Mike Konczal Talks FinReg on GRITtv: Taxpayers Still on the Hook for Wall Street's Recklessness

Jul 9, 2010

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal joined Demos's Nomi Prins and GRITtv host Laura Flanders last week to discuss the state of financial reform, whether the current bill does enough to change the culture of risk on Wall Street, and whether taxpayers are going to be stuck holding the bag -- again.

Check out the full interview:

More GRITtv

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal joined Demos's Nomi Prins and GRITtv host Laura Flanders last week to discuss the state of financial reform, whether the current bill does enough to change the culture of risk on Wall Street, and whether taxpayers are going to be stuck holding the bag -- again.

Check out the full interview:

More GRITtv

Mike notes that one of the key questions of reform is "who's going to pay for this, and ideally we want the people who caused the trouble to pay for it, not regular citizens." Instead, he says Republicans like Scott Brown have transferred the cost from banks to the FDIC and the savings accounts of average Americans.

On the subject of possible criminal charges for Goldman Sachs, Mike says that the lack of major arrests compared to previous crises "shows how much people haven't internalized the disaster they've caused. The culture is still very much the same." The problem, he explains, is that firms like AIG "thought they were being very clever when they were actually getting gamed." The fact that we still aren't sure how much of this was illegal "shows how disturbed the regulation is."

Mike pushes back on AIG's attempts to shift the blame for its reckless bets, noting that "when we talk about what AIG was doing, that's millions of Americans who are actually in those bonds, that were given loans that they shouldn't have so that AIG could juke some statistics." Unfortunately, he offers a grim prognosis for AIG's victims: "The foreclosure crisis is ongoing, it will be ongoing next year, and the President's plan there, HAMP, has been a total failure that most credible people have walked away from at this point. We have a quarter of homeowners underwater and they have no relief, and they're paying into a system that is pretty much insolvent."

Finally, responding to deficit hawks' calls for cuts to programs like Social Security, Mike argues that "if they were very concerned about protecting anyone, they would go much harder into financial reform. Because this is really where the deficit's coming from right now, the fact that we have a major financial crisis. There's two things that destroy an economy: financial crisis and war, and Republicans over the past decade have put us through a lot of both with no plans on paying for it."

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On Not Owning a Credit Card

Jul 8, 2010Bryce Covert

credit-card-fees-150Why are we forced to engage with a system rigged to keep us in debt?

credit-card-fees-150Why are we forced to engage with a system rigged to keep us in debt?

Good credit is like a golden key to the city. A good credit score gets you access to apartments, mortgages, and sometimes even jobs. A bad credit score will follow you around like a bad stench that you can't wash off.

I don't own a credit card. At age 25, I've made the conscious decision to avoid getting one since I was 17, when I opened a student bank account and began receiving credit card offers in the mail. Every time I'm tempted toward one, a distinct memory comes back to haunt me: my parents sitting at the kitchen table, trying to even up with their credit card bills. I remember how my mother turned to me and warned me about how dangerous they are. She carefully taught me not to spend money I don't have, and I always figured that with a debit card I'm basically constrained to stick to this program. But with a credit card, I open a Pandora's box of someone else's money.

I'm not in a majority. Seventy-eight percent of consumers own a credit card, and the average cardholder has 3.5 credit cards. But credit card usage is falling, particularly in this economic crisis, and card companies are reporting drops in customers. Many consumers are now wary of company practices exposed by the financial meltdown -- and are looking to simplify finances by paying off (and staying away from) debt.

Yet ever since I opened my first bank account, I've been repeatedly told -- by the financially dumb and savvy alike -- that I have to get a credit card in order to have good credit. And there is an unmistakable undertone to these admonishments that I'm naïve if I don't. It doesn't matter that I've never missed a payment on anything in my life. I pay rent on the first; I pay my electric bill when it comes in; I make every payment to my student loans ahead of schedule. But when my credit score is stacked up against someone who has 3.5 credit cards, I look less responsible because there is less proof of my ability to meet financial deadlines.

As our colleague Josh Rosner has pointed out, credit cards should really be called debt cards, since that is what you get when you open an account -- debt. Any money spent with a credit card is money you immediately owe to someone else. Credit cards are designed to give a false sense of wealth and then hit you with a load of fees. Rosner notes that it all began in the late 1970's, when consumers moved from charge cards to revolving debt issuance. This changed the consumption patterns of the whole country. Now, the average credit card debt is about $3,700 per adult, or $7,400 per household.

And opening the account is the easiest part. As New Deal 2.0 contributor Elizabeth Warren has repeatedly noted, most people can't even understand their contracts, and the fees can easily gobble up your savings. Hence Warren's fight for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency as an essential part of financial reform -- it promises to make contracts actually readable, so that people know what they're getting themselves into. It will also reign in the wild west of deregulation that credit cards now exist in. Warren has been making this argument since way back in 2007, when she pointed out that credit products fall through regulatory cracks (as opposed to toasters and microwaves that could never put consumers at so much risk). With stricter regulation will come better products and innovation in the consumer's interest. Credit cards will no longer be subject to a patchwork of state regulations, leading to a race to the bottom, but one uniform rule. Interest rates will be regulated. And rules will have real enforcement behind them. With these changes, credit cards could evolve to work for the consumer, rather than functioning as a financial booby trap.

But what if I want to live without debt cards altogether? Because I've made the choice to stay away from these dangerous cards and live within my means, I'm blocked from certain activities. Renting and buying houses or apartments is just one of those. There are a number of much smaller things that I'm excluded from -- that add up. For instance, some car rental companies don't let you pay with debit cards; you can only pay with a credit card. The MTA in New York City won't let me buy a refillable Metrocard without TWO credit cards on file (it's hard to get your bank to issue you two debit cards). And God help you if you don't have a Visa or Mastercard logo on your debit card -- at that point it's practically useless. Society is rigged in favor of owning a credit card, and it takes some real maneuvering (or just plain exclusion) to stay away from them. While grassroots campaigns such as Move Your Money are speaking out against predatory credit card policies, I have yet to see a movement to undo the deep connection between consumers and credit cards. (Although if anyone knows of one, I'd love to join it!)

We've constructed a world in which the risky choices have been turned into the reasonable ones. While financial reform will hopefully curtail the risks banks took with their own money and put limits on what credit card companies can do, we could use some restructuring of society to decentivize personal risk taking. We shouldn't reward -- nay, expect -- people to sign up for credit cards at age 18. We should reward prudent decisions. That would take some serious change.

Bryce Covert is Assistant Editor at New Deal 2.0.

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Underwater Mortgages and the Odd Definition of the Experian Study

Jul 1, 2010Mike Konczal

mortgage-crisis-150Strategic default models expect people to eat cat food rather than walk away from their house.

mortgage-crisis-150Strategic default models expect people to eat cat food rather than walk away from their house.

From the Wall Street Journal: Study: Nearly One in Five Mortgage Defaults Are ‘Strategic.’ That's a fairly high number! What do they mean by a strategic defaulter?

A new report estimates that nearly one in five mortgage defaults through the first half of 2009 were “strategic,” where borrowers who appeared to have the capacity to pay their mortgages stopped doing so.

The research follows on an earlier report by Experian and Oliver Wyman that first aimed to quantify the share of mortgage defaults that are “strategic.” Strategic defaulters are defined as those who miss six straight mortgage payments without missing multiple payments on auto loans and other consumer debts for the six months after they first fell behind on mortgage payments....

Researchers suggest that the share of strategic defaults may have hit a plateau as total mortgage delinquencies and may have also peaked in the fourth quarter of 2008. “We’re seeing this encouraging break in the quarterly data,” said Charles Chung, general manager of decision sciences at Experian.

I don't see that as a good working definition of strategic default. From their model, a strategic defaulter is someone who misses six straight months of mortgage payments without missing multiple payments on auto loans and other consumer debts. Now it can be fairly easy to keep consumer debt "current" by negatively amortizing it, or making the bare minimum payments, so the definition isn't about those not paying the rent to go to Disneyland.

All this definition means is that someone has enough money to pay their car payment and the minimum on their credit card but not enough money to pay their mortgage payment. The mortgage payment is going to be bigger than each of the other two, and there is no benefit to paying part of the mortgage payment, as it doesn't keep it current. A better definition is whether or not someone has income to make all their payments, not how they allocate payments. This is a definition for a bankruptcy judge, not a statistician. This other working definition is huge, expansive and doesn't get at what people are worried about.

In fact, to really illustrate it, think about what it means for someone to have a legitimate default here: they can't make any payment on any of their bills. Only when your car is repossessed, only when your credit has been cut, only when the gas is shut off, only then can you be excused for not making a payment on your second lien. That's simply not how people act.

(Source for graph.) In fact, look at the perverse notion of what constitutes a "lessening" of strategic defaults here -- people can't make their mortgage but also can't pay their car bill either. They want to color that as progress, but it's the exact opposite of progress! Delinquencies are skyrocketing, but even with this overly broad definition of what constitutes a strategic default it's already over. Now this theory and data is consistent with people optimistic that they'll be able to find work sooner than later after being laid off, juggling some mortgage payments but keeping most everything current, and then slowly realizing that 9.6% U3 unemployment (and near 17% U6) is the new normal.

The narrative here is to function as a meta-call to clamp down on homeowners, when anyone actually looking at the data would conclude, in the words of the Federal Reserve Board: “The fact that many borrowers continue paying a substantial premium over market rents to keep their homes challenges traditional models of hyper-informed borrowers." Challenging hyper-informed borrower models is a nice way of saying that most people aren't the throat-cutting sociopaths that game theorists and economic modelers think they are. They take their obligations seriously, they value their communities, neighbors and lives and won't rip their faces off simply to save 10% on a rent calculation. It would be nice if banks stopped taking advantage of that in a crisis, and if the government cleared the field of problems by letting real modifications go through.

Because this is the model where the ethical thing to do involves having people eat cat food rather than having a bank meet someone perfectly halfway with a small principal reduction, which they are refusing to do. They are encouraging people to go through loan modifications, a process that has has a high failure rate and that serves to simply recapitalize fees into balance, that often leads to higher payments, a process that works as an information filter for who is willing to pay whatever it takes to stay in their homes. I don't think we'll ever have a good statistical definition of this: the best way to judge this is to let an actual bankruptcy judge handle it.

For further general reading, Henry Sommer has a post at creditslips about trying to get voluntary mortgage modifications within a chapter 13 context.

And Yves Smith talks with a real estate expert off the record, who is saying what I hear more and more these days -- that the second liens are the real serious obstacle to mortgage modification. And in what I worry is a silent austerity measure that is already ongoing, people are going to eat cat food to stay in their communities because the stress tests measured the second liens at 86 cents on the dollar, and we need to make sure people will pay into four of our most powerful banks to that point. But watch the media scare you with stories about mean people skipping their bills to go to Disneyland.

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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The Financial Reform Bill: A Very Limited Step Forward

Jun 29, 2010Dean Baker

money-question-150FinReg bill falls short, especially in not ending Too Big to Fail.

money-question-150FinReg bill falls short, especially in not ending Too Big to Fail.

The final compromise bill approved by the conference committee on Friday will improve regulation in the financial sector. However, given the severity of the economic crisis caused by past regulatory failures, the public had the right to expect much more extensive reform.

On the positive side, the creation of a strong independent consumer financial products protection bureau stands out as an important accomplishment. Such an agency would have prevented some of the worst lending practices that contributed to the housing bubble. It will be important President Obama choose a strong and effective person, such as Elizabeth Warren, as the first head of the Bureau to establish its independence.

The requirement that most derivatives be either exchange traded or passed through clearinghouses is also an important improvement in regulation. However, important exceptions remain, which the industry will no doubt exploit to their limit.

The creation of resolution authority for large non-bank financial institutions is also a positive step, although the fact that no pre-funding mechanism was put in place is a serious problem. Also, the audit of the Fed's special lending facilities, as well as the ongoing audits of its open market operations discount window loans, is a big step towards increased Fed openness.

On the negative side, there is little in this legislation that will fundamentally change the way that Wall Street does business. The rules on derivative trading will still leave the bulk of derivatives to be traded directly out of banks rather than separately capitalized divisions of the holding company. The Volcker rule was substantially weakened by a provision that will still allow banks to risk substantial sums in proprietary trading.

More importantly, there is probably no economist who believes that this bill will end too big to fail. The six largest banks will still enjoy the enormous implicit subsidy that results from the expectation that the federal government will bail them out in the event of a crisis.

Also, the fact that no regulators, most obviously Ben Bernanke at the Fed, were fired for failing to prevent the crisis leaves in place serious doubts about the structure of incentives for regulators. Cracking down on reckless behavior by politically powerful financial institutions will always be difficult for regulators. On the other hand, if regulators know that failing to crack down carries no consequences, even when it leads to disastrous outcomes, we can expect that regulators will have a strong bias toward ignoring reckless behavior.

It is possible that Congress may take stronger steps toward restructuring the financial sector, most obviously in the context of a financial speculation tax. While this is not likely to pass at the moment, in the context of severe budget pressures, a tax that can raise $150 billion a year in revenue may look more appealing than most alternatives. Such a tax would do far more to restructure the industry than this financial reform bill.

Dean Baker is the co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

ND20 ALERT: Join us in NY for fresh ideas, July 16-18! Guild Hall, in collaboration with the Roosevelt Institute, will gather thought leaders in the arts, the economy, and the media in East Hampton for a can’t-miss symposium featuring George Soros, Van Jones, plus ND20 contributors Elizabeth Warren, Rob Johnson, Jeff Madrick, Editor Lynn Parramore, and more. RSVP today - seats are limited.

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A Mortgage in the State of Nature?

Jun 28, 2010Mike Konczal

house-in-hands-150Why home ownership should no longer be part of the American Dream.

house-in-hands-150Why home ownership should no longer be part of the American Dream.

Nick Rowe writes US fixed rate mortgages aren't fixed rate mortgages; they are weird, stupid, and dangerous. It's a good discussion, especially in the comments.

For the bond nerds in the audience, Nick thinks they are stupid because they are callable (can be prepayed) which creates negative convexity, which is dangerous with a fixed rate.

It's interesting, one of the reasons investors desired subprime was that it was believed to be more stable on the prepayment front; everyone was looking at interest rate risk instead of credit risk, and while the former was fine the second exploded (a situation relevant to Fannie as well, as John Hempton points out). I'll have more to say on this when we start to dig into housing reform, but I just want to point this out for now.

I do want to post this paragraph from Arnold Kling:

In any case, regardless of what Green or Rowe or I believe is the right mortgage, I think that the market ought to decide. It is my hypothesis that, in the absence of government support (including loading the tail risk onto taxpayers), the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage with no penalty for either prepayment or default would be priced too expensively to attract borrowers.

I'm not sure what he means by "the market ought to decide" what a mortgage looks like. A fully deregulated mortgage market? I'm fairly certain every modern nation has some sort of regulation on mortgages, and those nations that are modernizing are looking around for first-world solutions to emulate and guide them. (Another reason I take the financial reform movement seriously is that the developing world will have to live with it too. Here are notes on Mexico looking to the Danish mortgage market to modernize itself from Risk.net and Global Banking and Financial Policy Review.) This is because developed mortgage markets require developed capital markets, which also go with a system of regulation.

Mortgages in the State of Nature

We do have a case study of what deregulated lending looks like: the subprime market. It's worth remembering that subprime lending was not on the books of any of the relevant consumer laws in the country. Alan Greenspan refused to enforce consumer protection laws, most importantly the 1994 The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, which bans "extending credit without regard to payment ability of consumer" and put strict rules on prepayment penalties, negative amortization, and balloon payments. Ned Gramlich urged Greenspan to have the Fed start regulating subprime, which he could do with Citigroup, and HSBC started buying out subprime lenders. So did the GAO and a HUD-Treasury task force. Greenspan wouldn't. (Since it is off the shelf, this is from Our Lot p. 67-68.)

Leading conservative and libertarian think tanks were also touting the idea that subprime was the future of a deregulated mortgage market, replacing the need for consumer protection and lending laws. My favorite (h/t James Kwak) is this 2000 Cato publication, Should CRA Stand for “Community Redundancy Act”?, which informs the reader that the CRA isn't responsible for the increases in homeownership, or much of anything, since financial statistical technology and subprime are taking its place (how talking points change!).

So how did subprime work out? I walk through the experience of a subprime homeowner here as well as the "fake homeownership" part of it here, but in general in a consistently refinanced short term loan most of the equity growth goes to banks, in terms of refinancing fees and prepayment penalties:

That's how often they recycle: something like 75% are refinanced 30 months into the life. It is a vehicle that is very difficult to build equity in. Julie Gordon, from the Center for Responsible Lending, likes to say “I’m in favor of home ownership, not home buyership" when it comes to discussing these subprime loans, and I think that is accurate. Even if you weren't mislead, which many, many people were (Broke USA opens with a representative, and heartbreaking, episode of a man being lied to about how his payments would go), this is a terrible product.

I think further deregulation would see something similar to what we see in the credit card market, where everyone's mortgage looks like whatever the laws of North Dakota say, and that the poorest homeowners (or "inept", if you prefer) cross-subsidize the richest. Like subprime, the whole thing would be characterized by interest rate jumps and penalties and a whole bad-faith expectation that someone can actually pay it off. (I compare the logic of a credit-card to the logic of a subprime loan here.)

And I think that is accurate of mortgage markets in an unregulated market. The idea of home ownership for a broad class of people as a mechanism for building equity and wealth, without government intervention, doesn't exist. It didn't really exist before the New Deal (but please send me sources if you think I'm wrong about that), and it would look much more like subsidized renting, with the banks eating all the government subsidies. The mortgage would look, from a financial point of view, nasty, brutish and short in an unregulated market. Is that the future with more deregulation? I'm very open to all of your opinions on the matter.



Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute, and you can follow him on twitter here.

ND20 ALERT: Join us in NY for fresh ideas, July 16-18! Guild Hall, in collaboration with the Roosevelt Institute, will gather thought leaders in the arts, the economy, and the media in East Hampton for a can’t-miss symposium featuring George Soros, Van Jones, plus ND20 contributors Elizabeth Warren, Rob Johnson, Jeff Madrick, Editor Lynn Parramore, and more. RSVP today - seats are limited.

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Underwater and the Strategic Default PR Campaign, 3: What we got when we didn't get cramdown.

Jun 24, 2010Mike Konczal

A year ago a week from today I discussed the financial innovation that wasn't. It was a look at Lewis Ranieri, the creator of the mortgage backed security, as well as one of the minds behind the 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act that created the market for MBS.

A year ago a week from today I discussed the financial innovation that wasn't. It was a look at Lewis Ranieri, the creator of the mortgage backed security, as well as one of the minds behind the 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act that created the market for MBS. In the piece he warns in April 2007 and May 2008 that securitization was never meant to handle a nationwide housing bubble and would have major failures if stressed along these lines.

Portfolio lending, like the lending in George Bailey's bank, can handle writedowns and prevent foreclosures. There's someone there who is assigned the role of making sure you can make your payments, thus preventing the major destruction that occurs in foreclosures. Ranieri was trying to alert the Milken conference on those two days that there was real danger, and that the market couldn't fix it. Full quotes are at the post and worth your time, but this May 2008 quote summarizes:

Lou: The cardinal principle in the mortgage crisis is a very old one. You are almost always better off restructuring a loan in a crisis with a borrower than going to a foreclosure. In the past that was never at issue because the loan was always in the hands of someone acting as a fudiciary. The bank, or someone like a bank owned them, and they always exercised their best judgement and their interest. The problem now with the size of securitization and so many loans are not in the hands of a portfolio lender but in a security where structurally nobody is acting as the fiduciary. And part of our dilemma here is “who is going to make the decision on how to restructure around a credible borrower and is anybody paying that person to make that decision?” And what we need here is financial innovation in the first instance because you can’t do this loan by loan, you are going to have to scale this up to a bigger level and we are going to … have to cut the gordian knot of the securitization of these loans because otherwise if we keep letting these things go into foreclosure it’s a feedback loop where it will ultimately crush the consumer economy.

Moderator: How optimistic are you Lou? You used crisis, you used Great Depression a few minutes ago. That’s a little strong…

Lou: It’s not strong. I believe we know what to do because it is not remarkably different than what we’ve done in the past in the context of the housing bubble. If we are allowed to do it. We know how to restructure loans. The process has not changed and technology has made it easier….it will work because of the financial technology and internet technology…I don’t think this is an issue of the government, in fact we’d be better left to do what it is we actually know how to do, we know how to deal with housing crisis…but the difference between a foreclosure and a restructuring is frequently over 30% and because of the feedback loop that foreclosures create you keep taking a 30% loss on a smaller number. It doesn’t get to be fun. So no this isn’t a government issue, it is something the market needs to do…

And the market has failed. There are no major restructuring efforts through the private market. The legal conflicts and perverse incentives of middlemen servicers has devastated the housing market. The "nudge" philosophy of what the government can do - give the middlemen a little bribe to do the right thing - has also failed. A government action was clearly needed, and a government action was not delivered. Ranieri was wrong thinking that financial engineering would get them out of this legal mess, and growth and unemployment are suffering accordingly.

Representative Brad Miller is a blog reader, so I think he would have seen this writing on the wall in 2007. And I do know that Representatives Brad Miller and Linda Sanchez offered their "lien stripping" (the proper term for what has become known as cramdown) amendment in December of 2007, back when everyone first realized what a major problem we had in securitization (TPMCafe and dailykos).

Mortgage Modification

How well would this have worked? It's worthwhile to explain, once again, all the strengths of this approach. From Adam Levitin's Resolving The Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy:

In light of market neutrality, the Article argues that permitting modification of home mortgages in bankruptcy presents the best solution to the foreclosure crisis. Unlike any other proposed response, bankruptcy modification offers immediate relief, solves the market problems created by securitization, addresses both problems of payment-reset shock and negative equity, screens out speculators, spreads burdens between borrowers and lenders, and avoids the costs and moral hazard of a government bailout. As the foreclosure crisis deepens, bankruptcy modification presents the best and least invasive method of stabilizing the housing market....

In a perfectly functioning market without agency and transaction costs, lenders would be engaged in large-scale modification of defaulted or distressed mortgage loans, as the lenders would prefer a smaller loss from modification than a larger loss from foreclosure. Voluntary modification, however, has not been happening on a large scale for a variety of reasons, most notably contractual impediments, agency costs, practical impediments, and other transaction costs.

If all distressed mortgages could be modified in bankruptcy, it would provide a method for bypassing the various contractual, agency, and other transactional inefficiencies. Permitting bankruptcy modification would give homeowners the option to force a workout of the mortgage, subject to the limitations provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the possibility of a bankruptcy modification would encourage voluntary modifications, as mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over the shape of the modification. An involuntary public system of mortgage modification would actually help foster voluntary, private solutions to the mortgage crisis.

Mortgage modification would deal cleanly with the issues of refinancing, servicing conflicts and perverse incentives, second liens and other junior mortgages, getting rid of all the problems of mortgage securitization expert Ranieri identifies above.

Bankruptcy modification also would deals with the specifics of negative equity and unemployment income shocks without benefitting speculators, removing a real and worrisome issue for helping consumers who need it without helping those who don't.

This is because in Chapter 13, debtors must bear their finances to the public, have money and time transaction costs, and live on a court-supervised, means-tested budget for three or five years. Chapter 13 also insists on full repayment of certain debts. Chapter 13 filers must have less than $1,010,650 in secured debts, so million-dollar mortgage holders or multiple property holders couldn't rush to take advantage of this. It keeps speculators out.

This is not a magic solution. There will be those who can't afford their mortgages even at market clearing rates, for which Right To Rent is a perfect solution. But these are fair and efficient and a proper response for this crisis rather than the costs of other options. And it is important to remember that there still are options for the government to pursue rather than a lot of loud talk about blaming evil runaway homeowners. By any conceivable measure, homeowners are under-strategically defaulting, not over. They are doing this because they want to stay in their homes and communities. It would be a wise idea to have clear government solutions to get them to do so.

Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute. You can follow him on twitter here.

ND20 ALERT: Join us in NY for fresh ideas, July 16-18! Guild Hall, in collaboration with the Roosevelt Institute, will gather thought leaders in the arts, the economy, and the media in East Hampton for a can't-miss symposium featuring George Soros, Van Jones, plus ND20 contributors Elizabeth Warren, Rob Johnson, Jeff Madrick, Editor Lynn Parramore, and more. RSVP today - seats are limited.

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Underwater and the Strategic Default PR Campaign, 2: FHA and the problem of a definition.

Jun 24, 2010Mike Konczal

In a move that I'm assuming is market testing a potential new "welfare queen" meme, House Republicans attached an amendment to penalize strategic defaulters by barring them from getting Federal Housing Administration-backed loans in the future. Ryan Grim:

In a move that I'm assuming is market testing a potential new "welfare queen" meme, House Republicans attached an amendment to penalize strategic defaulters by barring them from getting Federal Housing Administration-backed loans in the future. Ryan Grim:

The GOP offered its provision as “motion to recommit,” which is one of the minority party’s few ways to amend a bill on the floor. Known as an MTR, the motion is generally stripped out in the Senate if it is adopted in the House. Such measures are put forward more to score political points than to craft policy, but the mood of the House can sometimes be gleaned from the vote’s outcome. In this case, Democrats chose not to fight, and accepted the motion with a simple voice vote.

Annie Lowrey has more.

The obvious questions, now that Republicans may push this hard and Democrats won't fight it, are, "What is a strategic defaulter? And when should be penalize them?"

I've still seen nothing that makes me think most strategic defaulters are not simply moving to follow jobs in this economy. In February I ran an email from a reader who walked away so he and his wife could move to a new city to get a much better job and have a child. They tried very hard to short-sale or work something out with the bank, which was non-responsive. The bank is currently refusing to foreclose, and still hits their credit every month with a non-payment, which is worse over time than the foreclosure.

Because of this, I'd argue we need to investigate, in Barry's words, strategic non-foreclosures as a major national problem. And if anything, piling on underwater homeowners who are trying to find some middle-ground to keep their heads above water is distracting us from strategic non-foreclosure -- the real, major, nationwide problem -- as well as issues for why banks aren't meeting desperate underwater homeowners halfway.

But back to the question: should the government penalize this family? Labor mobility is one of the strengths of this country. And given almost double-digit unemployment and 16.6% U-6 underemployment, shouldn't the ability of people to find jobs in new places, opening jobs for those seeking them, be a priority?

How to figure out who can pay?

I knew that the definition part was going to become a political battle back in February, when I listened to a one-hour radio discussion from Nevada on strategic default starring Felix Salmon and Megan McArdle. Megan was the anti-strategic default voice (though I think it is fair to say because she is worried it's going to put the good parts of our bankruptcy laws and consumer protection at risk).

Forty-three minutes into the show a woman called and described how she and her husband had a fine home and a good mortgage, but both became unemployed for a period of time. They fell behind on their mortgage but got back on their feet months later. The bank called, wanting to jump their $1,500 payment to $2,200 in order to capitalize on the lawyers fees and late fees and get the mortgage back on track, presumably into subprime category. The couple did this, and, in her words, "let her car go, let everything go, there were days where we were eating rice...." They called and just wanted their old mortgage back, and the bank wouldn't listen or even engage them over the course of a year, even though they had put $70,000 down. The bank said they didn't care unless they had the full principle. They moved down the block to rent.

Megan responded that they were right to walk away. That they shouldn't live on rice. This worried me, because the servicers, the bondholders, the banks and everyone that will be on the other side will think that it is perfectly reasonable that this homeowner should live on rice and let their car go to make every last payment they can squeeze out of the person.

This isn't an exaggeration. The quickest source I can grab is Alyssa Katz's Our Lot (p. 67). The formula in the 1990s subprime lender United Companies' handbook for determining whether or not to lend to someone was that borrowers just needed $400 a month left in their budget for each household member for all their non-housing expenses. The rest would go to United Company. That's rice and not fixing your car money. And that's representative of the whole mindset of these lenders.

Debt collectors and mortgage servicers will not think you need to have some sort of quality of lifestyle. They'll think you should be eating rice and getting a third job in order to pay, whatever it takes, and they won't engage borrowers unless they have the full payment. Is this the mindset that our government needs to be legislating?

It's not, because all evidence tells us that people are breaking themselves in half to make these payments, but the lenders aren't or can't meet them halfway. I'd like to see some high-end research that sees if so-called "strategic defaulters" have similar mobility characteristics than non-strategic defaulters. As well as the extent to which they have tried to work out some sort of arrangement with the bank, and what stopped that arrangement from going through. Foreclosures are devastating for both parties and lenders should be willing to work out deals. Why aren't they? Is it simply a securitization problem? An issue of playing "make believe" with the books? We need to figure this out before the government is mobilized against the people.

Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute. You can follow him on twitter here.

ND20 ALERT: Join us in NY for fresh ideas, July 16-18! Guild Hall, in collaboration with the Roosevelt Institute, will gather thought leaders in the arts, the economy, and the media in East Hampton for a can't-miss symposium featuring George Soros, Van Jones, plus ND20 contributors Elizabeth Warren, Rob Johnson, Jeff Madrick, Editor Lynn Parramore, and more. RSVP today - seats are limited.

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Underwater and the Strategic Default PR Campaign, 1: Fannie and a 7-year penalty.

Jun 24, 2010Mike Konczal

Wow. Fannie is jumping ahead of Congress in going after Strategic Defaulters without (a) identifying who they are even quasi-rigorously and (b) identifying how big of a problem this is, and how this isn't just piling on people experiencing deep income shocks in a major recession. Fannie Mae Increases Penalties for Borrowers Who Walk Away: Seven-Year Lockout Policy for Strategic Defaulters:

Wow. Fannie is jumping ahead of Congress in going after Strategic Defaulters without (a) identifying who they are even quasi-rigorously and (b) identifying how big of a problem this is, and how this isn't just piling on people experiencing deep income shocks in a major recession. Fannie Mae Increases Penalties for Borrowers Who Walk Away: Seven-Year Lockout Policy for Strategic Defaulters:

WASHINGTON, DC — Fannie Mae (FNM/NYSE) announced today policy changes designed to encourage borrowers to work with their servicers and pursue alternatives to foreclosure. Defaulting borrowers who walk-away and had the capacity to pay or did not complete a workout alternative in good faith will be ineligible for a new Fannie Mae-backed mortgage loan for a period of seven years from the date of foreclosure. Borrowers who have extenuating circumstances may be eligible for new loan in a shorter timeframe....

Fannie Mae will also take legal action to recoup the outstanding mortgage debt from borrowers who strategically default on their loans in jurisdictions that allow for deficiency judgments. In an announcement next month, the company will be instructing its servicers to monitor delinquent loans facing foreclosure and put forth recommendations for cases that warrant the pursuit of deficiency judgments.

Troubled borrowers who work with their servicers, and provide information to help the servicer assess their situation, can be considered for foreclosure alternatives, such as a loan modification, a short sale, or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. A borrower with extenuating circumstances who works out one of these options with their servicer could be eligible for a new mortgage loan in three years and in as little as two years depending on the circumstances.

A few initial thoughts with lots of graphs.

1) Why don't they cramdown these mortgages? Why don't they do a Right-To-Rent process? "Loan modification" has turned out historically to increase the balance of the loan by capitalizing fees and then just spinning out the length of the loan.

We know from HAMP analysis, specifically carried out by Analysis of Mortgage Servicing Performance, that 70% of modified mortgages have a principal increase (data discussed here):

And that a surprising amount of them redefault a year out:

There is no working definition of predatory lending, but a loan that has a negative amort (increases the balance) and a person is unlikely to be able to pay seems like a good working definition of predatory lending. If the GSEs are going to pressure people into modifications, I wonder what their expectations are of how much principal will be reduced and how likely it is people will immediately redefault. We didn't do this with HAMP, even though we should have, and HAMP is a disaster nobody will stand by.

Reducing principal, especially cramming it down to the market rate, is a plan to save a mortgage and get homeowners back on track. Modifications have a history of kicking a serious problem 10 yards down the road. And don't be mad Fannie, but the "we'll just kick the can for now" solution seems right up your alley.

2) Annie Lowrey has a good catch in When Underwater Homeowners Walk Away, with this Federal Reserve paper The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions:

After distinguishing between defaults induced by job losses and other income shocks from those induced purely by negative equity, we find that the median borrower does not strategically default until equity falls to -62 percent of their home’s value. This result suggests that borrowers face high default and transaction costs. Our estimates show that about 80 percent of defaults in our sample are the result of income shocks combined with negative equity. However, when equity falls below -50 percent, half of the defaults are driven purely by negative equity. Therefore, our findings lend support to both the “double-trigger” theory of default and the view that mortgage borrowers exercise the implicit put option when it is in their interest.

The median 2006 borrower from the four housing disaster states doesn't strategically default until LTV is at 162, and even then it is mostly from income shocks (unemployment, health care, etc.). For what it is worth, we ran some numbers here:

And if you are an LTV of 160, it will be, under generic estimates, a range of around 8 to 12 years until you are above water. You "own" (and have to upkeep) a place you are a decade out from owning. So a 7 year penalty has to be taken in context.

That paper has issues that could be extrapolated (we don't need the median borrower to walk away before we have major problems), but it's important to us to have a clear sense that there is an actual problem here, as opposed to the income shocks of near 20% underemployment.

3) Fannie is saying homeowners should be working with the servicers here. And they should. But it is worth noting that even when we bribe servicers to "nudge" them, as we have done in HAMP, we still don't actually get principal cuts. Shahien Nasiripour has just found, "As few as 0.1 percent of mortgage modifications initiated under the Obama administration's signature foreclosure prevention program involve reductions in principal, according to a federal report released Wednesday...A January report by the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group noted that principal reduction is the best way to stem the foreclosure crisis." Usually these involve payment increases, unless they lengthen the period of the loan, which means more time underwater.

HAMP, the Obama adminstration's foreclosure prevention program, has gone from "look busy" to "not working" to utter, complete disaster. A complete waste of time, resources and energy. And Fannie now wants to replicate it. Let's see how this goes.

Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute. You can follow him on twitter here.

ND20 ALERT: Join us in NY for fresh ideas, July 16-18! Guild Hall, in collaboration with the Roosevelt Institute, will gather thought leaders in the arts, the economy, and the media in East Hampton for a can't-miss symposium featuring George Soros, Van Jones, plus ND20 contributors Elizabeth Warren, Rob Johnson, Jeff Madrick, Editor Lynn Parramore, and more. RSVP today - seats are limited.

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Overdraft, Financial Access and Consumer's Experiences

Jun 23, 2010Mike Konczal

Stephen Spruiell did not like my previous characterization of his opinions on consumer finance, nor does he like the idea of consumer protection (my numbering):

Stephen Spruiell did not like my previous characterization of his opinions on consumer finance, nor does he like the idea of consumer protection (my numbering):

[1] Is Konczal really trying to argue that poor people aren't capable of understanding the connection between overdrawing their checking accounts and overdraft fees? Somehow, liberal condescension is still capable of surprising me....

[2] I like the way pietistic financial "reformers" such as Mike Konczal attribute sadistic motives to their opponents ("smacking around poor people") while pushing "reforms" that will in all likelihood lead to an increase in loansharking (poor people actually getting smacked around). Kevin Drum is right about this if nothing else — overdraft fees are a form of short-term credit offered at very high interest rates, like payday loans. But there is a persuasive case to be made that such forms of credit are actually welfare-enhancing. Liberal scolds look at the high annualized rates and shriek, but they're not thinking of the unintended consequences: What would happen if these forms of lending were restricted? Would poor people suddenly stop needing credit? Who would step in to fill that gap? Credit-card debt is fully dischargeable in bankruptcy, unlike debt owed to the Bank of Vinnie and Frank....

[3] You know, there's another way to opt-out of this service: Don't overdraw your account.

In response.

[1] Spruiell argued that people who pay overdraft fees are "inept." He seems to stick by this in his post, so let's discuss this. I provided evidence from FDIC that says that a large amount of the poorest bank consumers, the people most likely to pay fees, and the people most likely to pay the most fees, have very little money in the bank. 60% have less than $100 on average. Is this "inept"? It makes perfect sense for a person to want to pay a premium upfront to not get hit on the back end with a large amount of fees for overdraft, to want to opt-out of this feature.

In [3], he says you can already opt-out by not overdrawing the account. I think a problem is that Spruiell views the banking relationship as an independent thing floating out there, that people can use or not use responsibly, like a car or a gun. The reality is that charging fees on their unsuspecting clients is a major profit source for these banks, and they are actively and rationally trying to maximize this. How else can you explain double cycle billing for credit cards, or for this issue, the shuffling of charges banks used to do to maximize overdraft? The bank is not neutral, but an opponent for clients much of the time. So by "opt-ing out", he means both watch your finances and be smarter and more nimble than the financial sector. Good luck, unless you are in a position to sit $1,000 in a checking account and pay off your credit card monthly without stress. I don't think people are stupid, and I'm not condescending to them, I just think in reality people are not perfect calculators, especially when the other side is "nudging" you to pay fees.

In most circumstances this is fine; if people lose money by ineptly playing darts or basketball after putting money on the game, that's their problem. But given that access to basic banking is a prerequisite for functioning in the normal economy, this should worry us.

Aside: with technology and without regulation, the tendency toward the sophisticated quiet bleed of consumers and finance will increase. Kevin Drum wondered about the future of privacy in purchases recently, and various people told him to await the superfuture that is coming. I forgot to mention to him the most obvious thing I remember in this vein: the FTC complaint (settled) that CompuCredit was changing terms on credit cards depending on where you made purchases, with one nice example being increasing your interest rate for paying for a marriage counselor with your credit card, as divorce is a risk factor for not paying your bills. Classy.

The card networks were trying to get SKU data, and I'm not sure how that battle is currently going. But if so, without regulation, you could get your rates jacked for, say, purchasing music or books associated with depression, as depression is correlated with poor bill payment. Watch out emo kids! It's almost like an unregulated financial sector functions as some sort of crazy 18th century theoretical prison here, where it is always watching your behavior from a central, opaque location, and you are never quite certain what will make it jump and attack.

[2] As for me pushing people into the mob and loan sharks, is there good evidence of that happening? I'd be curious as to the evidence Spruiell would muster, but all I know of this are my own experiences, as well as this study by Harvard Law professor Angela K. Littwin in Comparing Credit Cards: An Empirical Examination of Borrowing Preferences Among Low-Income Consumers:

One of the strongest arguments against regulating credit cards is the substitution hypothesis, which states that if a restriction on credit cards decreases access, borrowers will respond by using other, less desirable forms of credit. For lowincome consumers, the argument is more powerful still, because their other options are high-cost lenders such as pawn shops and rent-to-own stores. But the substitution hypothesis has been more frequently assumed than investigated, and the empirical research that has taken place does not support the theory as strongly as has been supposed. This Article presents original data from a study of low-income women. The findings suggest that lenders such as pawn shops and rent-to-own stores may function as complements more than substitutes. More critically, low-income borrowers may experience credit cards as no more desirable than these other borrowing types. In addition, the research uncovered another form of credit that low-income families routinely use and participants evaluated favorably, but that is never discussed in literature. Both results indicate a need to develop a more nuanced formulation of the hypothesis that better predicts the consequences of credit card regulation...

Middleclass bias and traditional economic methodologies have meant that all regulation-driven substitution away from credit cards has been assumed to be harmful. But the current study suggests that credit cards are actually among low-income consumers’ least-preferred sources of credit, meaning that there is no “worse” alternative to which they would turn if credit card access were reduced.

Spending isn't necessarily going to be exogenous here, so the idea that the poor will go to loan sharks needs more evidence (and I'd be willing to read it, my mind isn't made up here). People are more likely to go to friends and family than loan sharks, the study finds. And it's important to remember that the poor also find the current credit and financial access they have predatory, just another type of pawn shop and rent-to-own. Nicer suits on the people, perhaps.

Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute. You can find him on twitter here.

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BP Lesson: Big Government Myths Are Undermining America's Future

Jun 23, 2010Jeff Madrick

picture-2Government does the most damage when it fails to act. ND20 ALERT: Jeff Madrick will be addressing this topic at the upcoming Hamptons Institute/Roosevelt Institute symposium July 16 - 18.

picture-2Government does the most damage when it fails to act. ND20 ALERT: Jeff Madrick will be addressing this topic at the upcoming Hamptons Institute/Roosevelt Institute symposium July 16 - 18. RSVP today - seats are limited.

We have had two towering examples of the failure of unregulated private enterprise before us, but still the push-back against government intervention continues. The oil rig explosion in the Gulf and the collapse of credit around the world in 2008 have demonstrated more than at any time since the Great Depression the importance of bold, intelligent government. Yet we are treated time and again to all the clichés about the merits of unrestrained private enterprise and the lurking danger of government. The Glenn Beck caricature is one thing. But there is plenty of push-back from old-new Democrats, Third Way advocates, and, of course both moderate and right wing Republicans.

The recent record of unregulated private enterprise is deeply disturbing. Apparently, the more you are paid by your corporation, the less of its workings you are supposed to know. Before Congress, Tony Hayward pleaded ignorance about BP's safety measures or even the current strategy to contain the tragic damage. He makes $6 million or so a year.

In May, Bob Rubin, who made $15 million a year, eagerly admitted to the Angelides Congressional investigatory committee that he did not know Citigroup (where he was effectively running things) had $43 billion of mostly-toxic collateralized debt obligations on its books until the fall of 2007, when the firm was forced to take tens of billions in losses. His boss, Chuck Prince, who took over as CEO of Citigroup following Sandy Weill (at a time when the firm was the largest banking operation in the world), said he did not realize they would lose so much money. He left in 2007 with about $80 million, pleading ignorance of the complexities of securitization and therefore any responsibility for it, or so it seemed. Stan O'Neal, the bright investment banker who tried to turn Merrill Lynch into a hip, super-profitable investment bank by issuing more collateralized debt obligations than anyone else, said he had no idea the losses were that high. He left with $160 million.

When Robert Reich suggested that the federal government intercede more in the matter of the oil fiasco on a recent Sunday talk show, columnist George Will reflexively said we don't need any more government run-companies. Has he seen the news?

Of course, there are many who blame Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for the credit fiasco, but this is nonsense. They had a part, but the private sector sold the majority of the subprimes mortgages by far, and basically all of the highly dubious, if not outright fraudulent, collateralized debt obligations -- without government guarantees. More to the point, Washington, in thrall to the free market ideologues, had long ago turned Fannie and Freddie into private, profit-making corporations. They paid their CEOs millions-in some case of tens of millions. Surely if they were private, they'd be run more efficiently, went the thinking.

Markets can work if prices are transparent and conflicts of interest minimal. But even then, especially in financial markets, regulation is needed to mitigate herd behavior, outright self-interested fraud and the illegal circumvention of rules.

Why are these concepts so hard to grasp? The anti-regulation political regime first gained momentum under Jimmy Carter (Richard Nixon also did some deregulating, but in fact more regulating). It went full speed ahead with Ronald Reagan, who gutted the National Transportation Safety Board, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Anti-trust bashing was all the rage under Reagan. Labor laws were poorly enforced and fines for infringements were minimal. He cut the staff of the Federal Trade Commission and the anti-trust division of the Justice Department by half. George W. Bush was absolutely brilliant at putting people in charge of the regulatory agencies who wanted to defang and incapacitate them.

Yet supposedly reasonable people still believe that somehow America was saved by the government push-back in the 1980s and 1990s. I read this in middle of the road analyses all the time. Bill Clinton's announcement that it was the end of big government defined the new Democratic Party, and still represents good common sense to many. In fact, government never got substantially smaller-under Reagan or even Clinton. And, above all, America was not saved. There was thankfully a technology revolution in the 1990s, but much of the prosperity was stimulated by wildly overpriced stocks and Alan Greenspan's crisis-induced interest rates cuts. The Asian financial crisis and Russia's default had as much to do with Greenspan's supposed prescient interest rate reductions than faith in the New Economy.

It should be clear to all readers that there is no serious evidence that so-called big government reduces growth or GDP per person. Some economists make the claim when comparing, say, European nations to the U.S. But the statistical work never holds up under close examination. Others show just the opposite. If the issue was as settled as so many claim, there would be no ambiguity about the evidence. In fact, the evidence shows no relationship at all between the size of government and slow growth.

When the FBI says there is an epidemic in fraudulent mortgages loans and no one in Washington does anything about it-which is what happened in 2004-this nation is no longer being governed the way it once was. Democracy is failing.

Theories were developed in these years, led by economists like Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase and James Buchanan that government was basically self-interested business at work, only far more inefficient. Coupled with anger and frustration in the 1970s, Americans turned against government. The tax revolts, resisted as late as 1973, took hold by the late 1970s.

Such ideology is undermining America's future. The reflexive belief that government is bad on the face of it, and business good, is not supported by history or theory. After the last two years, if government is not recognized as a premier agent of change and the main coordinating institution of the economy, the creator and enforcer of laws and property rights, the principal guardian against abuse and protector of social equity, it will be one of the landmark failures of governance in our history. A great democracy is being usurped. Pundits write with no sense of history, theory or skepticism. Washington remains subject to wealthy influence. Two hundred years ago, liberal politics once fought an autocratic state. Now liberal politics must fight a powerful private sector. America needs balance, not ideology. The public discourse is now simply wacky. Balance, not ideology.

Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Jeff Madrick is the author of The Case for Big Government.

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