for income below the poverty line, and a flat, proportionate rate for income above that.

Arguments for degressive taxation were very common in 18th century Europe. The French political economist François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais argued in 1758 that "the object of taxation is the preservation of property; and property is nil if it does not afford subsistence. Hence, the physical subsistence of every family is a privileged part of all income. Only the surplus above this minimum can be assigned to the public for the support of government."  Zero taxes for incomes up until poverty, flat tax above poverty.

Dean Woodward put the argument even more strongly in 1768. "Before we begin to tax any income for the poor, we must deduct from it as much as is requisite to purchase for the possessor and his family the absolute necessaries of life.  No man can be bound to give to another what is essential to his own subsistence.  To this every man has the exclusive right on which the very claim of the poor is founded."

Even though it isn't a flat tax across the entirety of income, as there are two distinct tax brackets, none of these people viewed their project as one of progressive taxation. Lord Auckland, debating England's first income tax in 1799, exempted 60 pounds for taxation as the minimum of subsistence but rejected progressive taxation "because of the implied inference, that because a man possesses much, therefore more shall be taken from him than is proportionably taken from others." As Seligman noted, surveying the arguments, "in degression the ideal is proportional taxation, although a concession is made, through lower rates or exemptions or abatements, to the poorest classes who ought theoretically to pay the same rate but who are deemed to be unable to do so."

How Does The Ryan Plan Stack Up Against the 18th Century?

I think it is fair to characterize the Ryan plan as, in its ideal, a degressive taxation plan. A low rate for those with little and a flat tax for everyone else. There are a few things that complicate this picture. It isn't clear where the 10 percent bracket ends and the 25 percent bracket starts (the 25 percent bracket now runs from $35,351 - $85,650 for singles, so in theory the 10 percent could run from $0 to $35,350). As James Kwak and many others point out, the numbers don't work -- this would be a major tax cut for the rich and a major tax hike for the working and middle classes.

However, would people making poverty wages pay ten percent under the Ryan Plan, or zero percent? People working for poverty wages now don't often pay income taxes because of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). But would Ryan look to cut the EITC tax break? As this fantastic New York Times chart shows, some sets of tax expenditures tilts to the 1% and some tilt to the bottom 40 percent:

Refundable tax credits, like the EITC, benefit the bottom 40 percent of Americans. The preferential treatment of capital gains and dividend income benefits the top 20 percent, especially the top 1%. Ryan is clear that he wants to give capital gains and dividends even better treatment. But will he look to cut the EITC, making those in poverty pay more? It's not clear from anything I can find. As Tim Noah writes, Eric Cantor looks pretty set on getting those who pay nothing in income tax to pay something, and cutting the EITC is the way to do that.

Looking further afield, Yuval Levin's big article "Beyond the Welfare State," the intellectual firepower (Committee on Social Thought-trained) justifying something like the Ryan Plan, mentions only three exemptions "worth keeping" after the conservative new dawn: "retirement savings (which are far preferable to universal cash benefits to retirees), a unified child tax credit (to encourage parenthood and to offset the mistreatment of parents in the tax code), and the charitable-giving deduction (since a reduction in government's role in social welfare must be met with an increase in the role of civil society, which should be encouraged)." Nothing specifically targeted for supplementing the incomes of those making poverty-level wages.

Which also means that at the turn of the 21st century, after centuries of economic growth, the conservatives in the United States are looking at tax policy potentially far more regressive at a conceptual level toward the poor than classical liberals in the mid 18th century. Forget so-called moderate Republicans of the Eisenhower-era; can we just get a handful of 18th century tax scholars in the Republican party?

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Dorian Warren: Criminals, Conservatives, and Oligarchs Are Deepening Inequality

Apr 27, 2012

This week, Roosevelt Institute Fellow Dorian Warren joined a panel on America's growing inequality crisis hosted by The Century Foundation and featuring TCF's Greg Anrig, Daniel Alpert, and Robert Hockett along with Timothy Noah, author of The Great Divergence. In the video below, Dorian lay

This week, Roosevelt Institute Fellow Dorian Warren joined a panel on America's growing inequality crisis hosted by The Century Foundation and featuring TCF's Greg Anrig, Daniel Alpert, and Robert Hockett along with Timothy Noah, author of The Great Divergence. In the video below, Dorian lays out three points that need to be included in any discussion of what's causing inequality and how we can address it: lawless employers, race-based political polarization, and the rise of an American oligarchy.

On the first point, Dorian notes the recent Wal Mart bribery scandal and says that when you think of "the lawlessness of Wal Mart when it comes to unionization, I think that's a great example to think about the other ways in which employers have pretty flagrantly violated the law in the last 20 years or so. So when you think about minimum wage, when you think about health and safety, we're in a new environment, and activists who work on this call this 'wage theft.'" He highlights some shocking statistics from a 2009 study that shows how badly low-income workers have been ripped off by their employers and points out that there is a "basic principle of the social contract that when you work at a job you have an agreement with the employer for how much you're going to make... There is a pretty systematic violation of that contract, and that explains at least part of the wage stagnation that we've seen in the low-wage service sector specifically." While updating and modernizing labor laws is important, "monitoring and enforcement of existing wage and hour laws are really important."

Where race is concerned, Dorian argues that while it doesn't explain the rise of inequality by itself, "there is a story where race does play a role, and it's a political story." He points out that "for 80 percent of our country's history, the majority of Americans weren't classified as citizens," and that Lyndon Johnson's signing of the Civli Rights Act caused an exodus of white southerners from the Democratic Party to the GOP. He says that "there is a difference between Republican administrations and Democratic administrations, but how you get to a Republic administration has to be part of that story, and that's very much about race and the response of southern whites to greater inclusion into American democracy." This racial backlash in turn helps to shape the policies that further inequality.

Finally, Dorian says that it's difficult to find solutions to the problem of inequality, as even the best policy solutions may not be politically viable. Citing political scientist Jeffrey Winters, he asks, "How do we make sense of the fact that we live in both a democracy and an oligarchy at the same time?" Wealth has become highlighy concentrated in the U.S. while also granting the wealthy a disproportionate level of political influence and a number of methods to safeguard their wealth and prevent redistribution. He notes that "the expectation of democracies is that non-rich people would outnumber rich people and therefore demand through their vote the one thing that makes everybody equal, greater redistribution." He concludes with the toughest question of all: "From the 1960s to the present, when we've expanded our democracy, how is it the case that we've also seen more redistribution but actually less and greater inequality?"

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Dorian Warren: Criminals, Conservatives, and Oligarchs Are Deepening Inequality

Apr 27, 2012

This week, Roosevelt Institute Fellow Dorian Warren joined a panel on America's growing inequality crisis 

This week, Roosevelt Institute Fellow Dorian Warren joined a panel on America's growing inequality crisis hosted by The Century Foundation and featuring TCF's Greg Anrig, Daniel Alpert, and Robert Hockett along with Timothy Noah, author of The Great Divergence. In the video below, Dorian lays out three points that need to be included in any discussion of what's causing inequality and how we can address it: lawless employers, race-based political polarization, and the rise of an American oligarchy.

On the first point, Dorian notes the recent Wal Mart bribery scandal and says that when you think of "the lawlessness of Wal Mart when it comes to unionization, I think that's a great example to think about the other ways in which employers have pretty flagrantly violated the law in the last 20 years or so. So when you think about minimum wage, when you think about health and safety, we're in a new environment, and activists who work on this call this 'wage theft.'" He highlights some shocking statistics from a 2009 study that shows how badly low-income workers have been ripped off by their employers and points out that there is a "basic principle of the social contract that when you work at a job you have an agreement with the employer for how much you're going to make... There is a pretty systematic violation of that contract, and that explains at least part of the wage stagnation that we've seen in the low-wage service sector specifically." While updating and modernizing labor laws is important, "monitoring and enforcement of existing wage and hour laws are really important."

Where race is concerned, Dorian argues that while it doesn't explain the rise of inequality by itself, "there is a story where race does play a role, and it's a political story." He points out that "for 80 percent of our country's history, the majority of Americans weren't classified as citizens," and that Lyndon Johnson's signing of the Civli Rights Act caused an exodus of white southerners from the Democratic Party to the GOP. He says that "there is a difference between Republican administrations and Democratic administrations, but how you get to a Republic administration has to be part of that story, and that's very much about race and the response of southern whites to greater inclusion into American democracy." This racial backlash in turn helps to shape the policies that further inequality.

Finally, Dorian says that it's difficult to find solutions to the problem of inequality, as even the best policy solutions may not be politically viable. Citing political scientist Jeffrey Winters, he asks, "How do we make sense of the fact that we live in both a democracy and an oligarchy at the same time?" Wealth has become highlighy concentrated in the U.S. while also granting the wealthy a disproportionate level of political influence and a number of methods to safeguard their wealth and prevent redistribution. He notes that "the expectation of democracies is that non-rich people would outnumber rich people and therefore demand through their vote the one thing that makes everybody equal, greater redistribution." He concludes with the toughest question of all: "From the 1960s to the present, when we've expanded our democracy, how is it the case that we've also seen more redistribution but actually less and greater inequality?"

 

Image courtesy of Shutterstock.com.

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Is There a Good Case For Doubling Student Loan Interest Rates?

Apr 25, 2012Mike Konczal

Sarah Jaffe recently wrote a story about how yesterday was the estimated day student debt would hit $1 trillion dollars. President Obama has called for Congress to keep interest rates on subsidized student loans at 3.4 percent instead of letting them revert back to 6.8 percent as per the law passed in 2007.

Sarah Jaffe recently wrote a story about how yesterday was the estimated day student debt would hit $1 trillion dollars. President Obama has called for Congress to keep interest rates on subsidized student loans at 3.4 percent instead of letting them revert back to 6.8 percent as per the law passed in 2007. He has even started a twitter hastag for it, #dontdoublemyrate. It looks like Mitt Romney is also against letting the rate go up.

Is there any good arguments for letting interest rates on student loans double? I've been trying to find some, so let's take a tour through the right-wing.

Douglas Holtz-Eakin essentially punts at National Review Online, saying that it is a distraction. "Americans would be better able to afford college if their budgets were less pressured by gasoline, food, and health-insurance premiums."  Umm, sure, I guess, though the rate matters quite a bit to those who will be impacted by it. What does that have to do with what the rate should be?

"Artificially" Low Rates?

Heritage quotes Eakins and adds a fun "None of this is to say that the federal government should be doing more to bail out students. It shouldn’t... But the current debate’s origins are in separate legislation passed in 2007 whereby the federal government set interest rates on student loans artificially low." Bailouts! Yes, bailouts.

Are rates "artifically low," thus bailing out student debtors? Right now, the United States can borrow for 10 years at real, or inflation-adjusted, interest rates that are negative. The 30-year conventional mortgage rate is the lowest its been in over 40 years. The market is using ultra-low interest rates to beg anyone who can make productive use of capital to borrow it  Educating our young citizens in universities that are the envy of the world certainly seems like a productive use of capital. So how is not jacking up interest rates when 10 year government debt yields are at ultra-low 2 percent rates the equivalent of paying AIG creditors at par during the financial bailouts?

The implication is that they are below market rates. "Below-market" here is a troublesome phrase, as the private market for student loans is incomplete, prone to collapse, thin, and exists either through previous credit guarentees or a reworking of the various rules that govern debt in this country. This constitutes the government stepping up to do the things that the private market won't. As Keynes said, "The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all."

Cost to Taxpayers

Cato tries harder to make a case if you can cut through a tangled web of metaphors about being "good parents" to kids. Neal McCluskey argues, "Finally, there’s the cost to taxpayers."

I like how he doesn't mention that this actually runs a profit for taxpayers. From the Department of Education student loan overview (R-10): "For Direct Loans, the overall weighted average subsidy rate was estimated to be -13.91 percent in FY 2011; that is, the overall program on average was projected to earn about 13.91 percent on each dollar of loans made, thereby providing savings to the Federal Government.” Unless you start making up discount rates, these loans make a profit for taxpayers.

As Alan White notes, according to the "Congressional Budget Office, $37 billion will flow IN to Treasury from student loans made this fiscal year at the 3.4% rate (on a net present value basis and net of about $1.5 billion to administer them.) " If anything, we should make rates lower than 3.4 percent.

Lavishing Cheap Credit

Cato continues by arguing, "the reality is that policymakers have been lavishing cheap money on students for decades...all the cheap aid has enabled colleges to raise their prices at breakneck speeds, rendering the aid largely self-defeating and college pricing insane."

For aid to be "self-defeating," you'd have to imagine a completely inelastic, fixed supply of higher education, which I hope isn't Cato's argument against keeping current rates. But maybe the author's on to something. If you look at, say, the maximum amount of Pell Grants, do they rise in proportion with increases in tuition? Ummm, no:

As Demos notes in its 10 points on how student debt is blocking mobility, "In 1980, 39 percent of federal financial aid to undergraduates was in the form of loans, and 55 percent was awarded in grants. By 2008, this had shifted to 64 percent of the funds awarded as loans and only 26 percent as grants. Moreover, today’s maximum Pell Grant covers just over a third of the costs of attending a public 4-year university, down from over two-thirds in 1980."

Meanwhile, during the same time period, numerous legal restrictions have been put on student debt and protections have been stripped away, which means that the major government changes to student debt involve the it making it a harder, not easier, form of debt to manage. Nondischargeability went from five years to seven years in 1990, until it was revoked permanently in 1998 (when the statute of limitations was also removed). That was extended to for-profit student loans in 2005. Social Security became eligible for student loan collections in 1996. The argument that student debt became "lavish" during the past 20 years requires some additional work.

And though some of the lower rates are captured by increased tuition because of inelastic supply -- an argument that is equivalent to saying that free, "public option" public universities would thus contain runaway costs -- current tuition movements look like they are being driven more by states cutting support for public universities during the Great Recession. As the CBPP notes, at least 43 states cut services to public higher education. That's what is going to drive serious tuition increases in the next few years.

(Digging into some of this research, the lack of decent empirical work linking increased aid to tuition increases is startling given how much movement conservatives rely on such an argument.)

There Are Better Subsidies

Friend-of-the-blog Josh Barro at Forbes has the another set of arguments against blocking rate increases. First Josh argues that we need to think of a low rate as a subsidy: "A below-market interest rate for Stafford Loans is just another subsidy mechanism—essentially, you can think of the present value of the interest savings as a partial subsidy of a student’s tuition payments." Josh also notes that "Instead of extending the policy of holding Stafford Loan interest rates very low, why not let rates go back up and redirect the cost of the subsidy into an expansion of Pell Grants and refundable tuition tax credits?"

Sure, but right now these loans are profitable. As noted above, we spent the last 20 years stripping out protections from these loans to guarantee a high recovery rate. There's no decent market rate to compare this to, given how thin and incomplete the private lending market is in this space. So why not fund it closer to where the government can borrow, adding in a small spread for administration and to cover losses?
 
Pell grants should be considered in their own right. But this is a specific conversation about what the government should charge when it is acting as a lender to young people, collecting the spread between the rate it can borrow and what students will pay. If that spread is very high because capital markets want the government to borrow, that doesn't strike me as an excuse for the government to squeeze borrowers more and use the extra profit it makes at 6.8 percent to do something different. Even if it is a good idea to raise Pell Grants, that doesn't change the nature of how low interest rates are right now, and how the government should approach the rates it sets for students in a way that is fair.
 
So what's left as far as arguments go?

 

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Article on Mass Incarceration at Jacobin

Apr 25, 2012Mike Konczal

The Spring 2012 issue of Jacobin is now online.  It has a lot of great content in it; make sure to check out Megan Erickson's addition to the "unschooling" debate that goes back and forth in parts of the internet.

The Spring 2012 issue of Jacobin is now online.  It has a lot of great content in it; make sure to check out Megan Erickson's addition to the "unschooling" debate that goes back and forth in parts of the internet.

I have a piece - Against Law, For Order - on ideology, governmentality and "policy" in an era of mass incarceration.  It's about how criminal laws informs our markets and government policy.  Bits and pieces of it have appeared in this blog, but here it is in one place.  The piece ends up reviewing a lot of recent books on policing, with special attention to Bernard Harcourt's work on neoliberalism and policing, as well as Jonathan Simon's work on "governing through crime" - how policy is reworked to use the language and techniques of policing.  I hope you check it out!

I wrote it a while ago so I didn't get to reference two of the big events in policing and incarceration that happened recently, but I think they fit into the framework I try to build.  The killing of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman appears to be, in large part, about Zimmerman believing Martin didn't belong in the neighborhood he lived in.  Maintaining order, seperating insiders from outsiders, and who gets to make those calls and what consequences they have is a central part of the neoconservative vision of policing I outline.

Meanwhile the 5-4 Supreme Court decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington held that "Jail strip searches do not require reasonable suspicion, at least so long as the arrestee is being admitted into the general jail population."  Reading Justice Kennedy's logic, it looks like that since people put into a prison population could be dangers to themselves, guards and other prisoners, the guards have the ability to institute whatever techniques they believe are necessary.  Kennedy looks uninterested or unwilling to second guess the prison system.  Which means that people within the criminal justice system exist in a sphere of total government control and competency, a way of thinking I link back to the neoliberal vision of governance.

Sadly I couldn't find a way to link in one of the more interesting pieces I've read recently, one I'm still grappling with, Kate Redburn's Hate on Me at New Inquiry.  It's about the GLBTQ groups - including The Sylvia Rivera Law Project, FIERCE, Queers for Economic Justice, the Peter Cicchino Youth Project, and the Audre Lorde Project - who oppose New York State's "Gender Expression Non-Discrimination Act," which "would make violence against gender-nonconforming people a hate crime."

This is governing through crime - the best way to react to the social problems of violence and hate aimed at the GLBTQ community is to increase the policing and incarceration of those who do the violence.  Mandatory minimums, which translates into higher guilty pleas, which translates to more bodies in jail.  These groups oppose this because the police themselves are part of the problems they face, not part of the solution.  As Redburn argues, "Hate crimes legislation not only doesn’t change institutional bias; it further empowers this broken system by increasing law enforcement’s ability to arrest and imprison."  I find the challenges posed here important to understand as we all try to find a way to have a governance project built outside the logic of mass incareceration.

 

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Virginia Foxx's Comment and the Intergenerational Problem of the Public University

Apr 20, 2012Mike Konczal

Scott Keyes at Think Progress notes the following comment from Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-NC), who chairs the House subcommittee on higher education:

Scott Keyes at Think Progress notes the following comment from Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-NC), who chairs the House subcommittee on higher education:

FOXX: I went through school, I worked my way through, it took me seven years, I never borrowed a dime of money. He borrowed a little bit because we both were totally on our own when we went to college, totally. [...] I have very little tolerance for people who tell me that they graduate with $200,000 of debt or even $80,000 of debt because there’s no reason for that. We live in an opportunity society and people are forgetting that. I remind folks all the time that the Declaration of Independence says “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” You don’t have it dumped in your lap.

A major problem with our leaders is that they are approaching what is happening in the public university through a mental model of a world that no longer exists.

EdwardMurray at DailyKos notes "Virginia Foxx went to the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill in 1968. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, in 1968, the average yearly cost for tuition, room, and board for a public university was $1,245 which, in today’s words, is one thousand two hundred and forty-five dollars for a year’s worth of college. For today’s average college student, that dollar amount is roughly equivalent to the cost of a textbook and a garbage bag."  Quick and the Ed has notes "Representative Foxx would have paid $279 for the academic year—about $2,140 today. That’s about equivalent to what students pay right now at community colleges, not public four-year institutions—especially not public flagships."  Rebuild the Dream has a petition going on the matter.

Beyond the fact that it was much cheaper, how does University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill's tutition look on a chart?  Digging into UNC-Chapel Hill's Office of Institutional Research and Assessment website, which has online collections of several previously published yearly reports (data from here, here, here and here), we can construct the following graph.  Some years, especially earlier ones, are missing. Data is adjusted for inflation:

 

As you can see, tuition is roughly around $2,000 a year for most of the 20th century after the Great Depression.  Starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s it skyrockets.  It shows no sign of slowing down, either.  This is a political choice, based on what we want the university to do and how we want to provide it as a country.  There was a political consesus that made sure Virginia Foxx had college available as a publicly-provided good - her "opportunity society" is a world of high quality "public options" available to those who can use them - and now there is a new set of active choices to have students at UNC-Chapel Hill graduate with debt.  Foxx should know better than to ascribe it as a simple morality play.  If she doesn't know this, which is possible, that's a major problem.

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