Revenue Sharing for the States: How It Works, Why We Need It and Why Nixon Liked It!

May 11, 2011Marshall Auerback

States are being cut off just at the time they most need federal assistance. Revenue sharing would be a winning strategy for the economy and for Obama.

Our policymakers continue to believe that they must first ‘get credit flowing again’ to restore output and employment. Unfortunately the reverse is the case: restoring output and employment will restore the flow of credit. Creditworthiness precedes credit.

States are being cut off just at the time they most need federal assistance. Revenue sharing would be a winning strategy for the economy and for Obama.

Our policymakers continue to believe that they must first ‘get credit flowing again’ to restore output and employment. Unfortunately the reverse is the case: restoring output and employment will restore the flow of credit. Creditworthiness precedes credit.

And yet, as we get closer and closer to D-Day on the debt ceiling limit, the negotiations continue to turn on how much income the government should drain from the economy, even as private sector activity continues to stagnate. All moves to date by the Treasury and Federal Reserve have only served to shift financial assets between the public and private sectors. And that includes quantitative easing. Nothing has directly added to aggregate demand (the overall demand for goods and services).

The economy has therefore continued to deteriorate, with only the ‘automatic stabilizers’ like unemployment insurance slowly adding financial assets and income to the private sector as the counter-cyclical deficit rises. The rate of federal deficit spending now exceeds around 8% of GDP and seems to have begun moving the economy sideways, but has been insufficient to offset the impacts of the worst recession in over 70 years. Indeed, the combination of a tepid fiscal response -- which appears to have been just enough to ward off a second Great Depression -- and the premature fiscal withdrawal are largely to blame for the weak and teetering recovery.

Worst of all, most of the fiscal packages have been spent. That suggests that in spite of all of the cheerleading by US officialdom and the beneficiaries of this Potemkin prosperity, we will not record significant gains in employment until real output of goods and services exceeds productivity growth. Withdrawal of yet more fiscal stimulus, as the mainstream “experts” (who completely missed the Great Recession of 2008!) continue their call for further cutbacks in government spending, risks a repeat of the error that FDR made when he listened to conservative economic advisers in 1937. He slashed the budget deficit during the Great Depression -- causing a renewed surge in unemployment and the extension of the depression.

Sign up for weekly ND20 highlights, mind-blowing stats, and event alerts.

The most immediate crisis, deserving attention before any other, is in the states and cities. Yet assistance to the states is being cut off at a time likely to forestall economic recovery. State and local budgets should not be cut. But how to prevent this? Here's an idea: By recreating a revenue sharing program for the states, with a pass-through to cities, on a scale sufficient to plug the budget gaps. How much is needed? As James Galbraith has noted, the federal government’s fiscal aid to the states has hitherto only offset the job cuts imposed by falling revenues and balanced budget requirements. He therefore suggests a number of practical measures to enhance this revenue sharing:

Federalizing Medicaid may be the most effective and practical way to achieve this. The alternative is open-ended general revenue sharing: on the condition that states neither raise nor lower their tax rates, the federal government should supply the funds required to close their budget gaps and to maintain public services at baseline levels, for the duration of the crisis.

President Obama could well point out that revenue sharing has Republican lineage; it ought to be a bipartisan cause today. It was Richard Nixon who first introduced the concept. Nixon viewed the federal bureaucracy as a poor revenue manager and argued that much counter-cyclical spending should go to the states, as they are closer to people's needs and more directly hurt by falling revenues. But instead of simply cutting taxes, as later conservatives would, he proposed a new system called revenue sharing, which redirected funds to states and municipalities. The federal government would collect taxes and local governments would spend the money. Passed after contentious debate, the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972 initially delivered $4 billion per year in matching funds to states and municipalities. The program, which distributed some $83 billion dollars before it was killed by Ronald Reagan in 1986, proved enormously popular.

It is important to remember that a sovereign government with its own currency can always financially afford such a program. By virtue of its position as issuer of the currency, the US Federal government could promote employment, output, income, and private expenditure through the expedient of revenue sharing. By contrast, US states, as users of currency, are reliant on this counter-cyclical fiscal policy to mitigate the destructive effects of economic downturns -- particularly unemployment and the suffering it causes. In the words of Erik Dean, the states “cannot run budget deficits without risking credit downgrades and insolvency. Recessions typically diminish revenues for these users of the currency at the very time that their expenditures are most needed."

As an example, consider Hurricane Katrina. True, the rescue package was marred by incompetence, but how was New Orleans able to rebuild, given the underlying financial condition of the state of Louisiana? Simple, as David McWilliams noted in today's UK paper, "The Independent":

The United States cavalry rode in to save New Orleans and the State of Louisiana. The President declared a state of emergency, Treasury wrote the cheques and the Federal Reserve credited Louisiana's accounts. They then spent those dollars on cleaning up the city. So the central bank credited the account of the State of Louisiana because emergency economic conditions meant the State needed it. The State issued no bonds; there were no IOUs, except that the deficit of the US rose. There was no effect on inflation.

Yes, we have recovered from the worst of the crisis. But it is delusional to believe that economic recovery can really get underway until we have added something close to 10 million jobs. The current level of job growth will not see us get anywhere near that target for at least another 3-4 years. Indeed, in the absence of revenue sharing, we are likely to see more attacks on workers of the kind that has characterized recent budget battles in Wisconsin and Michigan. Wall Street crashed their pensions and created the fiscal crisis now afflicting the states. But this administration is still caught in the grips of that failed economic paradigm. If President Obama were to fight for revenue sharing, he would develop tens of thousands of local government allies. He would also have a very powerful issue with which to fight the next election, as well as a winning economic argument.

Marshall Auerback is a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, and a market analyst and commentator.

Share This

Our Problem is Bigger than "Structural" Unemployment

May 10, 2011Mike Konczal

The fact that college students and women are also suffering from high unemployment points to something larger.

David Brooks brings up structural unemployment in his editorial today:

The fact that college students and women are also suffering from high unemployment points to something larger.

David Brooks brings up structural unemployment in his editorial today:

Americans should be especially alert to signs that the country is becoming less vital and industrious. One of those signs comes to us from the labor market. As my colleague David Leonhardt pointed out recently, in 1954, about 96 percent of American men between the ages of 25 and 54 worked. Today that number is around 80 percent. One-fifth of all men in their prime working ages are not getting up and going to work...

Part of the problem has to do with human capital. More American men lack the emotional and professional skills they would need to contribute. According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 35 percent of those without a high school diploma are out of the labor force, compared with less than 10 percent of those with a college degree.

Matt Yglesias and Jamelle Bouie both responded, noticing how the Great Recession is missing from this narrative.

I would throw in two things. As for "human capital," here's the employment rate of 20-24 year-old college graduates that Charlie Eisenhood dug up:

Around 5 percent more college graduates ages 20-24 are not getting up and going to work. It's difficult to argue that they need to go to college, because they did. It's difficult to argue that they can't move to new jobs (since they're unlikely to be homeowners) or suffer high health care costs (doesn't health care reform allow employers to push health costs for young adults onto their parents' employer?). Unless we think that the graduating class of 2008 is fundamentally worse than the graduating class of 2006, I don't see a technology problem.

Also for fun, the graduating classes post-Recession have increasingly large student debt loans, which should lower the reservation wage they'll accept due to liquidity pressures. So the idea that everyone 20-24 is on vacation is harder to accept compared to earlier years.

There's also an argument that 20 to 24-year-olds are waiting longer for their first job since income and career paths are determined by one's first job. But that begs the question as to why they are waiting and amplifies the misery this extended period of joblessness is causing for people.

Sign up for weekly ND20 highlights, mind-blowing stats, and event alerts.

As for the FatherBringsHometheBaconEconomics of the Brooks piece, before we declare permanent gynohegemony over the labor markets can we mention that women have also lost 1.6 million jobs in the recession?

It's worth noting that men are adding jobs right now, while women are staying steady and have actually lost jobs over the past few months. Normalizing the employment numbers to January 2010 for people over 20, we see that the anemic job growth of the past year and a half has gone to men, who have added 2% more jobs since then:

Welcome to the recovery.

**For more evidence against the idea of structural unemployment, check out a working paper I co-wrote with Arjun Jayadev, "The Stagnating Labor Market."

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

Share This

Getting America Back to Work Remains the Singular Challenge for the Obama Administration

May 6, 2011Marshall Auerback

A universal Jobs Guarantee Program could free us from the predations of politicians and foster a strong economy.

A universal Jobs Guarantee Program could free us from the predations of politicians and foster a strong economy.

On the anniversary of the inauguration of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), it is striking to compare the unemployment record of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and that of his modern day successor, Barack Obama. FDR's achievements in putting Americans back to work are among the most impressive of his tenure; he took the rate from 25% to 9.6% by 1936. But so far, Obama's policies have failed to "jump-start" unemployment in a significant way, even as Wall Street has continued a recovery utterly and totally divorced from Main Street.

It's easy to see why: The debt loads remain too high while income and employment continue to fall. Meanwhile, delinquencies and foreclosures continue to rise. Even at current depressed prices, assets are overvalued. Many financial institutions (probably including most of the big ones) are hopelessly insolvent, holding mountains of toxic waste that will never be worth anything. By the same token, almost 14 million active job seekers remain unemployed. Another 6.4 million people who are not actively looking for work (and therefore are not counted as unemployed) say they want jobs. Among workers who are lucky enough to have jobs, 8.3 million are employed part-time but want full-time jobs. Taken together, there are well over 28 million people in the United States for whom the economy has not performed its most important function -- providing enough jobs to go around.

The pace of recovery from the recession has been distressingly slow. It took only 18 months for the nation's unemployment rate to climb from 5.0 percent to its peak of 10.1 percent in October 2009. In the 16 months since then, the rate has made up less than a quarter of that loss. True, we did dodge another Great Depression. That fact is attributable to the federal government's forceful macroeconomic intervention in late 2008 and early 2009. Economists Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi (one a former Clinton appointee to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and the other a former economic adviser to Senator John McCain) have estimated that the nation's unemployment rate would have reached 16 percent rather than its actual 10.1 percent in the absence of this intervention.

And yet, in spite of the historic successes of programs such as the WPA, the current government cannot seem to even begin to replicate it. The very fiscal stimulus that helped to avert an even greater economic calamity is now viewed as an excuse against further action to mitigate the scourge of unemployment. We continue to be plagued by misguided notions that our government faces imminent insolvency (imagine the fate of the US had the Roosevelt Administration embraced this idea!).

Part of the aversion toward embracing WPA-style programs today is the false idea that they did little to reduce unemployment, which some claim was only "solved" by the war. Most statistical studies understate the effect of the New Deal job creation measures because they don't show how much of the decline in official employment was attributable to the multiplier effect of spending on direct job creation. Additionally, the "work relief" category does not include employment on public works funded by the Public Works Administration (PWA), nor the multiplier effect of PWA spending. The figures tell the story indirectly, however, in the path official unemployment followed -- steeply declining in periods when work relief spending was high and either declining more slowly or increasing in periods when work relief spending was cut back*.

Estimates for the years prior to 1940 are intended to measure the number of persons who are totally unemployed, having no work at all. For the 1930s this concept, however, does include one large group of persons who had both work and income from work -- those on emergency work. In the United States we are concerned with measuring lack of regular work and do not minimize the total by excluding persons with made work or emergency jobs. This contrasts sharply, for example, with the German practice during the 1930s when persons in the labor-force camps were classed as employed, and Soviet practice which includes employment in labor camps, if it includes it at all, as employment. Counting the WPA programs, FDR's record on unemployment, notably in his first time of office, was formidable, as he took the rate down from 25% to 9.6% by 1936.

It’s free! Sign up to have the Daily Digest, a witty take on the morning’s key headlines, delivered straight to your inbox.

True, an economy can boom for a time, with what may appear to be inadequate levels of net government spending without rising unemployment. In these situations, as is evidenced in countries like the US during the Clinton Administration, GDP growth can be driven by an expansion in private debt. The problem with this strategy is that when the debt service levels reach some threshold percentage of income, the private sector will "run out of borrowing capacity" as incomes limit debt service. This tends to restructure their balance sheets to make them less precarious and as a consequence the aggregate demand from debt expansion slows and the economy falters. In this case, any fiscal drag (inadequate levels of net spending) begins to manifest as unemployment.

The Obama Administration remains fixated by deficit reduction at the expense of reducing unemployment. This is not helpful to recovery: In addition to inflicting lasting damage on an individual's labor market prospects, unemployment is associated with increased rates of physical and mental illness, alcohol and drug abuse, child and spouse abuse, failed relationships and family dissolution, suicide and attempted suicide, and a host of other personal and social ills. All sectors of the unemployed suffer an increased risk of experiencing these problems, but since unemployment itself is distributed unequally among population groups, with disadvantaged workers bearing more than their fair share of its immediate burdens, so too are they destined to bear more than their fair share of its painful, longer-term consequences.

The existence of our current job shortage also makes it harder for us to dig our way out of the recession. Long term unemployment prevents the housing market from rebounding and the housing industry from recovering. It forces the consumer sector to wait anxiously for customers. It keeps capital goods producers waiting for a plausible customer.

A more effective way to restart the economic process on solid ground is to deal with the underlying cause of the problem: We have a credit-based economy, rather than an incomes-based economy. The whole boom of the 2000s (and more broadly the growth process that emerged at the in the early 1980s) was based on household borrowing and the continuation of negative saving trends (that is, household deficit spending). A good place to start recovery efforts, therefore, would be to change this method of economic growth by fostering more, not fewer WPA-type programs.

In my view, a universal Job Guarantee program would be the best way forward and truest to the spirit of the WPA. The jobs would pay basic wages and benefits with a goal to provide a living wage. The program would take all comers -- anyone ready and willing to work, regardless of education, training, or experience. We could adapt the jobs to the workers. As the late Hyman Minsky put it, we could "take the workers as they are", work them up to their ability, and then enhance their skills through on- the-job-training. Additionally, the guaranteed public service job would be a counter- cyclical influence, automatically increasing government employment and spending as jobs were lost in the private sector, and decreasing government jobs and spending as the private sector expanded. Such a program would remain a permanent feature of our economy, acting as a buffer stock to put a floor under unemployment, while maintaining price stability whereby government offers a fixed wage which does not "outbid" the private sector, but simply creates a stabilizing floor and thereby prevents deflation.

Given the nature of today's "predator state" (to use Jamie Galbraith's felicitous phrase), politicians have a proclivity to reward those who "pay to play".  They tend toward wasteful spending and give goodies to campaign contributors. But we could take this power away from sock puppet politicians through a mechanism that automatically adjusts to insure the private sector can actually realize its desired net nominal savings position. This would help to free the system from political parasites while increasing the freedom of the private sector to achieve its savings goals. What better way to celebrate the anniversary of the WPA's inauguration?

Marshall Auerback is a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, and a market analyst and commentator.

*The original source of this finding was Michael R. Darby (1976) "Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid: Or, an Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941", Journal of Political Economy, 84(1), 1-16). Darby had studied the writings of Stanley Lebergott (1964) Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record since 1800, New York, McGraw-Hill. He had constructed early data from the Great Depression. See also Weir, D.R. (1992) "A Century of U.S. Unemployment, 1890-1990: Revised Estimates and Evidence for Stabilization", Research in Economic History, 14, 301-346. The hint that Darby picked up was in the original book by Stanley Lebergott on pages 184-5.

Share This

Video of Stiglitz, Yglesias, Gagnon and Others at the Future of the Federal Reserve Event

Apr 28, 2011

The videos from the panels at the Roosevelt Institute's Future of the Federal Reserve event are now online. You can watch introductory remarks by Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow and Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz and the full-length panels, as well as clips broken down by speakers.

The videos from the panels at the Roosevelt Institute's Future of the Federal Reserve event are now online. You can watch introductory remarks by Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow and Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz and the full-length panels, as well as clips broken down by speakers.

I hope you check it out. I moderated the first panel on what the Fed needs to do now in terms of unemployment, monetary policy and financial reform. Matt Yglesias made the point that this is a political problem, because the macroeconomy determines both political success and success for liberal governance and infrastructure.

Joe Gagnon, who executed QE1 for the Federal Reserve and wrote the paper that outlined a $2 trillion dollar purchase for QE2 in December 2009 (which the Fed did a quarter of a year later when it actually executed QE2, a delay that Gagnon said cost the United States 1 million jobs) talked about his time at the Fed and argued for extending and expanding QE2 through the end of the year.

The second panel was about the Federal Reserve throughout history. Moderated by Roosevelt Institute Fellow Matt Stoller, the idea was to show that the Fed is a political creation that reacts and evolves to different economic realities and will continue to evolve in the future. It is both appropriate and necessary for liberals to create their own vision of the Fed.

Perry Mehrling started the panel by discussing the creation of the Federal Reserve, bringing arguments from his book "The New Lombard Street" to the audience. He notes that political economy concerns at its creation -- the fear of a big government and of big finance -- are still very relevant today.

Tim Canova discussed the Federal Reserve in the 1940s under the strong proto-liberal Marriner Eccles, in an argument that expands on what he wrote for The American Prospect in The Federal Reserve We Need.

The third panel, moderated by Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Rob Johnson, featured visions of the types of monetary policy, financial reform, governance, economic philosophy and priorities that are necessary for the Federal Reserve to focus on post-crash. Jane D'Arista outlined how capital and credit need to be a focus of the Federal Reserve:

There are many more speakers for each panel at the website. Hope you check it out and leave a comment about what you think.

Share This

Tickle me, Visa. Sesame Street Brings Fiscal Lessons to Tots From Big Finance

Apr 18, 2011Lynn Parramore

There's something rotten on Sesame Street. And it ain't Oscar's garbage can.

"One of the best things about being around preschool-age children," gushes Ron Lieber in the NYT, "is that they are a blank slate awaiting your imprint."

Or perhaps the imprint of Visa, HSBC, and Wells Fargo.

There's something rotten on Sesame Street. And it ain't Oscar's garbage can.

"One of the best things about being around preschool-age children," gushes Ron Lieber in the NYT, "is that they are a blank slate awaiting your imprint."

Or perhaps the imprint of Visa, HSBC, and Wells Fargo.

In an article archly titled, "Too Young for Finance? Think Again", we are informed by Lieber that it's time for America's toddlers to "think hard about money." And why? Well, because irresponsible little people are likely to grow up into spendthrift adults. Bite-sized lessons, outlined in cute storybooks and videos, sound straightforward and wholesome enough: Save. Spend. Earn. All together now!

But who exactly will be teaching Little Jimmy the joys of fiscal responsibility? The very people who brought you the financial crisis.

That's right. The campaign to teach economics to tots comes courtesy of a group called the JumpStart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy, which describes itself as a D.C.-based "non-profit organization of organizations that share an interest in advancing financial literacy among students in pre-kindergarten through college." Peruse the website, and you will find that the folks behind JumpStart share a very significant interest: Nearly everyone listed is either directly or indirectly involved with Big Finance. We're talking giant banks, mortgage financiers, and credit card companies.

What you will not find on JumpStart's board or list of partners is even the usual ceremonial window dressing of representatives from labor or consumer advocates. There is one person listed associated with the Consumer Federation of America, but this pathetic nod is hardly a counterweight to the entire banking industry. Where is Elizabeth Warren, for example? Not here. Nor is anyone identified with criticism of the banks and financial firms that have bilked consumers, raised fees, and nearly tanked the global economy. Are  preschoolers really supposed to learn about financial responsibility from the Mortgage Federation of America? Obviously, the logic is to start 'em young before they have had any real contact with these paragons of fiscal virtue. And before their brains are properly functioning.

It’s free! Sign up to have the Daily Digest, a witty take on the morning’s key headlines, delivered straight to your inbox.

Lieber begins his article with the #1  lesson that the financial sector has been pushing ever since the meltdown. The crisis really wasn't their fault. It was ours. And that means you, Little Sally, with your greedy, ice-cream coveting ways.  "In the wake of the financial crisis," writes Lieber, must come a "realization that individuals share at least some of the blame for the bubble." What's needed, says Lieber, are "better habits from an earlier age" that will help kids grow up responsibly.

"For Me, For You, For Later" is the title of Sesame Street's package of videos -- offered free at banks around the country! -- that will encourage anklebiters to forgo that ice cream and donate cat food to a local shelter instead.  Very nice. But coming from this gang, perhaps a more appropriate title would be"For Me, For Now, Forever." It could include lessons on How to Indenture Young People Through Student Debt. Or How to Make Families Homeless Through Predatory Mortgage Lending. And the biggest lesson of all, How to Defraud Your Neighbor and Not Go To Jail.

In its crusade for fiscal values, JumpStart Coalition has enlisted Sesame Street to use the popular character Elmo to urge children to create three special jars labeled "Spending", "Saving", and "Sharing" into which they drop their pennies. But it forgot a very important jar. "Stealing". Because that's how many of the firms represented by JumpStart have made much of their money.

So how does Sesame Street, beloved of educated parents everywhere, get into the game of pushing the financial sector's fiscal ABCs? It just so happens that Joan Ganz Cooney, one of the founders of Sesame Street, is married to Blackstone Group billionaire Pete Peterson, the former investment banker and conservative who has been spending quite a lot of his own money to push the destruction of Social Security and Medicare through his Peterson Foundation and convince us all to forget the lessons of Macroeconomics 101 on deficits. Being married, of course, is not a crime. But here's the smoking gun: Muckety.com reveals that Cooney also serves on the board of the Peterson Foundation.

Frankly, this whole thing reeks worse that Oscar's garbage can.

Lynn Parramore is the editor of New Deal 2.0, Media Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute fellow, co-founder of Recessionwire, and the author of Reading the Sphinx.

**Follow Lynn Parramore on Twitter at http://www.twitter.com/lynnparramore

Share This

The Ryan Plan: The Biggest Risk Shift Ever

Apr 7, 2011Mark Schmitt

It's not just that Ryan slashes spending -- he places the burden of risk on American families' shoulders.

It's not just that Ryan slashes spending -- he places the burden of risk on American families' shoulders.

There are lots of ways to talk about Rep. Paul Ryan's dramatic budget plan, none of them kind. It's a massive cut in benefits to the poor and elderly. It's another giant tax cut to the well-off. It doesn't reduce the national debt at all, according to the Congressional Budget Office. It doesn't just reduce costs in Medicare and Medicaid, it effectively eliminates those vital Great Society programs. Its extreme budget austerity would doom the hesitant economic recovery and condemn the economy to a slower growth path for decades to come.

All those statements are true. But a better way to look at the the Ryan plan is in the context of some of the big shifts in the economy and government programs over the last few decades. Seen this way, it would be yet another step, the biggest yet, in shifting economic risk onto individuals and families.

The political scientist Jacob Hacker's 2006 book, The Great Risk Shift, demonstrated that the biggest trend in the evolution of the social contract over the last three decades has been the shift of risk away from bigger institutions that can handle it (corporations, government) and onto smaller businesses, individuals and families. The disappearance of traditional defined-benefit pensions, and their replacement by 401(k)s, is one good example: Instead of the company bearing the risk for all its employees, with a federal insurance program to back it up, it's all on you to save enough and invest it well. That might work out fine, or it might not.

But pensions aren't the only risk that families now bear. Employment has become shakier, and when people lose their jobs, they're much less likely to be hired back when the recession ends, because the job and perhaps the company are gone for good -- a phenomenon reflected in the record 6.1 million people unemployed for 27 weeks or longer almost two years after the recession officially ended. The housing bubble, when it burst, wiped out the economic security promised by homeownership, while the costs of higher education have forced young people to take an ever-bigger gamble that more schooling would pay off.

The achievement of the New Deal and the Great Society was not primarily in providing benefits to the poor and the old, although that's often how both liberals and conservatives talk about it now. What those programs did best was to reduce risks for individuals by sharing them across society. Whether it was health insurance through Medicare and Medicaid, insurance against poverty in old age through Social Security, federal mortgage insurance that made homeownership possible, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that enabled people to save for the future with confidence, when government absorbed and shared some of the risks of life, individuals were able to take chances and make the most of their potential.

It’s free! Sign up to have the Daily Digest, a witty take on the morning’s key headlines, delivered straight to your inbox.

Today, though, the only risks we're sharing are the wrong ones: Wealthy investors are protected by real or implicit guarantees such as “too big to fail,” while the risks that should shared, through social insurance, are instead privatized -- that is, pushed down the line onto us as individuals.

The Ryan plan would be one more step, the biggest step yet, in the privatization of risk. It makes no secret about it. The logic of his proposal to turn Medicare into a voucher, with which seniors would purchase private insurance, is that only if individuals bear some of the risks will they be conscious of the costs of health care and apply pressure as consumers to reduce those costs.

There are some health care costs that we can all be smarter about -- particularly preventive care that would reduce costs later in life. But more often, people over 65 (or, under Ryan's proposal, 67) would simply forgo care they need in order to get an insurance plan they can afford.

That is, if any health insurance is available to them at all. Before Medicare, there was no such thing as private health insurance for people over 67, and even with subsidies, health insurers are unlikely to rush to create products for people who are extremely likely to incur major health costs at some point between 67 and the end of their lives. It would be like creating auto insurance just for 16-18 year old boys! Ryan's plan proposes risk-adjusted subsidies that increase with age, but the only way to make a health insurance market work for 80-year-olds is to make the subsidies so generous, and the regulations so strict, that it's hardly private-sector at all.

Similarly, Ryan's plan to convert Medicaid -- the health program that serves mostly poor and near-poor families -- to a block grant to the states is an explicit risk shift. Today the risk of Medicaid costs -- which increase not only with health inflation, but with unemployment -- is shared between the states and the federal government. In some cases, it's a 50-50 split, but in states like Mississippi, the federal government absorbs 75% of the costs. A block grant would put all the risks on the states and their governors -- not their governors today, but their next governor, and the one after that, because the block grants will not adjust to keep up with health costs or economic conditions. With little room to adjust, because of state balanced-budget requirements, the risk will fall on poor working families or on other state programs, such as education.

Like other conservatives, Ryan claims the mantle of “devolution,” which promises shift responsibility down from the big cumbersome federal government to states, cities, and individuals. But the reality is that what he's shifting down is risk, not responsibility. There's one thing the federal government has shown it can do better than any state, family, or business -- absorb and share risk so that we can all move forward with confidence. Instead of thinking of budget plans like Ryan's in terms of who benefits, ask, where do the risks fall? And that question can be a guide to policies that might still reduce federal spending but also free up citizens, their families, and their businesses to live up to their potential.

Mark Schmitt is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Fellows Program at the Roosevelt Institute.

Share This

Why is Paul Ryan's Budget Trying to Dismantle Financial Reform?

Apr 6, 2011Mike Konczal

It's not enough to gut programs for low-income Americans. Paul Ryan wants to roll the clock back on Wall Street to 2008.

The budget Paul Ryan released yesterday has huge cuts that are likely to fall on the poorest Americans while offering all kinds of bonuses to the top 1%. Others will be talking about how it eliminates Medicare and Medicaid. I want to talk about how it dismantles one of the few regulations put on Wall Street post-crisis.

Recap: Living Wills

It's not enough to gut programs for low-income Americans. Paul Ryan wants to roll the clock back on Wall Street to 2008.

The budget Paul Ryan released yesterday has huge cuts that are likely to fall on the poorest Americans while offering all kinds of bonuses to the top 1%. Others will be talking about how it eliminates Medicare and Medicaid. I want to talk about how it dismantles one of the few regulations put on Wall Street post-crisis.

Recap: Living Wills

Let's back up with a high-level overview. During the financial crisis of 2008, regulators found that they were lacking the necessary legal powers for unwinding and resolving large financial institutions. We can debate whether they actually lacked these powers, but their argument that they didn't have them was more than enough for them to avoid having to do anything. They also found that when they went to collapsing institutions like Lehman, there was little prep done at the firm by either regulators or staff for what it would mean to unwind itself, so the only option was to send it flying into bankruptcy in the most awkward way or do an extensive bailout. These were the only options.

How to solve this problem? Give regulators the powers they need and then make a very public showing of prepping firms for resolution when they fail. Have records of "living wills" so it is clear that no firm is too big to fail. It's not enough to say, "We'll never bail anyone out again." We need to do a few simple things to make sure a crisis or a failure goes more smoothly. Seems fair, right?

Well a funny thing happened on the way to writing living wills. Wall Street has decided that they can't be bothered and are lobbying against it. From Bloomberg, March 24th, 2011, "Banks, Insurers Resist U.S. ‘Funeral Plan’ Crisis Breakup Rules":

Lobby groups including the American Bankers Association are voicing concern to regulators in a series of comment letters seeking to limit the impact of the new rules. JPMorgan Chase & Co. and New York-based insurer MetLife Inc. have discussed so-called resolution, or the unwinding process, with FDIC officials...

Since November, representatives from companies including JPMorgan, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Fidelity Investments, BlackRock Inc., Barclays Plc, Credit Suisse Group AG and Deutsche Bank AG have met with Fed or Treasury Department officials to discuss issues related to systemic risk, according to records released by regulators.

A living will is an “enormous burden” that puts banks on a course “that differs dramatically from the way they currently look at their business,” said Mark Tenhundfeld, senior vice president at the American Bankers Association.

So here's a sensible, necessary (but not sufficient) part of taking down a large, failing financial firm. Wall Street hates it because it requires work and it requires them to think of their business as something that could in fact fail. Who can they turn to?

Republican Budget

Cue Paul Ryan and the new Republican budget. Pat Garofalo at Wonkroom finds the following in the new budget:

Although the bill is dubbed “Wall Street Reform,” it actually intensifies the problem of too-big-to-fail by giving large, interconnected financial institutions advantages that small firms will not enjoy. While the authors of Dodd-Frank went to great lengths to denounce bailouts, this law only sustains them.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) now has the authority to access taxpayer dollars in order to bail out the creditors of large, “systemically significant” financial institutions. CBO’s expected cost for this new authority is $26 billion, although CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf recently testified that “the cost of the program will depend on future economic and financial events that are inherently unpredictable.” In other words, another large-scale financial crisis in which creditors are guaranteed to get government bailouts would cost taxpayers much, much more. This budget would end the regime now enshrined into law that paves the way for future bailouts.

Wall Street really likes the status quo. Resolution authority requires a series of actions, from having to make funeral plans to being subject to prompt corrective action, that begin to make it credible to resolve firms and move us away from the status quo.

These are not radical proposals. Here's Squam Lake Working Group on the topic, a group that includes Greg Mankiw, John Cochrane and Frederic Mishkin, a fairly conservative bunch. Their recommendation:

We endorse legislation that would give authorities the necessary powers to effect an orderly resolution. As part of this authority, every large complex financial institution should be required to create its own rapid resolution plans, which would be subject to periodic regulatory scrutiny. These “living wills” would help authorities anticipate and address the difficulties that might arise in a resolution. Required levels of capital should depend in part on what the living wills imply about the time required to close an institution. This will create an incentive for financial institutions to make their organizational and contractual structures simpler and easier to dismantle.

The GOP's budget is far more radical than what people like Greg Mankiw see as the role of regulation for the financial sector. There are problems with resolution authority that need to be addressed, particularly its international components. But the idea that the legal structure of summer 2008 is ideal -- the idea that "let's do it over, but mean it this time" is the strategy -- is horrific.

Remember, Paul Ryan voted for TARP. And now he wants to say "no problems here" and simply set the dial back. What more could Wall Street want -- someone who votes for bailouts in TARP and then fights any and all accountability and reform mechanisms after the fact? In a budget that skews so strongly towards the top 1%, it's telling that it tries to break apart one of the few mechanisms for holding Wall Street accountable post-crisis.

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

Share This

Josh Rosner Testifies on Dodd-Frank's Unfinished Business

Mar 30, 2011

ND20 blogger Josh Rosner testified before Congress on the financial reform bill's implementation thus far. Although that process has only begun, one thing is clear: there are plenty unintended consequences and loopholes big enough to drive a Goldman Sachs bank truck through. A few of his key points:

- Too Big To Fail Firms are Bigger Than Ever: Although not fully implemented, Dodd-Frank has not reduced the number of systemically risky firms; since the crisis, the largest firms have gotten even larger.

ND20 blogger Josh Rosner testified before Congress on the financial reform bill's implementation thus far. Although that process has only begun, one thing is clear: there are plenty unintended consequences and loopholes big enough to drive a Goldman Sachs bank truck through. A few of his key points:

- Too Big To Fail Firms are Bigger Than Ever: Although not fully implemented, Dodd-Frank has not reduced the number of systemically risky firms; since the crisis, the largest firms have gotten even larger.

- Dodd-Frank's Attempt to Reduce Risk Creates More Risk: The taxpayer safety net will be expanded to more large banks and regulators who failed in the past are the only cops on the beat.

- Our Bankruptcy Code Won't Work: Even though Dodd-Frank is likely to put failing firms into bankruptcy, our current code can't handle them.

- Too Big To Fail Negates the Attempt to Make Banks Hold on to Risk: Dodd-Frank's efforts to stop originators from selling shoddy loans will only result in more systemic risk and more TBTF institutions.

Read his full testimony here: "Has Dodd-Frank Ended Too Big To Fail?"

Share This

The Sickening Double Whammy of Unaffordable Health Care and Credit Card Debt

Mar 23, 2011Bryce Covert

With skyrocketing costs and falling coverage, many Americans have to pull out the plastic to pay their bills.

This week's credit check: 17% of consumers can't afford to pay medical bills and Americans pay about $45 billion worth of health care costs with credit cards.

With skyrocketing costs and falling coverage, many Americans have to pull out the plastic to pay their bills.

This week's credit check: 17% of consumers can't afford to pay medical bills and Americans pay about $45 billion worth of health care costs with credit cards.

Today marks the one-year anniversary of the health care reform bill. Ezra Klein, ever an expert on the matter, explains exactly what it is meant to do:

In 2019, once the law has been fully implemented for five years, it is expected to cover about two-thirds of the uninsured, to cost about 4 percent of what the health-care system spends in any given year and to cut the federal deficit by less than 1 percent... [O]nce it kicks in fully in 2014, is expected to do four things: provide coverage; remake a small slice of the private insurance market; pay for itself; and try to control costs... Of the 32 million people the law is expected to cover by 2019, 16 million will be on Medicaid and the rest covered by private insurance.

This legislation literally can't come a moment too soon. Not only does our broken health care system have catastrophic -- and sometimes fatal -- effects on our health, but it has a serious effect on our wallets. There's been a recent increase in those who can't afford to pay their medical bills or buy medications -- 17% of consumers in February as opposed to 15.6% in January and 14.7% a year ago, according to the Consumer Reports Trouble Tracker. It was the most prevalent trouble faced by consumers, ahead of missing payments on their bills. The story is particularly bad for low-income households -- of those earning less than $50,000 a year, 26% can't afford medical bills or medications.

Sign up to have the Daily Digest, a witty take on the morning’s most important headlines, delivered straight to your inbox.

The recession is likely to blame for the upsurge in these numbers. High unemployment levels, rising treatment costs and unaffordable coverage means four in 10 Americans struggled to pay their medical bills last year, according to a report by the Commonwealth fund. The report also found that 40% of respondents had to forgo care they needed because of high costs. (That number was at 29% in 2001.) Fifty-seven percent of those who lost their coverage with their job couldn't get new insurance, and enrollment in a government program to cover part of the cost of COBRA ended last May.

In the struggle to pay for necessary care and medications, many Americans turn to using their credit cards. We pay about $45 billion worth of health care costs with cards, according to a report from McKinsey & Company. Meanwhile, Demos and the Center for Responsible Lending surveyed low- and middle-income households and found that nearly a third had used a credit card to pay medical expenses. They also had high levels of credit card debt: an average of $11,623, as opposed to $7,964 for households without, with 44% of those carrying more than $10,000.

Why do medical costs get so easily coupled with credit card debt? It's not that Americans have a knee-jerk reaction to reach for the plastic. "Up to Our Eyeballs" notes that the rising use of cards can be linked to an insistence from health care providers on getting up-front collection on co-pays and deductibles -- and the number one strategy is getting credit card information before treatment. Not to mention the creation of a whole new product: the medical credit card. They come in many shapes and forms, but most are filled with fine print and loopholes. While almost all start with an 0% interest rate, they often rocket up to over 20% after an initial period -- rates on GE's CareCredit card jump to 26.9%, for example.

Health care reform will help ease these problems by covering more Americans and hopefully lowering the cost of care. But even this sweeping bill won't grant relief to many until its implementation in 2014. Until then, more Americans are going to have to reach for plastic when faced with medical bills they can't afford.

Bryce Covert is Assistant Editor at New Deal 2.0.

Share This

Educating College Graduates So They Can be Unemployed

Mar 22, 2011Mike Konczal

College graduates entering the recession face a lifetime of consequences -- and more education isn't going to solve the problem.

Aw hamburgers.

A new Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco paper, Recent College Graduates and the Labor Market by Bart Hobijn, Colin Gardiner, and Theodore Wiles, argues that unemployment is particularly bad for those just graduating from college. It explains how this puts pressure on structural or "recalculating" arguments of unemployment:

College graduates entering the recession face a lifetime of consequences -- and more education isn't going to solve the problem.

Aw hamburgers.

A new Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco paper, Recent College Graduates and the Labor Market by Bart Hobijn, Colin Gardiner, and Theodore Wiles, argues that unemployment is particularly bad for those just graduating from college. It explains how this puts pressure on structural or "recalculating" arguments of unemployment:

The current labor market outcomes of recent college graduates closely mirror those observed during the 2001 recession and the subsequent jobless recovery. This is important because recent college graduates are not subject to the kinds of structural factors that have been posited as the main sources of weakness in the overall labor market. Unemployment rates during the 2001 recession are widely recognized as cyclical in nature. Similarities in the experiences of recent college graduates in the labor market during the two recessions and recoveries are evidence that high unemployment rates in the current downturn and recovery are also mainly cyclical.

(h/t Mark Thoma, who has additional comments.) Check it out.

Children: Teach them well and let them lead the way. Or not.

I say hamburgers because Roosevelt Institute intern Charlie Eisenhood and I were working on a similar paper. Looks like it's getting absorbed into another project. I'm going to dump Eisenhood's summary of the long-term effects of graduating into a recession that we had in draft form to help supplement this argument, because it can't be said enough.

Eisenhood dug up the data for what I think is the most shocking graph. Here's the employment-population ratio for 20-24 year olds with a college degree, unadjusted monthly (they don't produce it adjusted) and then yearly average:

This is a cohort with mobility, fresh degrees, low health care costs, low wage rigidity, etc. etc. I don't shine the flashlight here to ignore the pain that those without college degrees experience in this economy. But if young people with college degrees can't survive in the post-recession era, nobody can. And this explodes the idea that education alone, instead of monetary and fiscal policy, is the way out of our current high unemployment rate.

I've been on a kick of watching the employment rates of 20-24 year olds with college degrees as a barometer for our economy's health for some time. Some people on the right get that this is going to kill a generation -- David Frum in particular has done great work. But in general everyone on the right is screaming about the Europeanization of the U.S. economy. Ironically, they have been screaming about the part where we could get universal health care and some decent trains and not the part where the young generation that is supposed to start building their careers, innovating and creating the future of the economy, is sitting idle. The part where a generation becomes permanently detached from the formal labor markets. An economy of insiders and outsiders.

Blog-Level Literature Summary

Handing the microphone off to Eisenhood:

Even considering both un- and underemployment rates may not be enough to describe the impact of the recession. As an Economic Policy Institute briefing paper points out, the unemployment rates might “underestimate the severity of the labor market problem for young college graduates because they do not indicate whether they are employed in a job that matches their skill level.” That can mean lower wages and a more arduous upward mobility path.

Research suggests that this effect is very real. Paul Beaudry and John DiNardo found “that every percentage increase in the [national] unemployment rate is associated with a 3-7 percent drop in entry-level contract wages.” Lisa Kahn found an estimate on the high end of that spectrum, discovering an “initial wage loss of 6 to 7% for a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate measure.”

Phillip Oreopoulos, Till von Wachter, and Andrew Heisz found a smaller, but still strong effect in a study of Canadian graduates. They determined that “a typical recession -- a rise in unemployment rates by five percentage points in [their] context -- implies an initial loss in earnings of about 9 percent…”

Unfortunately, the recession’s effect is not limited just to the initial job search and wages. The negative impact persists far beyond that. Kahn found that the effect “falls in magnitude by approximately a quarter of a percentage point each year after college graduation. However, even 15 years after college graduation, the wage loss is 2.5% and is still statistically significant.”

Oreopoulos again found a smaller impact -- a wage effect that “halves within five years and finally fades to zero by 10 years” -- but attributed the discrepancy between his finding and Kahn’s “partly due to [Kahn’s] focus on graduates entering the strong recession of the early 1980s.” That provides little solace to students graduating in this recession, considering that it is deeper and markedly more prolonged than the 1981 downturn.

Job mobility is also affected. Kahn found a “negative correlation between the national unemployment rate and occupational attainment (measured by a prestige score) and a slight positive correlation between the national rate and tenure.” She concludes that “workers who graduate in bad economies are unable to fully shift into better jobs after the economy picks up.” Worse, Oreopoulos found permanent wage effects on workers with low expected earnings (based on occupational prestige).

Considering that Paul Devereux and Robert Hart determined that wages are notably more pro-cyclical among job movers (particularly those changing employers) than among job stayers, longer tenures in periods of growth are likely to depress wages.

It’s important to note that it’s not just lower-skill workers who experience these effects. Paul Oyer showed that “macroeconomic conditions have a large effect on the likelihood of [Economics Ph.D.s] obtaining desirable academic positions” -- those who searched for jobs in periods of high unemployment were more likely to take a position at a lower-ranked institution. Once again, it appears that the initial placement has a long-term effect on the workers career. As Oyer puts it, “it appears that getting a good initial job has a causal effect on having a good job later. His research suggests that those Ph.D.s in better first jobs are more productive in their research, leading them to better future jobs, perhaps through the mechanism of increased human capital.

Mike Konczal is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

Share This

Pages