Obama's SOTU Captures the Millennial Mindset

Jan 25, 2012Adin Lenchner

flag-150The president showed he understands that Millennials are concerned about paying for college, getting a job, and not getting left out of health care if they can't.

Last night, listening to the State of the Union, I felt really proud of my president. I felt inspired. He spoke to me as a member of the Millennial generation.

flag-150The president showed he understands that Millennials are concerned about paying for college, getting a job, and not getting left out of health care if they can't.

Last night, listening to the State of the Union, I felt really proud of my president. I felt inspired. He spoke to me as a member of the Millennial generation.

There seems to be a lot of chatter in politics about how to help out my cohort -- talk of how to save my generation from a dystopian future of mountains of federal debt, an oppressive federal health care system, and illegal immigrants stealing our jobs. Lord knows, if you've caught any of the recent political debates on TV or in Washington, you've heard it too. (See the phrase: "It's for our children and grandchildren!")

Last night, President Obama showed that he understood that this kind of rhetoric is not what my generation needs. Fairness is at the heart of the solution. Millennials know it, and the president gets it. He also understands that fairness is not merely a virtue to aspire to, but a core value that we can tangibly work on -- and one that is at the center of what makes our country as strong and resilient as it is.

But the president was also right when he said that the defining issue of our time is how to keep the American dream alive. I know this to be true. Like the rest of my generation, I've watched friends and family struggle with what can feel at times like a Sisyphean challenge, but is, in fact, a challenge that can be met.

A close friend of mine, I'll call her Sara, found herself in trouble a few years ago. With the help of her extended family, she was able to afford attendance to a fantastic liberal arts school and major in what she loves. As a college student, she was eligible for health care under her parents' plan. Unfortunately, with the onset of the recession, her family was no longer able to support her education and she was forced to drop out of school. Sara moved back home and began searching for a job. No longer a student, she was now ineligible for coverage under her parents' health care plan. She was out of school, out of a job, without health care. At the time, she described to me her health care strategy: "Don't get hit by a bus."

Sara was not alone in her experience, nor in her health care strategy. And this unfortunate experience has become one that is too familiar.

This is the kind of experience that the president had in mind when he said we need to "return to the American values of fair play and shared responsibility." We must ensure that my generation gets a fair shake: a fair chance to get a good education, a good-paying job, and an opportunity like everyone else to support ourselves and our future families without having to adopt a "don't get hit by a bus" strategy.

The 2012 election is already in full swing and the ideological camps are staked out. The pundits and candidates have painted a campaign pitting individual liberty against the shared responsibility and fair deal the president laid out. This is, in fact, a false choice.

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As the president said, "No one built this country on their own. This nation is great because we built it together." We were able to do so because individuals made the choice to do great things as a community, as a state, as a nation. The role of government is and should be to, as Lincoln said and the president reminded us, "do for people only what they cannot do better by themselves." Yet there is much that we simply cannot do alone -- much that we must work together to achieve.

Many of the challenges that the president has faced thus far required not individuals, communities, or states to address, but a country as a whole. Because the president understands this reality, 2.5 million young people now have health insurance, thousands of college students are now eligible for more funding through Pell Grants and can more easily pay back their federal loans, tens of thousands of young people are coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan, and millions of Americans are finding work and climbing out of the terrible hole they are in.

The president encouraged us to act as a nation so that we can take on these larger questions. Furthermore, the notion that these accomplishments run counter to or limit individual liberty misses the mark. Beyond the fact that health care, college aid, and employment maximize individual liberty, they allow us to begin at the same starting line. It is disappointing, and perhaps surprising, when such an agenda is labeled "extreme" and "pro-poverty," as it was in the formal response to the State of the Union, or dismissed as "a hodgepodge of little ideas" in the Tea Party response.

There is still plenty of progress to be made, and like many Americans and many Millennials, there are policies and goals I have wanted to see politically that haven't been realized. I know we're not there yet.

But I was thrilled to hear the president make proposals that are directed at my generation: doubling the number of federal work-study jobs in the next five years, calling on Congress to send him a law to give young immigrants the chance to earn their citizenship, and reducing the red tape that stifles the creativity of young entrepreneurs.

In 1910, Teddy Roosevelt went to Osawatomie, Kansas, and declared, "I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the games, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally good service."

Fairness isn't important simply because it speaks to the best of us as people. For after the famously profound "we hold these truth to be self-evident, that all men are created equal," just after the piece about "inalienable rights," a little bit past explaining that among those are "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," there is an oft forgotten piece: "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men."

Last night, the president clearly and compellingly reminded us of the potential we hold and the great work we stand to accomplish together.

Adin Lenchner is the president of the Wheaton College (MA) Roosevelt Institute | Campus Network chapter and is majoring in political science.

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Will Homemakers Once Again be Left Without a Financial Lifeline?

Jan 24, 2012Suzanne Kahn

There may be a new trend of men becoming homemakers, but they could face the same limitations to credit that women did in the 1950s.

There may be a new trend of men becoming homemakers, but they could face the same limitations to credit that women did in the 1950s.

"We may see the Masculine Mystique in 2020." That's the prediction Kathleen Christensen, Program Director at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, makes at the end of Bloomberg Businessweek's article on homemaker dads published earlier this month. She suggests that in any arrangement where one person does 100 percent of the housework and the other 100 percent of the work outside the home, someone will get frustrated. Today's homemaker dads may be discovering what mothers in the 1950s knew -- that it can be isolating to be the parent who stays home to do the laundry and take the kids to playdates. But there are other lessons to learn from the experience of homemaker moms in the years of the "feminine mystique." These women were not just frustrated with life in the suburbs. They faced real practical problems that homemaker parents (moms and dads) could end up facing again, like lack of access to credit.

History shows us that it's not just frustration with an unequal distribution of housework that can pose problems. Nancy Folbre's great piece in the New York Times last week highlighted the fact that the spouse at home usually experiences a reduction in future earnings and employability. Other concrete problems can arise as well.

Benefits are often tied to our work or our family members. Thus, if women in the era of the "feminine mystique" lost their husband through divorce, separation, or death, they could suddenly find themselves not only without a partner, but also without access to pension benefits, healthcare, or credit.

Is this still a worry in 2012? Earlier this year, new rules went into effect to regulate the extension of credit. These rules were issued by the Federal Reserve Board in response to the CARD Act of 2009, and many of them are very good for consumers, like limiting the kinds of fees that you can be charged on a credit card. One of them, however, requires credit card companies to evaluate an applicant based on individual, not household, income. This makes it much harder for individual homemakers to get credit.

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Women in the 1960s and 1970s fought to be recognized as individuals instead of simply appendages of their spouses. At the time, creditors refused to give wives credit in their own names, a vestige of the law of coverture, which said a wife's legal personhood was subsumed under her husband when she married. Lenders erased women's credit history when they married and only extended credit to them through their husbands. In addition, when couples applied for loans based on their combined income, lenders routinely insisted that women provide signed statements promising they would not or could not get pregnant before counting their income. Lenders' explanations for these practices rested on the assumption that married women would get pregnant and leave the workforce. They could not be trusted to maintain an income and therefore afford their own credit.

When the Equal Credit Opportunity Act passed in 1974, it banned these practices and other methods of discriminating based on sex and marital status. Women now had to be given credit in their own names if they wanted it. But credit card companies still counted household income when extending credit to women. This meant that women could have credit in their own name while married, even if they chose to commit themselves to raising their children. As a result, the ECOA let women build a credit history that they could draw on to get credit if they lost their husband.

The new law stops lenders from giving homemakers credit. Individuals can only get credit in their own names based on their own income. Not having credit in one's own name can (and did) lead to a host of indignities during a marriage, but it causes real problems when a marriage ends. More often than not, this is the moment when people need credit the most to get back on their feet. But if homemakers have not had credit in their own names for years (even if they have been the partners that balance the checkbooks and pay the bills), they lack the credit history necessary to get a car, an apartment, or a good credit card.

Not being able to get a job upon returning to the labor force is not the only economic ramification of deciding to become a full-time homemaker. The fact that more men are making this decision may be a trend worth supporting, but we need to think about how a whole host of public policies around essential economic benefits support this decision or make it quite a risky one.

Suzanne Kahn is a Roosevelt Institute | Pipeline Fellow and a Ph.D. student in history at Columbia University.

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How Local Governments Can Fight Back Against the Foreclosure Crisis

Jan 18, 2012Kristen Tullos

Cities can use local housing codes and land banks to push back against banks' reckless behavior.

Since the beginning of the economic downturn, Congress has passed numerous pieces of legislation aimed at stabilizing the housing market. Their legislative efforts succeeded in stabilizing financial markets, but foreclosures have continued unabated, affecting families and neighborhoods across the country. While the foreclosure crisis continues to be a drag on the economy, its effects are felt most acutely in communities and neighborhoods.

Cities can use local housing codes and land banks to push back against banks' reckless behavior.

Since the beginning of the economic downturn, Congress has passed numerous pieces of legislation aimed at stabilizing the housing market. Their legislative efforts succeeded in stabilizing financial markets, but foreclosures have continued unabated, affecting families and neighborhoods across the country. While the foreclosure crisis continues to be a drag on the economy, its effects are felt most acutely in communities and neighborhoods.

For the last decade or so, growth in America's housing stock was driven primarily by investment rather than demand. As a result, there is a surplus in the housing market, which causes many foreclosed homes to sit vacant for years, generating no revenue for their (often institutional) owners who have no intention of occupying the property themselves. Rather, the institutional owners must either pay to maintain the property or let it fall into disrepair. In the many cities where this is the case, it is economically rational for the lender to modify the mortgage, if possible, and allow the current occupants to remain in their home. There are two benefits to such an arrangement: (1) the lender will not be responsible for maintaining the property, and (2) the property will continue to generate revenue for the lender in the form of mortgage payments.

In refusing to modify mortgages, lenders are often acting irrationally. Despite many attempts, the federal government has failed to pass legislation that would force or sufficiently incentivize lenders to modify mortgage principals on a large scale. As a result, foreclosures continue and local governments are left to bear a disproportionate share of the burden. The harms of abandoned property are well-documented: nearby property values decrease, property tax revenues decrease, the community's safety and health are often put at risk, and a negative perception keeps out new investment.

Not all localities, however, are letting these institutional lenders harm their neighborhoods without a fight. Increasingly, they are holding absentee and institutional lenders accountable for the mess their mindless foreclosures create within their jurisdiction. The most successful approaches have included two components: strong code enforcement and a land bank. Land banks are local, usually governmental, entities that can acquire, hold, and dispose of properties according to community needs and priorities. The best way to explain the process is to walk through the steps.

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The mortgagee, often a bank, forecloses a mortgage that the homeowner is no longer paying. The bank may not be able to resell the property, so it sits vacant. This is happening all across the country. The New York Times reported that there were 15,000 abandoned properties in Chicago back in October 2011, most of which resulted from foreclosures. Ideally, the property would not be sitting vacant at all, but the problem of vacancy is compounded when institutional owners fail to manage the property. Most institutional owners, often the big banks, are not well-equipped to maintain properties at the standard required by local housing codes. As a result, it often falls on the local government to board up broken windows and mow overgrown grass.

Here, code enforcement comes into play (which is sometimes supplemented by a vacant property registration system). The owners can be fined when the property does not meet code. The fine must be sufficiently large to give the absent owners an incentive to either maintain or sell the property. If the institutional owner does not pay the fine, it can be placed against the property as a lien. Eventually, non-payment allows the city to foreclose the lien and take the property into its inventory, ideally transferring it to a land bank with expertise in land management to assist in long-term community development.

Alternatively, the banks may choose to donate unoccupied properties in their inventories as a way to avoid paying the steep fines. The case study of Cleveland has been widely publicized in the New York Times and 60 Minutes, among other media outlets. The banks that own dilapidated property in Cleveland, including Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, are so tired of paying fines that they are actually donating them to the local land bank and sometimes paying it up to $7,500 to demolish formerly-occupied properties! The inefficiency of this option for banks is startling and, if banks get their act together, will result in more modifications in lieu of foreclosures.

Cities facing high rates of foreclosure and high rates of property abandonment would be well-advised to adopt this model. Doing so on a widespread basis will have one of two positive effects: either the institutional owner will maintain the property in a way that lessens the harm to the community or the locality will be able to impose large fines and eventually take control of the abandoned property. Without a successful national program to decrease foreclosures, this is the most powerful option local governments can adopt to minimize the effects of the foreclosure crisis.

Kristen Tullos is a Roosevelt Institute Pipeline | Fellow and a third-year student at Emory Law School in Atlanta .

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Josh Kosman on the Loopholes That Fuel Private Equity Buyouts

Jan 12, 2012Mike Konczal

kosman_paperback_launchAs a result of a series of attacks and counter-attacks on Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney's work with Bain, there's been a lot of discussion about private equity, buyouts of firms, and their ultimate relation to the economy.

kosman_paperback_launchAs a result of a series of attacks and counter-attacks on Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney's work with Bain, there's been a lot of discussion about private equity, buyouts of firms, and their ultimate relation to the economy. So far the discussion has been a back-and-forth on layoffs and "creative destruction," with very little on how laws and regulations structure the way private equity and buyouts happen in this country.

I interviewed Josh Kosman, author of The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Is Destroying Jobs and Killing the American Economy, on this topic. Bob Kuttner reviewed his book in May 2010, and Kosman was on Up with Chris Hayes last weekend. The interview has been edited for length.

Mike Konczal: What are private equity funds, and what do they do?

Josh Kosman: Private equity firms are mostly former Wall Street bankers who raise money to buy companies on credit. They used to be called leveraged buyout (LBO) firms, and when the first leveraged buyout boom went bust in the 1980s they regrouped and called themselves private equity.

The big difference between them and venture capitalist or hedge funds is that the companies that they buy borrow money to finance the acquisitions.

Private equity firms own more than 3,000 U.S. companies and employ roughly one out of every 10 Americans in the private workforce. This is just America, so it doesn't include companies or employees overseas. Some companies include HCA, the largest hospital chain, to Clear Channel, the largest radio station operator, to Dunkin' Donuts. They are in every industry.

MK: People coming to the defense of private equity from both the left-neoliberal and conservative spaces directly invoke or allude to "the market" as a natural, already existing thing. But a key progressive retort to this laissez-faire view of economics argues that all markets are deeply embedded in and constructed through legal, tax, and other regulatory government codes. Your research has found that, far from being natural, private equity exists largely due to issues with the tax code. Can you explain?

JK: The whole industry started in the mid-to-late 1970s. The original leveraged buyout firms saw that there were no laws against companies taking out loans to finance their own sales, like a mortgage. So when a private equity firms buys a company and puts 20 percent down, and the company puts down 80 percent, the company is responsible for repaying that.

Now the tax angle is that the company can take the interest it pays on its loans off of taxes. That reduces the tax rate of companies after they are acquired in LBOs by about half. Banks, also realizing this tax effect, were willing to finance these deals. At the time, you could also depreciate the assets of the company you were buying -- that's not true today.

They saw that you could buy a company through a leveraged buyout and radically reduce its tax rate. The company then could use those savings to pay off the increase in its debt loads. For every dollar that the company paid off in debt, your equity value rises by that same dollar, as long as the value of the company remains the same.

MK: So the business model is based on a capital structure and tax arbitrage?

JK: Yes. It's a transfer of wealth as well. It's taking the wealth of the company and transferring it to the private equity firm, as long as it can pay down its debt.  It think it is real - the very early firms targeted industries in predictable industries with reliable cash flows in which they by and large could handle this debt. As more went into this industry, it became very hard to speak to the original model. Now firms are taken over in very volatile industries. And they are taking on debts where they have to pay 15 times their cash flow over seven years -- they are way over-levered.

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MK: The most common argument for why Bain Capital and other private equity firms benefit the economy is that they are pursuing profits. They aren't in the business of directly "creating jobs" or "benefitting society," but those effects occur indirectly through the firms making as much money as they can.

But even here, "profits" -- how they exist, where they come from, and how they are timed -- have a crucial legal and regulatory function. A recent paper from the University of Chicago looking at private equity found that "a reasonable estimate of the value of lower taxes due to increased leverage for the 1980s might be 10 to 20 percent of firm value," which is value that comes from taxpayers to private equity as a result of the tax code. Can you talk more about this?

JK: That sounds about right. If you took away this deduction, you'd still have takeovers, but you'd have a lot less leverage and the buyer would be forced to really improve the company in order to make profits. I think that would be a great thing.

If you look at the dividends stuff that private equity firms do, and Bain is one of the worst offenders, if you increase the short-term earnings of a company you then use those new earnings to borrow more money. That money goes right back to the private equity firm in dividends, making it quite a quick profit. More importantly, most companies can't handle that debt load twice. Just as they are in a position to reduce debt, they are getting hit with maximum leverage again. It's very hard for companies to take that hit twice.

If you look at Ted Forstmann, an original private equity person who just passed away, he would rail against dividends in this manner -- borrowing money to pay out dividends. He was more interested in taking companies public and selling shares and paying down debts and collecting proceeds that way. I can respect that a lot more. The initial private equity model was that you would make money by reselling your company or taking it public, not by levering it a second time.

Private equity and buyouts started as a way to take advantage of tax gimmicks, not as a way of saying "we're going to turn around companies." And now it's out of control. I look at the 10 largest deals done in the 1990s, during ideal economic times, and in six cases it was clear that the company was worse off than if they never been acquired. Moody's just put out a report in December that looked at the 40 largest buyouts of this era and showed that their revenue was growing at 4 percent since their buyout, while comparable companies were growing at 14 percent.

In January -- so just in the past 12 days -- Hostess, the largest bakery in the country, just went bankrupt. Coach, the largest bus company, just went bankrupt. And Quizno's is about to go bankrupt. All of these were owned by private equity.

MK: This battle is part of a larger discussion of, in Henry Manne's phrase, "the market for corporate control." The tax code is set to overlever firms, which require increases in earnings to go toward debt payments instead of research and development, expansion, and other things that build the firm. What could we change to generate different outcomes?

JK: That's exactly right. Right after this goes on for a few years, you've starved your firm of human and operating capital. Five years later, when the private equity leaves, the company will collapse -- you can't starve a company for that long. This is what the history of private equity shows.

What I'd like to see Mitt Romney do is to show an example of a buyout that went well. The only success stories he's talking about on any level are venture capital investments -- Staples and Sports Authority. Personally I like venture capital, I think it provides a lot of value, but that's not what he did mostly, and that's not what these takeovers are about.

The big fix I'd encourage is an end to interest-tax deducibility for leveraged buyouts. The tax system encourages companies to borrow as much as they can. For certain industries, like telecom, these deductions might make a lot of sense. But it was never intended for financing leveraged buyouts. If you put a cap on this you would find buyouts and private equity firms that were much more focused on building companies.

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The Foreclosure Crisis: A Government in Denial

Jan 9, 2012Bruce Judson

mortgage-crisis-150The Federal Reserve sent a warning shot that housing is the greatest threat to the economy. The government should take note.

mortgage-crisis-150The Federal Reserve sent a warning shot that housing is the greatest threat to the economy. The government should take note.

As we start the New Year, the executive branch and Congress continue to pretend the gravest risk to our economy and social stability does not exist: the ongoing foreclosure crisis. The financial crisis began with the housing crisis and it will not end until we resolve housing. Government policymakers who seemingly ignore this basic fact are leading the nation to another potential catastrophe.

This past week, a number of important events occurred in Washington, including important recess appointments by President Obama. However, the most noteworthy event did not make front page news: the Federal Reserve's (apparently) unsolicited memo to the committees of Congress that oversee financial services warning of the dangers the current housing market poses for the economy.

This represents an extraordinary action and underscores both the seriousness of the continuing crisis and the absence of meaningful discussion of the problem in Washington. Bernanke's memo reviewed federal actions to date and effectively concluded that they were unlikely to solve this national tragedy. The memo concluded, in part:

The challenges faced by the U.S. housing market today reflect, in part...a persistent excess supply of homes on the market; and losses arising from an often costly and inefficient foreclosure process (and from problems in the current servicing model more generally)... Absent any policies to help bridge this gap, the adjustment process will take longer...pushing house prices lower and thereby prolonging the downward pressure on the wealth of current homeowners and the resultant drag on the economy at large.

This memo is notable for several reasons. First, it's important to remember that when the Fed speaks, it does so in sober, limited terms. So an unprompted Fed warning suggesting "a persistent excess of supply" and a "resultant drag on the economy" is comparable to the Secretary of Homeland Security holding a press conference to warn of the risk of an imminent national emergency. Second, an unprompted memo from Bernanke to the House means that he is so deeply worried he felt the need to speak out in as strong a voice as his position permits. Third, the Fed rarely speaks on issues unrelated to its direct activities. Indeed, The Wall Street Journal subsequently wrote, "For an institution that jealously guards its independence, the Federal Reserve is wading into treacherous political waters."

Finally, co-ordinated speeches by three top Fed officials further indicate the depth of the Fed's concerns. On Friday, the presidents of the New York and Boston Fed banks and Betsy Duke, a Fed Governor, all gave speeches detailing the need for aggressive action to spur a housing recovery. For example, William Dudley, President of the New York Fed, told a group, "The ongoing weakness in housing has made it more difficult to achieve a vigorous economic recovery."

There are a multitude of other indicators that our current treatment of the housing sector will at minimum prevent an economic recovery and at worst have disastrous consequences for the stability of the financial sector as well as the health of the middle class. (For the record, my analysis leans toward the latter of these two viewpoints.) These include the reportedly poor health of our financial institutions (zombie banks), the administration's seeming efforts to cover this fact up, and the inevitable failure of federal homeowner assistance programs that rely on the cooperation of financial institutions whose profit incentives are in the reverse direction.

Consumer spending represents 70 percent of the nation's economy and is central to any economic recovery. To achieve sufficient aggregate demand (i.e. total spending on goods and services), this will require spending by middle-income individuals in addition to what we now call the 1%. The Fed report suggests that the housing crisis makes such a recovery unlikely.

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The report found that, in the aggregate, more than $7 trillion in home equity -- more than half of the aggregate home equity that existed in early 2006 -- has now been lost, noting, "This substantial blow to household wealth has significantly weakened household spending and consumer confidence." Moreover, "Middle-income households, as a group, have been particularly hard hit hit because home equity is a larger share of their wealth in the aggregate than it is for low-income households (who are less likely to be homeowners) or upper-income households (who own other forms of wealth such as financial assets and businesses)." These households have seen their home equity decline by an estimated 66 percent.

Moreover, the fear of a continuing loss of wealth (which is a cushion against job loss or other economic emergencies), the fear of job loss itself, the negative effects of underwater homes, lack of forbearance for unemployment (a point the Fed particularly emphasizes), and consumers struggling to meet mortgage payments in a far more difficult environment are all dragging the economy down.

There is also a far worse possibility. Today, an estimated 29 percent of all homes with mortgages are underwater. In addition, at least one respected analyst estimates that a total of 14 million homes will be foreclosed on from 2007 to the end of the crisis. This represents a hard-to-imagine one in every four mortgages. With foreclosures increasing, there is now such a looming imbalance of supply and demand that, as the Fed notes, further decreases in home prices are likely. Some believe home price reductions of another 20 percent are likely. This would, in all likelihood, have disastrous consequences on at least three fronts -- and ripple effects that are impossible to predict.

First, so many homeowners would be so far underwater that massive walkaways would be likely. The negative impact on consumer spending of such price declines would almost certainly lead to a vicious cycle of more job losses, leading to further walkaways by struggling consumers.

Second, the mortgage securities market would be in chaos. Nonperforming loans would lead to the forced recognition that bank capital (based on the value of mortgages in bank portfolios) is weak or insufficient.

Third, it is almost impossible to imagine foreclosures on the massive scale anticipated without dire social consequences or even some form of social unrest. As Peggy Noonan has observed, the real meaning of Occupy Wall Street is that this is just the beginning of the protests we are likely to see. "OWS is an expression of American discontent, and others will follow," she predicts. Protests and social unrest are particularly likely if people feel they are unfairly losing their homes to support irresponsible, law-breaking institutions that have successfully disregarded the fundamental rules of capitalism and good citizenship. Mechanisms to avoid this possibility are one of the central issues I address in my forthcoming book, Making Capitalism Work for the 99%: A Manifesto.

What is shocking is the almost total lack of attention the administration has paid to suffering homeowners. It's hard for me (and apparently Chairman Bernanke) to understand how the administration can possibly hope to revitalize the economy without seriously addressing the overhang of consumer housing debt. Moreover, the failure to address the risk this poses for a broader economic catastrophe borders on the inexcusable.

If President Obama is serious about saving the middle class and reducing income inequality, the administration needs to be far more aggressive in developing policies to keep homeowners as homeowners. As I have written before, this was one of FDR's central goals in the New Deal. Detailed proposals for addressing this extraordinary risk do exist. However, they will require a determined effort. There are solutions, but they are not simple.

What is most important right now is that we recognize we are in a lifeboat that will not reach land. We need to focus on implementing a meaningful solution to the problem. A clock is ticking and Washington needs to acknowledge that a witching hour is approaching.

Bruce Judson is Entrepreneur-in-Residence at the Yale Entrepreneurial Institute and a former Senior Faculty Fellow at the Yale School of Management.

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Cordray's Recess Appointment Helps Implement a Law That Already Passed

Jan 4, 2012Mike Konczal

President Obama rightfully sidestepped a GOP that insists on dismantling a law that addresses some of the fundamental breakdowns of the crisis.

President Obama rightfully sidestepped a GOP that insists on dismantling a law that addresses some of the fundamental breakdowns of the crisis.

One way to think about how the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act goes about policing finance is that it levels the playing field of rules and regulations between bank and non-bank financial firms. In the lead up to the crisis, financial firms acted like "shadow banks" without having to follow the rules regular banks did. The legal and regulatory infrastructure that evolved since the Great Depression for regular banks was never extended to these new shadow banks.

This was especially true for consumer financial products, particularly home mortgages. There's a solid regulatory network for home mortgages in place when it comes to regular banks. However, when it came to subprime mortgages made through non-bank lenders, those rules didn't apply. Many financial regulators urged Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to have the Fed start regulating subprime and leveling the regulatory playing field. So did the GAO and a HUD-Treasury task force. Greenspan wouldn’t. Hence Dodd-Frank's emphasis on reducing regulatory arbitrage by creating a special Bureau to consolidate consumer financial protection in one place.

But the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) needs a director in order to start working on reducing the uneven playing field. As a recent report noted, "[w]ithout a Director, the CFPB cannot fully supervise non‐bank financial institutions such as independent payday lenders, non‐bank mortgage lenders, non‐bank mortgage servicers, debt collectors, credit reporting agencies and private student lenders." Enter our dysfunctional Senate.

In early May of 2011, 44 Republican Senators signed onto a letter that requested three specific changes before they confirmed any nominee, "regardless of party affiliation," to head the CFPB. The changes included replacing "the single Director with a board to oversee the Bureau" and subjecting "the Bureau to the Congressional appropriations process."

Dodd-Frank, signed into law in July 2010, created a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that had a single director and was consciously funded in a very specific way. In order for the CFPB to fully work, it needs an appointed director -- certain powers don't kick in otherwise. So in effect a minority of Republican Senators say that they won't allow an act of law to be fully implemented unless certain, crucial, parts of the law are overturned.

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People are correctly referring to this as a new nullification crisis (see also here). Brookings Scholar Thomas Mann notes that insisting "that a legitimately passed law be changed before allowing it to function with a director [is] a modern-day form of nullification. Same with the director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. There is nothing normal or routine about this. The Senate policing of non-cabinet appointments is sometimes more aggressive but the current practice goes well beyond that, more like pre-Civil War days than 20th century practice." This has also gone on with the NLRB and, in a way, went on with the debt ceiling battle. Eventually the administration needed to challenge this.

So it's great to see it recess appoint Richard Cordray as director. ThinkProgress outlines the initial legal analysis as to why Obama has the power to do this. Cordray will make a great director for the CFPB and the Bureau will continue to do the excellent work that it has already done.

It's a shame that more confirmations weren't pushed through with this window. A large number of financial regulator positions need to be filled, and even more judicial spots sit empty. In terms of building a longer-term, ascendent liberalism, it is essential to appoint people such as judges and nurture them to become strong leaders in the future.

It is uncertain whether this will shut down the confirmation process in the Senate, which may escalate tensions. If so, it will be a good time to reexamine how confirmations happen in the Senate more broadly. This is a part of government that was never meant to work the way it does now, and it is having serious consequences for the country.

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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The Womancession Will Prolong Our Economic Slump

Jan 4, 2012Bryce Covert

They oversee 80 percent of consumer spending. While they suffer, the economy suffers.

They oversee 80 percent of consumer spending. While they suffer, the economy suffers.

The New York Times reported earlier this week that consumer spending, while slightly up for the holidays, wasn't as strong as many were hoping and ended up looking pretty depressed in 2011. Consumers' unwillingness to open up their pocketbooks and go on credit-fueled shopping sprees portends dismal economic growth in the near future. They have already cut back so far that there is "little room for a big increase in spending in 2012," as the article puts it. And it reports, "Consumer spending makes up 70 percent of the economy, so until it ignites, general growth is likely to be sluggish."

It's no mistake that both the people interviewed for the article were women. There's Sarah M. Manley from Minnesota, who has frozen crab legs she bought on discount stowed away for Valentine's Day and now buys milk in plastic bags from the gas station instead of in cartons. There's also Lynette Paudel of Ohio, who plans to drive her 2003 minivan until it breaks but was lucky enough to avoid being let go from her high school English teaching job. When it comes to talk of consumer spending, we might as well be talking almost exclusively about women. They oversee 80 percent of consumer spending, totaling $3.7 trillion. As long as they continue to suffer in the recession, the rest of the economy will sputter along.

Paudel is very lucky to have kept her teaching job. Since the recovery officially began in 2009, women have actually been losing jobs. They saw 46,000 disappear, while at the same time men made some gains, getting back 1.26 million. Women's unemployment rate has also inched up while men saw a decline. And a large part of that trend is that women were big losers in public sector layoffs, losing 374,000 jobs. A lot of those came from public education jobs -- elementary and high school teachers like Paudel.

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That's not the whole story, however. Men have also been making gains in the public sector while women lost, driven by huge job losses for administrative and secretarial positions. Men are even gaining in the traditionally female-dominated retail industry.

Even those women who are still employed are likely struggling with other factors. Housing debt is a huge barrier holding consumers back. The Times article reports, "with more than one in every five borrowers still owing more than their homes are worth, many homeowners feel too pressed to spend on much more than the essentials." But as the Consumer Federation of America found, women were 32 percent more likely to receive subprime mortgages than men across all product lines, even though they have similar credit profiles. Those high-cost loans, often pawned off on those who could least afford them, have led to a massive wave of foreclosures and put many homeowners underwater. And overall, women's representation in the mortgage market has grown in recent decades -- the number of single women homeowners, for example, grew by 4 million between 1994 and 2002. They're likely to be struggling under heavy mortgage debt loads.

They also, of course, make less than their male counterparts for similar work. So while American workers' wages have stagnated over the past three decades, women have yet to even catch up to men.

It's likely that some of the women overseeing that 80 percent of consumer spending aren't going it alone. Many are making decisions for their families' spending, and if they are unemployed hopefully they can rely on income from an employed spouse. (Although in a recent poll almost a quarter of respondents had a family member who had experienced job loss.) But if consumer spending is going to continue driving the economy, and the economic recovery, what's happening to women in the recovery period can't be ignored. Things have been bad and show no sign of looking up.

Bryce Covert is Editor of New Deal 2.0.

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Why is the Government Saving Money by Driving Students Into Debt?

Dec 21, 2011Bryce Covert

The latest budget deal cuts Pell Grants, one more blow to the old system that helped students pay for college directly.

It's no secret that college graduates are struggling under huge debt loads. The overall debt owed is set to hit $1 trillion this year.

The latest budget deal cuts Pell Grants, one more blow to the old system that helped students pay for college directly.

It's no secret that college graduates are struggling under huge debt loads. The overall debt owed is set to hit $1 trillion this year.

Rising debt loads are fueled by two simultaneous trends: soaring tuition and falling assistance. As James Surowiecki writes, "Since the late nineteen-seventies, annual costs at four-year colleges have risen three times as fast as inflation." And the days when a college education could be financed through government assistance like the GI Bill or Pell Grants are quickly disappearing. Grants used to cover two-thirds of financing an education. Now two-thirds of college financing comes from loans.

In the face of these pressures facing graduates, the government might be expected to offer more assistance. And Obama announced an executive order in October that tries to ease burdens. It allows grads to cap repayments on their federal loans at 10 percent of their discretionary income come January (which is two years before it was already set to happen). After 20 years, all the remaining debt on those loans would be forgiven -- five years earlier than it would have been without his order. On top of this, some borrowers with more than one federal loan can consolidate them, which could reduce their interest rates (slightly). But even that most immediate impact, consolidating loans, is only likely to save the average borrower between $4.50 and $7.75 a month, a barely noticeable sum.

Now news came out this week that the last-minute budget deal to fund the government and avert a shut down included cuts to Pell Grants. The maximum grant will be preserved at $5,550, but changes to the eligibility criteria will make as many as 100,000 recipients ineligible. The maximum amount a family can earn without contributing anything toward tuition will drop from $30,000 to $23,000. It also retroactively limits the number of semesters that a student can use grants, from 18 to 12. In sum, these changes will mean less money for fewer people to pay for a college education.

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Even as the government has shifted further and further away from directly subsidizing higher education -- i.e. giving out money that doesn't have to be paid back -- it is still subsidizing education costs. It just does so through multiple tax breaks for student loans, which are far less visible to the average American. And the cost of these tax code subsidies isn't cheap. As my colleague Mike Konczal notes, the government shells out about "$22.75 billion... through the tax code to make college tuition and student debt more manageable." This means that in order to finance an education, the government is basically assuming students and their families will take on huge debt burdens.

Compare that number to the total cost of the Pell Grant program. It cost the government $36.5 billion in 2010. While that's a larger sum, the government is still shelling out both amounts -- but only looking to cut money from the aid that doesn't entail students miring themselves in debt.

Those tax subsidies should also be compared to what it would cost the government to simply provide free public higher education: by Mike's estimate, $15-$30 billion. If the government is looking to save money, it could do worse than shifting funds lost to tax breaks that subsidize indenture to giving out aid directly through either grants or simply free public ed. In fact, if it no longer had to lose money through tax breaks or pay out money for Pell Grants, the savings of free public colleges could be pretty nice.

Because this debt does have a real life impact on the students who carry it. As I've written before, research shows that higher debt loads narrow the career choices students make upon graduation. By cutting down on direct aid and therefore pushing more students toward debt, the government is complicit in Wall Street's brain drain. And this debt can hang over them for an entire lifetime. Almost 10 percent of people ages 55-64 still have student loan debt. The bankruptcy code doesn't allow this type of debt to be discharged.

As unemployment rates and income levels make clear, a college education is an important asset. The government has choices it can make in how it helps people finance those educations. One path leads to debt loads that skew students' life courses. Why would we choose that one?

Bryce Covert is Editor of New Deal 2.0.

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Could We Redirect Tax Subsidies to Pay for Free College?

Dec 20, 2011Mike Konczal

Want a way to pay for free higher education? Take a look at all the tax breaks that ease the burden of student debt.

Want a way to pay for free higher education? Take a look at all the tax breaks that ease the burden of student debt.

Josh Eidelson has a great post at The Nation, "Fighting Privatization, Occupy Activists at CUNY and UC Kick Into High Gear," that dives into the battles currently being waged against the dismantling of public higher education. One of the Occupy movement's major objectives is combating the privatization of public higher education and its replacement with a debt-fueled economy of indenture.

While prepping a recent Occupy panel, Sarah Jaffe brought up how we subsidize student debt in a similar way to mortgage debt, that is, through allowing people to deduce the interest paid on this debt from taxes. According to Pew Charitable Trust's website subsidyscope, the deductibility of student loan interest alone costs taxpayers $1.4 billion dollars. Instead of taking $1.4 billion dollars and directly making college cheaper, students take out massive amounts of student loan debt and we alter the tax code to make that debt $1.4 billion dollars cheaper.

This is an example of what Suzanne Mettler calls "the submerged state," a pattern where the government has, as she says, "shunned the outright disbursing of benefits to individuals and families and favored instead less visible and more indirect incentives and subsidies, from tax breaks to payments for services to private companies. These submerged policies...obscure the role of government and exaggerate that of the market." Instead of directly providing public options, we subsidize the purchasing of private goods, often using the tax code.

Let's take the case of student debt and the tax code. How much would it cost to make public colleges and universities free? Rough estimates (quoting Jeffrey Sach's latest book) put the price of free public higher education at $15-$30 billion, which fits other estimates I've seen.

Now what are the costs of how we subsidize higher education through the tax code? There's already the $1.4 from the interest exemption. Also from subsidyscope, there's the exclusion of employer-provided educational assistance ($1.1 billion), exclusion of interest on student-loan bonds ($0.6 billion), exclusion of scholarship and fellowship income ($3.0 billion), exclusion of tax on earnings of qualified tuition programs: savings account programs ($0.6 billion), the HOPE tax credit ($5.4 billion), the Lifetime Learning tax credit ($5.5 billion), parental personal exemption for students age 19 or over ($3.4 billion), and state prepaid tuition plans ($1.75 billion). There's also the stimulus's American Opportunity Tax Credit ($14.4 billion) and some part of the deductibility of charitable contributions (education) ($4.9 billion).

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Even without the last two, that's $22.75 billion we are paying through the tax code to make college tuition and student debt more manageable. This amount is in the middle the range of the cost of just making public high education free. Now these aren't equivalent -- much of what is spent through the tax code will be biased more towards private and professional schools, which are more expensive. But this also isn't anywhere near the full extent we subsidize student debt (a government creation from 1965).

But there is a choice in how to provide mass higher education. We can either use resources to reduce the price of the good upfront -- make college free -- or to subsidize the purchase of the good -- here through the numerous hoops of the tax code. The amount of money we take from the tax code to try and make student debts and runaway tuition more bearable could be used instead to just provide free public colleges.

There are winners and losers in each case. When we subsidize through the tax code, people who are well off and pay more taxes benefit more. People who can afford support staff, such as accountants and lawyers, are also more likely to understand how to take maximum advantage of these benefits. These subsidies benefit private educational institutions over public ones, as they'll make private education feel more "natural" while obscuring the role of the government in setting up these markets. They give public college a nudge towards corporatization and privatization. Much of these subsidies are likely captured either by the higher education institutions themselves or the debt lenders. These subsidies will make tuition and debt easier to deal with, but providing colleges free as a public option would likely do far more to contain costs (also see here).

Most importantly, it breaks the link between citizenship and education. The subsidy approach replaces the claim to a necessary good to be full, participating citizens in our market economy with the claim of a consumer, whose claim is ultimately one of willingness to pay either through wealth or debt. The first kind is the place where progressives have the stronger argument about freedom, as opposed to those who see the market as the only source of freedom available.

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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Amir Sufi on the Balance Sheet Recession and How to Address Household Debt

Dec 16, 2011Mike Konczal

money-globe-150I think that Amir Sufi (University of Chicago Booth School of Business) and Atif Mian (University of California, Berkeley) are doing the most interesting and important empirical work on what is going on with this Great Recession.

money-globe-150I think that Amir Sufi (University of Chicago Booth School of Business) and Atif Mian (University of California, Berkeley) are doing the most interesting and important empirical work on what is going on with this Great Recession. So I was excited to see that they just released two new papers on the subject, "What Explains High Unemployment? The Aggregate Demand Channel" and "Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and the Economic Slump." Here's an editorial -- "How Household Debt Contributes to Unemployment" -- summarizing their research. They have used a lot of innovative methods and data sets in order to pinpoint the problem of the "household balance sheet" and housing debt overhang and its link to sluggish growth and employment. These papers have been covered in the blogosphere already (here's Paul KrugmanCalculated Risk and Kevin Drum all discussing it.) I was able to interview Amir Sufi about this research.

Mike Konczal: To get started, your papers, and much of the similar work on the matter, show how debt is impacting our slow recovery. In order for this to happen in an otherwise functioning economy, your model introduces three frictions.  Can you describe them?

Amir Sufi: From an academic perspective, most macroeconomics is done within a representative agent framework where all types of people are identical. What that means is that leverage can never really matter -- because it is one guy basically borrowing from himself.

So the first main ingredient in this paper -- and I think Eggertsson and Krugman have said this in the most straightforward way -- is that you have got to have some agents in the economy who are borrowers and some who are savers. For leverage to matter in an economic model, you are going to have to have heterogeneity among households in the model. From a practical point of view, when talking about the real world that's pretty obvious, but for the macroeconomic model you need to add that in.

The second ingredient is some shock that reduces the consumption of the borrowers very sharply. Both the Eggertsson/Krugman paper and another by Veronica Guerrieri and Guido Lorenzoni make the argument that the fundamental shock is to the ability of the borrowers to borrow -- they are forced to either default or massively pay back their debt burdens. In the context that I interpret it in the real world, it is the combination of the decline in house prices that took away the home equity channel, along with the collapse in credit card availability because of the financial crisis. Those are the big shocks that matter.

In my view, those two things are noncontroversial. Even when I present them to more right-leaning economists who don't believe frictions are so important, they're are willing to accept these assumptions. The third thing is trickier. The standard response of economists who don't believe in frictions is: fine, the consumption of these borrowers declines massively, but there's no reason the economy shouldn't equilibrate itself by the savers making up for the lost consumption. And what mediates that channel generally is the interest rate. When the borrowers reduce their consumption, the interest rate collapses -- it's like a positive shock to savings demand. At that point the savers, seeing the lower interest rate, should start buying cars, redoing their kitchens, and everything we think people do when there's lower interest rates.

What you need, and this is where the third thing, the zero-lower bound, comes in, is some friction that prevents the savers from making up the shortfall. And that's where the liquidity trap stuff really comes in. In order to get the savers to consume more, you need the interest rate to get really negative, but it can't get negative because of the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates.

And then you get into all kinds of problems, like the Fisher debt-deflation stuff. The normal way you try to get real interest rates negative is through expected inflation, but the only way you can get expected inflation is if you force the current price level down, which is deflation. But the debt burdens are written in nominal terms. If you push the price level down, you get this vicious cycle where the borrowers cut their consumption by even more.

I want to add that the third ingredient -- the friction -- doesn't need to be the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. But that is what has been articulated in the theory work most prominently.

MK: Reading much of the zero lower bounds literature now, it strikes me that it was a conversation among a handful of Princeton and New Keynesian academics when it first started. But looking at it now, it seems very obvious that the zero-lower bound creates a challenge. If right-leaning economists don't think the zero-lower bound is a friction, what do they think?

AS: I think that right-leaning economists don't deny that the zero lower bound could be a friction. I think the zero-lower bound does bother them, that they think it is a fundamental friction. I think where they'd disagree with Paul, and to an extent even I disagree with Paul, is that if you look at his model, the optimal policy in those models isn't necessarily fiscal stimulus, it is writing down the debts of borrowers. That's the number one policy that fixes the problem.

Gauti and Paul's model in particular has a tightened borrowing constraint on borrowers that pushes down their consumption, which in turn leads to zero lower bound problems. The quickest and most effective way in their model would be some type of transfer from the savers to the borrowers to offset this dramatic decline in consumption. Principle forgiveness is exactly such a transfer. Fiscal stimulus is a form of this transfer where we borrow from future generations to make up for the shortfall in demand. But it strikes me as much less direct and potentially more distortive than principle forgiveness.

I come from a finance micro background, so if I were to criticize the zero-lower bound literature, which I use, it is that fiscal stimulus doesn't fall so naturally out of it. Paul goes to lengths to argue against the argument "how can more debt solve a debt problem?" and explains it is because the borrowers are constrained, and there's some truth to that. But the fundamental problem in these models, what generates the zero-lower bound problem, is a sharp reduction in consumption by borrowers. Why not attack that problem head on? If you look at Rogoff's opinion against Krugman's, I think this is the main difference. They agree on the zero-lower bound nature of the problem, but have different tactics on how to fight it. I tend to agree with the view that directly targeting the household debt problem seems to make more sense than fiscal stimulus.

MK: Looking at these models, the real world implication is that a sharp drop in housing prices and a subsequent increase in debt-to-leverage should cause a decrease in consumption. But it isn't necessarily clear why this must be the case. Most of the papers don't develop this, often taking a debt limit as exogenous, though one could imagine people going about their spending decisions in much the same way before or after a housing crash. I was wondering if you have an answer for this.

AS: I think there's a few ways to think about it that we outline in our consumption paper. Why does the shock lead to such a strong reduction in consumption? One, and this is based on previous research, a lot of the consumption by the indebted households during the housing boom was being financed through home equity withdrawal. So just mechanically, consumption can't stay at the same path because they no longer have their homes to borrow against to finance consumption.

The second thing is that the deleveraging effect is real. The Survey of Consumer Finances shows that up until the 90th percentile of the distribution, as of 2007, made up around 65 percent of people's net worth. If you see a massive decline in the value of your home, it is kind of mechanical that if you are thinking about savings and retirement you'll think, "I was planning on having enough equity in my home when I retire that I could just borrow against it for the rest of my life. Now I don't, so I have to adjust my consumption path immediately."

The third thing comes from the credit supply channel. These guys can no longer refinance into lower rates, therefore their income in a relative sense goes down because they can't get these lower interest payments. Hence you'd see their relative consumption against those that can refinance decline. Also, the act of delinquency itself reduces consumption -- your credit score is shot, foreclosures have an effect on durable consumption. Regardless of what you think of the theory, the empirical evidence in our stuff is undeniable: highly indebted households see very sharp relative declines in spending.

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MK: A lot of the underwater mortgages in the country are in a handful of states. How well does your research deal with local conditions? Many of these places would have had a major housing construction boom too.

AS: We take on the local difference, and this is where our housing supply elasticity instrument becomes so critical. You are correct: if you unconditionally look at the high debt-to-income places, a lot of it is highly correlated with places that had construction booms and a lot of migration. To get rid of the construction and migration effects, we try to use exogenous variation in debt-to-income ratios that is driven by housing supply elasticity. This is a technique called "two-stage least squares." We regress the debt-income ratio on how hard it is to build in an area. The idea is that this instrument allows us to disentangle the effect of debt levels from construction and migration. The results after doing this are very strong. Any place that had a high debt-income ratio, whether or not it had a construction boom, is suffering massively now.

MK: A response to your argument is that the savings rate hasn't gone up that much. It's up, but lower than historical averages and has stayed pretty much in the 5 percent region. If your theory relies on people saving more, is this a problem?

AS: First, it is in some sense about the derivative. It might not be high historically, but it is high when compared to 2002 through 2007. Every single quarter since 2008, it's been higher than during the expansion preceding this recession.

But the more fundamental issue is that the savings rate is a very misleading number because it is endogenous. It's easiest to see this argument by looking at (1 - the savings rate), which is how much consumption you are doing out of your current income. It is true that consumption is not that much lower relative to total income than it has been historically. But of course that is a silly way of looking at it. The point is that consumption is way down, period. We don't care whether it low relative to current income.

Once you think about it this way, the problem with the savings rate becomes a lot more obvious. The right benchmark for judging whether consumption is low or savings is high is not relative to current income, it is relative to the consumption you had before the recession. When you say, "People don't seem to be consuming that much less as a fraction of their total income," I say, "Who cares?" The point is that their income is way lower precisely because of the recession. And their income is lower because everybody is consuming less. This is why the savings rate is kind of a silly number when talking about a deleveraging recession.

The right way to look at it is to say how much has consumption fallen since 2006. It has gone down tremendously! And that's prima facie evidence that consumers are deleveraging. People are earning less, because they are consuming less, which is the essence of the deleveraging argument.

Finally, you also have to take into account that interest rates are basically zero. If interest rates are zero, then people are really saving a huge amount of money, because they are saving 5 percent at a zero interest rate. You have to adjust for interest rates to determine whether or not savings rates are historically high.

MK: Another response to this model is that the debt-to-income ratios don't actually matter that much. What is really driving this is a wealth effect. People feel poorer from losing housing value, and thus they spend less. James Surowiecki just had a piece arguing against these balance sheet recession models in The New Yorker, "The Deleveraging Myth." Dean Baker from CEPR makes this argument as well.

AS: Well obviously I disagree 100 percent with that for both theoretical and empirical reasons. The theoretical reason is that housing should not be thought of in a pure wealth sense. We all have to consume housing going forward. And the value of my house going down is also the same value of the price of housing going down. The easiest way to imagine this is to picture a young couple that currently rents and will buy a house in the future. If housing prices decline, it is good for them because they can then more easily buy a house in the future. Clearly, this is not a negative wealth effect for the young couple.

MK: But as far as I understand it there are studies that find a wealth effect in housing.

AS: This is a semantic point on what you call it. I'm saying as an economist that if you call something a wealth effect, then it has nothing to do with borrowing constraints and debt levels, and that effect in theory should be zero. To the degree that we observe that when people's house prices go up they consume more, that's not a wealth effect -- that's a borrowing constraint being alleviated, and people borrowing against collateral that they couldn't before. Which is a very different thing, and it matters empirically. My own research on this topic shows definitively that people consume aggressively out of housing wealth because of borrowing constraints, not a simple wealth effect.

Here's why I fundamentally disagree with the "wealth effect" argument. Suppose you have an economy that looks like the U.S. before the recession, where you have an extremely skewed net wealth distribution. The wealth effect argument is that the response of the economy to house price declines would have been the same if you flattened that out versus if you had the polarization that we have now. And I disagree with that fundamentally, and that's what the research shows. The net wealth distribution matters. People who have very high debt-to-income ratios cut their spending very dramatically, and there is no way a pure wealth effect can explain the magnitude of the cut.

MK: How necessary is debt forgiveness?

AS: I'll say this: We are about four years into this mess, and we still don't have any sense what the elasticity of consumption would be with respect to principle forgiveness. The reason we don't have that estimate is that there's been no principle forgiveness government programs. Of all that has been allocated, there's been virtually nothing allocated to principle reduction to see if it works.

I'm not willing to come out and say principle forgiveness will solve all of our problems. But at the very least, shouldn't we have some basic idea of how responsive spending of highly indebted households would be to principle forgiveness? We've tried a ridiculous number of things in terms of government policy during this downturn: fiscal stimulus, homebuyer tax rebates, cash for clunkers, etc. Can't we at least give principle forgiveness a chance, even if it is on a very small scale?

MK: Any concluding remarks?

AS: The distribution of net wealth matters a lot. Let's suppose there's $100 of wealth in the economy and there's a hundred people. If everybody had $1 of wealth, and then there's a massive drop in house prices, my argument is that this recession wouldn't have been nearly as severe. It's because the five guys at the top have all of the $100 and are just lending to the other 95, that's why the recession is so severe when house prices collapse. Paul said this a few times on his blog, and he's usually very clear, but I don't think he's been clear enough on explaining this. These models on why deleveraging matters are all about the net wealth distribution. We shouldn't be surprised that this recession and the Great Depression were preceded by very large increases in wealth inequality. This is well documented during the 1920s and the 2000s. This is why I get a bit annoyed at the guys who are saying it's just a pure wealth effect, because it's something bigger than that.

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