Daily Digest - September 23: Even Wall Street Sees Inequality Holds Back the Economy

Sep 23, 2014Rachel Goldfarb

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Why Wall Street Cares About Inequality (WSJ)

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Why Wall Street Cares About Inequality (WSJ)

Major Wall Street institutions like Standard & Poor's and Morgan Stanley have put out reports on income inequality. Pedro Da Costa says it's because these companies see what's holding back the economy.

Treasury Announces Rules to Help Curb Benefits of Inversions (Buzzfeed)

The new rules will change how money transferred from foreign subsidiaries and U.S.-based parent companies is taxed, in order to reduce the advantages of inversion, writes Matthew Zeitlin.

The Politics of Pre-K: How A Program Known to Help Poor Mothers Could Doom Your Candidacy (TAP)

Rachel M. Cohen explains why the gubernatorial candidates in Pennsylvania will only talk about pre-K in terms of education, skipping any mention of working mothers or income inequality.

The GOP's Jobs Bill Will Create Few Jobs, But Plenty of Debt (TNR)

The $590 billion deficit increase from the bill's tax breaks proves to Danny Vinik that the GOP doesn't actually care about the deficit as much as it opposes increased government spending.

What Happens to Families on Housing Assistance When the Assistance Goes Away? (WaPo)

The cost of market-rate housing often erases the benefits of positive life changes that take people off housing assistance, writes Emily Badger, and more gradual assistance reductions are costly.

Those Lazy Jobless (NYT)

Paul Krugman says that John Boehner's repetition of the accusation that the unemployed just don't want to work proves that the "closed information loop of the modern right" is particularly effective.

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Wall Street Swindled Local Governments, Too. Here’s How They Can Get Their Money Back.

Sep 17, 2014Saqib Bhatti

Predatory lenders drove municipal governments and taxpayers into debt with risky interest rate swap deals that may have violated federal regulations.

The story of how Wall Street banks steered unsuspecting homebuyers towards complex mortgages with hidden risks and hidden costs has been well-documented. In fact, the typical sales pitch for adjustable-rate mortgages was premised on the false notion that home values never fall and that borrowers could refinance their loans before interest rates jumped.

Predatory lenders drove municipal governments and taxpayers into debt with risky interest rate swap deals that may have violated federal regulations.

The story of how Wall Street banks steered unsuspecting homebuyers towards complex mortgages with hidden risks and hidden costs has been well-documented. In fact, the typical sales pitch for adjustable-rate mortgages was premised on the false notion that home values never fall and that borrowers could refinance their loans before interest rates jumped.

Less widely understood is the fact that a very similar story played out with cities, states, and other municipal borrowers that were also steered into predatory interest rate swap deals riddled with hidden risks and hidden costs. Banks pitched these deals as a way for municipalities to save money on bond issuances: instead of issuing a traditional bond that had a fixed interest rate, they could take out a cheaper variable-rate bond that had an adjustable interest rate, but use a swap to protect against the risk of interest rate spikes.

Under this structure, municipalities made fixed-rate payments to banks on their swap deals, while the banks gave them back a variable-rate payment that was intended to offset the interest rate that the municipality had to pay its bondholders. The idea was that this would allow borrowers to get a “synthetic fixed rate” on their debt that was cheaper than what they would have to pay on a comparable conventional fixed-rate bond.

However, there were numerous risks embedded in these deals. For example:

  • The variable interest rate that the banks paid to the municipality could fall short of the rate that the municipality owed bondholders, creating a shortfall.
  • These deals contained many termination clauses that would allow the banks to cancel the deals and charge municipalities tens or even hundreds of millions in termination penalties.
  • Rather than rising, interest rates could crater, causing the net payments on the swap deals to skyrocket and leaving the municipalities unable to take advantage of the low-interest environment unless they terminated their swaps and paid hefty termination penalties.

Even though banks tried to downplay or dismiss these risks in order to push interest rate swaps, all of them materialized in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis:

  • When interest rates on a type of variable-rate bond known as an auction rate security shot up, the bank payments on the corresponding swaps could not cover those payments, and cities and states across the country were stuck paying double-digit interest rates to bondholders.
  • When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and defaulted on its swap payments with municipalities, it triggered termination clauses on the bank’s swaps. In an ironic twist, cities and states actually had to pay penalties to Lehman because of the way the termination clauses were written.
  • When the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates in response to the financial crash, it also drove down variable rates on swaps, causing the net payments on the swaps for cities and states to soar and preventing taxpayers from enjoying any of the benefits from the low rate environment.

As a result, municipalities across the country have been hit with large bills to Wall Street at the same time that they are trying to close record budget shortfalls amid the biggest economic downturn in 80 years. The Detroit Water and Sewage Department is shutting off water to families who have missed just a couple of payments on their water bill so that it can pay off more than $500 million in termination penalties on its swaps. The City of Chicago is now paying $72 million a year on its swaps as a result of the low interest rates, even as entire neighborhoods on the south and west sides of the city fall into disrepair. The school district in Chicago is paying another $36 million a year on swaps, while the Board of Education is invoking budget problems to justify the largest mass school closing in national history. In Wisconsin, the state is now paying $25 million a year on its swaps and making catastrophic cuts to state healthcare programs. These are just a few examples of a trend cropping up everywhere in the U.S.

It is no accident that the same communities that were disproportionately targeted for predatory mortgages are also bearing the brunt of these predatory municipal finance deals. Across the country, working class communities of color are disproportionately impacted by cuts to public services, and austerity measures serve to exacerbate the crisis in those communities in particular.

Luckily, there is something that public officials can do to stop the bleeding. Under Rule G-17 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), a federal regulator charged with protecting the interests of municipal borrowers, banks that pitch deals to public officials must “deal fairly” with them. According to the MSRB, this means that they “must not misrepresent or omit the facts, risks, potential benefits, or other material information about municipal securities activities undertaken with the municipal issuer.” In other words, they must not downplay the risks associated with deals like interest rate swaps, and they must not mislead public officials about the likelihood of such risks materializing. The banks must ensure that public officials truly understand the risks of the deals they enter into.

This is a burden that was not met in the typical swap transaction. As a rule, bankers highlighted the upside and minimized the potential downside in pitching these deals. This was in violation of MSRB Rule G-17 and municipalities like Chicago and Detroit have legal recourse to potentially win back hundreds of millions from Wall Street. Cities, states, and other municipal borrowers can pursue these legal claims by filing for arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).

The Baldwin County Sewer Service, a privatized utility in Alabama, successfully used a similar legal argument earlier this year to win back its swap payments and get out of its deals without any termination penalties. The total value of the award was approximately $10 million. The potential claims could be many magnitudes higher for cities and states that had significantly greater swap exposure.

However, officials in municipalities with swaps need to act fast, because time may be running out. FINRA has a six-year eligibility period on these claims. Because many of the risks associated with swaps materialized in October 2008, when interest rates plummeted as a result of the federal response to the financial crisis, it is possible that the clock could run out on these claims as early as October 2014. Public officials like Mayor Rahm Emanuel in Chicago and Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin should act now to potentially recover millions for their constituents before it is too late.

Saqib Bhatti is a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and Director of the ReFund America Project.

Image via Thinkstock

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Daily Digest - September 11: Funding Universal Preschool Means Taking Banks to Task

Sep 11, 2014Rachel Goldfarb

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Bright Future Chicago Pushes for Universal Preschool (Chicago Tonight)

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Bright Future Chicago Pushes for Universal Preschool (Chicago Tonight)

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Saqib Bhatti explains one way that universal preschool could be funded: Chicago could pursue legal claims against banks for bad interest rate swap deals.

Jerry Brown Signs Bill Requiring Employers to Give Paid Sick Leave (The Sacramento Bee)

California is the second state to enact state-wide paid sick leave, but David Siders reports that labor groups aren't in full support of the new law because it excludes home health care workers.

Asset Limits Are a Barrier to Economic Security and Mobility (CAP)

Rebecca Vallas and Joe Valenti explain how asset limits on social safety net programs prevent low-income families from building necessary economic stability, and lay out a plan for reform.

The Federal Reserve's Too Cozy Relations With Banks (WSJ)

Stephen Haber and Ross Levine suggest ways to limit banks' influence with the Federal Reserve, including requiring ex-Fed officials to agree to a waiting period before taking jobs in financial services.

Student Debt Collections Are Leaving the Elderly in Poverty (Bloomberg Businessweek)

Federal student debt among the elderly has increased sixfold since 2005, and a law meant to keep garnishments from putting retirees in poverty is in dire need of an update, reports Natalie Kitroeff.

Who Needs a Smoke-Filled Room? (NYT)

Thomas Edsall lays out an example of the complicated structures that allow tax-exempt "social welfare" organizations to spend millions of dollars on political campaigns with little accountability.

These Charts Are Good News if Your Employer Pays for Health Insurance (TNR)

Jonathan Cohn says that the slowed premium increases for employer-sponsored insurance this year are another sign that the Affordable Care Act is keeping health care costs down.

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Progress, Yet No Progress: The Two Lines of Defense Against Too-Big-To-Fail

Aug 7, 2014Mike Konczal

It’s been a week of whiplash when it comes to the issue of Too Big To Fail (TBTF). First the GAO released a report saying that it is difficult to find any bailout subsidy for the largest banks, implying that there's been progress on ending TBTF. Then, late Tuesday, the FDIC and Federal Reserve released a small bombshell saying that the living wills submitted by the 11 largest banks “are not credible and do not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.” These living wills were designed to make sure that banks could fail without causing chaos in the economy, and this report implies TBTF is still with us.

One of them has to be wrong, right? In order to understand this contradiction it's important to map out where the actual disagreement is. Doing so will also help explain how the battle over TBTF will play out in the near future.

So look - a large, systemically risky financial firm is collapsing! Oh noes! What has happened and will happen?

There are two levels of defense when it comes to ending this firm. The first is through a bankruptcy court, and the second is through the FDIC taking over the firm, much like what it does to a failing regular bank. The next several paragraphs give some technical details (skip ahead if your eyes are already glazing over).

<technical>

As you can see in the graphic above, before the failure, regulators will have failed to use “prompt corrective action” to guide the firm back to solvency. These are efforts regulators use to push a troubled firm to fix itself before a collapse. For example, if bank capital falls below a certain point, the bank can’t pay out bonuses or make capital purchases in order to attempt to make it more secure.

Once a failure happens, there are two lines of defense. The default course of action is putting the firm in bankruptcy, similar to what happened with Lehman Brothers. Why might this be a problem for a major financial firm? The Bankruptcy Code is slow and deliberate, when financial firms often need to be resolved fast. It isn't designed to preserve ongoing firm business, which is a problem when those businesses are essential to the economy as a whole. It can’t prevent runs by favoring short-term creditors. There is no guaranteed funding available to keep operations running and to help with the relaunch. And there are large problems handling the failure of a firm operating in many different countries.

With these concerns in mind, Dodd-Frank sets up a second line of defense. Regulators can direct the FDIC to take over the failed firm and do an emergency resolution (OLA), like they do with commercial banks. In order to active the OLA, there’s a comically complicated procedure in which the Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve Board, and the FDIC all have to turn their metaphoric keys.

OLA, particularly with its new "single point of entry" (SPOE) framework, solves many of the problems mentioned above. OLA comes with a line of emergency funding from Treasury to facilitate resolution if private capital isn’t available, as it likely won’t be in a crisis. OLA would also be able to prioritize speed, as well as protect derivatives and short-term credit, stopping potential runs. SPOE, by focusing its energy at the bank's holding company level, also helps to deal with coordinating the failure internationally. However, OLA would be executed by administrators instead of judges, and it could put taxpayer money at risk. (More on all of this here.)

</technical>

The Contradiction

So, what is the battle over? How are we making progress yet also making no progress?

All the innovation in the past 18 months in combating TBTF has taken place at the second line of defense. When Sheila Bair, for instance, says there’s been significant progress in ending taxpayer bailouts, or the Bipartisan Policy Institute releases a statement saying adopting an SPOE approach has the potential to eliminate TBTF, they are referencing the progress that is taking place at this second line of defense.

But there's no progress at the first line of defense. The living wills that regulators found insufficient are, by statute, part of the first line of defense. Dodd-Frank says that if the living will “would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the company under title 11, [Bankruptcy]” then the FDIC and the Fed “may jointly impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company.” They purposefully didn't drop the hammer in their announcement, instead telling the banks to go back to the drawing board rather than enforcing stricter requirements. But they can get as aggressive as they want here. 

So the FDIC and the Fed are drawing a line in the sand here - the first line of defense needs to work. The regulators call out the banks for their “failure to make, or even to identify, the kinds of changes in firm structure and practices that would be necessary to enhance the prospects for orderly resolution.” So making this line of defense work will not be a trivial endeavor.

If the first line of defense doesn’t work, why don’t we just rely on the second line? Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman of the FDIC and an aggressive opponent of TBTF, released a statement accompanying the regulators' release, specifically saying that they would not find this argument convincing. It’s worth noting how clear he is about this:

“Some parties nurture the view that bankruptcy for the largest firms is impractical because current bankruptcy laws won’t work given the issues just noted. This view contends that rather than require that these most complicated firms make themselves bankruptcy compliant, the government should rely on other means to resolve systemically important firms that fail. This view serves us poorly by delaying changes needed to assert market discipline and reduce systemic risk, and it undermines bankruptcy as a viable option for resolving these firms. These alternative approaches only perpetuate 'too big to fail.'”

That’s a strong statement that they are going to hold the first line.

Note here that the GAO results could still stand. The market's lack of a subsidy could reflect the second line of defense. Or it could reflect that even if they both fail, Congress, which is gridlocked, would not pass a bailout. It's not clear what would happen if a major bank failed, but the market is right not to assume the banks are permanently safe.

Politics

It will be interesting to see how this shakes out. Those who think reform didn’t go far enough like the idea of fighting on the first line, because there is significant leeway to push for more systemic changes to Wall Street. To get a sense of the stakes, Sheila Bair told Tom Braithwaite back in 2010 that she would break up an institution that couldn’t produce a credible living will.

This will also animate the Right, but in a different way. From the get-go, their preferred approach to TBTF was just to create a special new bankruptcy code Chapter, removing any type of independent regulatory administrative state like the FDIC from the issue. It’s not clear if they’ll support regulators pushing aggressively to restructure firms so they can go through the bankruptcy code as it is written right now.

The administration appears to be silent for now. It’s also not clear whether it will see this as a second bite to get higher capital requirements, or if they is happy enough with the second line of denfense as it is. If the second is true, that would be unfortunate. The banks remain undercapitalized and too complex for bankruptcy, and regulators have a responsiblity to make sure each line of defense is capable of stopping the panic of 2008.

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It’s been a week of whiplash when it comes to the issue of Too Big To Fail (TBTF). First the GAO released a report saying that it is difficult to find any bailout subsidy for the largest banks, implying that there's been progress on ending TBTF. Then, late Tuesday, the FDIC and Federal Reserve released a small bombshell saying that the living wills submitted by the 11 largest banks “are not credible and do not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.” These living wills were designed to make sure that banks could fail without causing chaos in the economy, and this report implies TBTF is still with us.

One of them has to be wrong, right? In order to understand this contradiction it's important to map out where the actual disagreement is. Doing so will also help explain how the battle over TBTF will play out in the near future.

So look - a large, systemically risky financial firm is collapsing! Oh noes! What has happened and will happen?

There are two levels of defense when it comes to ending this firm. The first is through a bankruptcy court, and the second is through the FDIC taking over the firm, much like what it does to a failing regular bank. The next several paragraphs give some technical details (skip ahead if your eyes are already glazing over).

<technical>

As you can see in the graphic above, before the failure, regulators will have failed to use “prompt corrective action” to guide the firm back to solvency. These are efforts regulators use to push a troubled firm to fix itself before a collapse. For example, if bank capital falls below a certain point, the bank can’t pay out bonuses or make capital purchases in order to attempt to make it more secure.

Once a failure happens, there are two lines of defense. The default course of action is putting the firm in bankruptcy, similar to what happened with Lehman Brothers. Why might this be a problem for a major financial firm? The Bankruptcy Code is slow and deliberate, when financial firms often need to be resolved fast. It isn't designed to preserve ongoing firm business, which is a problem when those businesses are essential to the economy as a whole. It can’t prevent runs by favoring short-term creditors. There is no guaranteed funding available to keep operations running and to help with the relaunch. And there are large problems handling the failure of a firm operating in many different countries.

With these concerns in mind, Dodd-Frank sets up a second line of defense. Regulators can direct the FDIC to take over the failed firm and do an emergency resolution (OLA), like they do with commercial banks. In order to active the OLA, there’s a comically complicated procedure in which the Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve Board, and the FDIC all have to turn their metaphoric keys.

OLA, particularly with its new "single point of entry" (SPOE) framework, solves many of the problems mentioned above. OLA comes with a line of emergency funding from Treasury to facilitate resolution if private capital isn’t available, as it likely won’t be in a crisis. OLA would also be able to prioritize speed, as well as protect derivatives and short-term credit, stopping potential runs. SPOE, by focusing its energy at the bank's holding company level, also helps to deal with coordinating the failure internationally. However, OLA would be executed by administrators instead of judges, and it could put taxpayer money at risk. (More on all of this here.)

</technical>

The Contradiction

So, what is the battle over? How are we making progress yet also making no progress?

All the innovation in the past 18 months in combating TBTF has taken place at the second line of defense. When Sheila Bair, for instance, says there’s been significant progress in ending taxpayer bailouts, or the Bipartisan Policy Institute releases a statement saying adopting an SPOE approach has the potential to eliminate TBTF, they are referencing the progress that is taking place at this second line of defense.

But there's no progress at the first line of defense. The living wills that regulators found insufficient are, by statute, part of the first line of defense. Dodd-Frank says that if the living will “would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the company under title 11, [Bankruptcy]” then the FDIC and the Fed “may jointly impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company.” They purposefully didn't drop the hammer in their announcement, instead telling the banks to go back to the drawing board rather than enforcing stricter requirements. But they can get as aggressive as they want here. 

So the FDIC and the Fed are drawing a line in the sand here - the first line of defense needs to work. The regulators call out the banks for their “failure to make, or even to identify, the kinds of changes in firm structure and practices that would be necessary to enhance the prospects for orderly resolution.” So making this line of defense work will not be a trivial endeavor.

If the first line of defense doesn’t work, why don’t we just rely on the second line? Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman of the FDIC and an aggressive opponent of TBTF, released a statement accompanying the regulators' release, specifically saying that they would not find this argument convincing. It’s worth noting how clear he is about this:

“Some parties nurture the view that bankruptcy for the largest firms is impractical because current bankruptcy laws won’t work given the issues just noted. This view contends that rather than require that these most complicated firms make themselves bankruptcy compliant, the government should rely on other means to resolve systemically important firms that fail. This view serves us poorly by delaying changes needed to assert market discipline and reduce systemic risk, and it undermines bankruptcy as a viable option for resolving these firms. These alternative approaches only perpetuate 'too big to fail.'”

That’s a strong statement that they are going to hold the first line.

Note here that the GAO results could still stand. The market's lack of a subsidy could reflect the second line of defense. Or it could reflect that even if they both fail, Congress, which is gridlocked, would not pass a bailout. It's not clear what would happen if a major bank failed, but the market is right not to assume the banks are permanently safe.

Politics

It will be interesting to see how this shakes out. Those who think reform didn’t go far enough like the idea of fighting on the first line, because there is significant leeway to push for more systemic changes to Wall Street. To get a sense of the stakes, Sheila Bair told Tom Braithwaite back in 2010 that she would break up an institution that couldn’t produce a credible living will.

This will also animate the Right, but in a different way. From the get-go, their preferred approach to TBTF was just to create a special new bankruptcy code Chapter, removing any type of independent regulatory administrative state like the FDIC from the issue. It’s not clear if they’ll support regulators pushing aggressively to restructure firms so they can go through the bankruptcy code as it is written right now.

The administration appears to be silent for now. It’s also not clear whether it will see this as a second bite to get higher capital requirements, or if they is happy enough with the second line of denfense as it is. If the second is true, that would be unfortunate. The banks remain undercapitalized and too complex for bankruptcy, and regulators have a responsiblity to make sure each line of defense is capable of stopping the panic of 2008.

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Daily Digest - August 4: The Underappreciated Success of Financial Reform

Aug 4, 2014Rachel Goldfarb

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Obama’s Other Success (NYT)

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Obama’s Other Success (NYT)

Dodd-Frank financial reform is proving more successful than expected, writes Paul Krugman. He cites Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal in debunking the claim that the law created permanent bailouts.

The NFL Cheerleaders Should Be Your Fair-Pay Heroes (TNR)

Bryce Covert looks at what's needed to achieve wage growth in today's economy. She talks to Mike Konczal, who suggests that the Fed could help everyone's wages if it focused on unemployment.

Economy Adds 209,000 Jobs in July; Unemployment Rate Edges Up to 6.2 Percent (WaPo)

Ylan Q. Mui breaks down Friday's jobs report, which was generally positive but showed that underemployment (part-timers who want more hours) and long-term unemployment haven't budged.

Relying on Online Listings, Young Americans Struggle to Find Jobs (The Guardian)

Today's system of online job applications isn't making the search any easier, writes Jana Kasperkevic, as job-seekers find that their applications seem to disappear into black holes.

Work and Worth (Robert Reich)

Robert Reich emphasizes the difference between pay and value to society, given that kindergarten teachers and social workers make far less than hedge fund managers.

New on Next New Deal

The Worker-Owned Small Business Revolution

In his video speculation for the Next American Economy project, Gar Alperovitz predicts that as MBAs realize that worker-owned companies achieve higher productivity, the model will grow.

Thinking About the Women in Think Tanks

Bringing more women into the upper echelons of policy work will require engaging younger women in this work, writes Roosevelt Institute Summer Academy Fellow Hannah Zhang.

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The GAO Can't Distinguish Between a Good and a Bad Liquidation

Aug 1, 2014Mike Konczal

To emphasize a point I made yesterday, we need to think of ending Too Big To Fail (TBTF) as a continuum rather a simple yes-no binary. The process of failing a large financial firm through the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) can go very well, or it could go very poorly. It's important to understand that the recent GAO report, arguing that the TBTF subsidy has largely diminished, is incapable of telling the difference.

What would make for a successful termination of a failed financial firm under OLA? To start, bankruptcy court would be a serious option as a first response. Assuming that didn't work, capital in the firm is structured in such a way that facilitates a successful process. There's sufficient loss-absorbing capital both to take losses and give regulators options in the resolution. There's also sufficient liquidity, both within the firm due to strong new capital requirements and through accountable lender-of-last-resort lending, that prevents a panic from destroying whatever baseline solvency is in the firm. As a result, less public funding is necessary to achieve the goals.

Living wills actually work, and allow the firm to be resolved in a quick and timely manner. The recapitalization is sufficient to repay any public funding without having to assess the financial industry as a whole. There's no problems with international coordination, and the ability of the FDIC to act as a receiver for derivatives contracts is standardized and clear in advance, reducing legal uncertainty.

That's a lot! And it's a story about what could go right or wrong that is becoming more and more prevalent in the reform community [1]. Let's chart it out, along with the opposite happening.

Again, from the point of view of the GAO report, these are identical scenarios. Both would impose credit losses on firms. Thus the GAO's empirical model, scanning and predicting interest rates spreads to imply credit risk, picks up both scenarios the same way. Whether OLA goes smoothly or is a disaster doesn't matter. But from the point of view of taxpayers, those trying to deal with the uncertainty and panic that would come with such a scenario, and the economy as a whole, the bad scenario is a major disaster. And we are nowhere near the point where success can be taken for granted. Tightening the regulations we have is necessary to making the successful scenario more likely, and the apparent lack of a subsidy should not distract us from this.

 

[1] Note the common similarities along these lines in the critical discussion of OLA from across the entire reform spectrum. You can see this story in different forms in Stephen Lubben's "OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?" for the Unfinished Mission project,  the comment letter from the Systemic Risk Council, Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution from the Bipartisan Policy Center, and the "Failing to End Too Big to Fail" report from the Republican Staff of the House Committee on Financial Services.

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To emphasize a point I made yesterday, we need to think of ending Too Big To Fail (TBTF) as a continuum rather a simple yes-no binary. The process of failing a large financial firm through the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) can go very well, or it could go very poorly. It's important to understand that the recent GAO report, arguing that the TBTF subsidy has largely diminished, is incapable of telling the difference.

What would make for a successful termination of a failed financial firm under OLA? To start, bankruptcy court would be a serious option as a first response. Assuming that didn't work, capital in the firm is structured in such a way that facilitates a successful process. There's sufficient loss-absorbing capital both to take losses and give regulators options in the resolution. There's also sufficient liquidity, both within the firm due to strong new capital requirements and through accountable lender-of-last-resort lending, that prevents a panic from destroying whatever baseline solvency is in the firm. As a result, less public funding is necessary to achieve the goals.

Living wills actually work, and allow the firm to be resolved in a quick and timely manner. The recapitalization is sufficient to repay any public funding without having to assess the financial industry as a whole. There's no problems with international coordination, and the ability of the FDIC to act as a receiver for derivatives contracts is standardized and clear in advance, reducing legal uncertainty.

That's a lot! And it's a story about what could go right or wrong that is becoming more and more prevalent in the reform community [1]. Let's chart it out, along with the opposite happening.

Again, from the point of view of the GAO report, these are identical scenarios. Both would impose credit losses on firms. Thus the GAO's empirical model, scanning and predicting interest rates spreads to imply credit risk, picks up both scenarios the same way. Whether OLA goes smoothly or is a disaster doesn't matter. But from the point of view of taxpayers, those trying to deal with the uncertainty and panic that would come with such a scenario, and the economy as a whole, the bad scenario is a major disaster. And we are nowhere near the point where success can be taken for granted. Tightening the regulations we have is necessary to making the successful scenario more likely, and the apparent lack of a subsidy should not distract us from this.

 

[1] Note the common similarities along these lines in the critical discussion of OLA from across the entire reform spectrum. You can see this story in different forms in Stephen Lubben's "OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?" for the Unfinished Mission project,  the comment letter from the Systemic Risk Council, Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution from the Bipartisan Policy Center, and the "Failing to End Too Big to Fail" report from the Republican Staff of the House Committee on Financial Services.

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Let's Hope the GAO Report Ends the Too-Big-to-Fail Subsidy Distraction

Jul 31, 2014Mike Konczal

The GAO just released its long-awaited report on whether Wall Street receives an implicit subsidy for still being seen as Too Big To Fail (TBTF). I'm still working through the report, but the headline conclusion is that "large bank holding companies had lower funding costs than smaller ones during the financial crisis" and that there is "mixed evidence of such advantages in recent years. However, most models suggest that such advantages may have declined or reversed."

For a variety of reasons, whether this subsidy exists has become a major focal point in the discussion about financial reform. The Obama administration wants the headline that TBTF is over, and the President's opponents want to argue that Dodd-Frank has institutionalized bailouts. Hopefully this GAO report puts that "permanent bailouts" talking point to rest.

More generally, however, I find that there are three problems with this emphasis on a possible Wall Street subsidy in the financial reform debate:

The first is that it makes it seem like the bailouts were the only problem with the financial sector. Let's do a thought experiment: imagine that in September 2008, Lehman Brothers went crashing into bankruptcy and...nothing happened. There was no panic in interbank lending or the money market mutual funds. The Federal Reserve didn't do emergency lending, and nobody suggested that Congress pass TARP. There was nothing but crickets out there in the financial press.

Even if that had happened, we'd still have needed a massive overhaul of the financial system. Think of all the other things that went wrong: Wall Street fueled a massive housing bubble that destroyed household wealth and generated bad debts that have choked the economy for half a decade. Neighborhoods were torn apart by more than 6 million foreclosures while bankers laughed all the way to the bank. A hidden derivatives market radically distorted the price of credit risk and led to the creation of instruments designed to rip off investors. Wall Street failed at its main job -- to allocate capital to productive ends in the economy. Instead, it went on a rampage that did serious harm to investors, households, and ultimately our economy. 

TBTF is the most egregious example of the out-of-control financial system, and it's a major problem that needs to be checked. But if emphasized too much, it makes it seem as if the problem is only how much damage a firm can do to the economy when it fails. In fact, the problem is much broader than that, and solving it requires transparency in the derivatives market, consumer protections, accountability in the securities Wall Street makes and sells, a focus on actual business lines, and regulation of shadow banking as a whole, not just last rites for individual firms.

This is important because the second problem is that some will take this report as evidence that reform is just right, or has even gone too far. And scanning the coverage, I see that the commentators who are applauding the GAO's conclusions are often the same people who have said that, for instance, liquidity rules in Dodd-Frank have gone too far, or that the Volcker Rule should be tossed out. This is even as the GAO points to these provisions as necessary reforms.

We can debate whether a subsidy for failing banks exists or how big it is, but the goal of regulation should not be to fine-tune that number. The subsidy is only a symptom of much larger problems with the financial system, and the point of regulation is to build a system that works. 

Finally, the third issue is that emphasizing the subsidy makes us think of ending TBTF as a binary, check-yes-or-no, pass-fail kind of test. Again, there are political reasons for this emphasis, but TBTF isn't a switch that can be flipped on or off. Addressing the problem is an ongoing process that will be carried out through the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), and that process can be either more or less robust.

It's good that the financial markets have confidence in the OLA, but the FDIC is still crafting the living wills and the details of how they will be implemented. Major questions and challenges still remain. For instance, a rule has not yet been written to determine how much unsecured debt firms are required to carry. And conservatives are already floating the idea that a successful OLA would be a "bailout" anyway

The success of an orderly liquidation process will depend on many different factors, but we should think of it not as a binary, but as a continuum -- a continuum on which one end has more capital and slimmer business lines to protect taxpayer dollars and keep the risks contained, and the other end has us crossing our fingers and hoping that the aggregate damage isn't too bad. [UPDATE: See more on this point from me here.]

The GAO report is welcome news. We've made progress on the most outrageous problem with the financial sector. But that doesn't mean the work is done by any means.

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
 
  

Header image via Thinkstock

The GAO just released its long-awaited report on whether Wall Street receives an implicit subsidy for still being seen as Too Big To Fail (TBTF). I'm still working through the report, but the headline conclusion is that "large bank holding companies had lower funding costs than smaller ones during the financial crisis" and that there is "mixed evidence of such advantages in recent years. However, most models suggest that such advantages may have declined or reversed."

For a variety of reasons, whether this subsidy exists has become a major focal point in the discussion about financial reform. The Obama administration wants the headline that TBTF is over, and the President's opponents want to argue that Dodd-Frank has institutionalized bailouts. Hopefully this GAO report puts that "permanent bailouts" talking point to rest.

More generally, however, I find that there are three problems with this emphasis on a possible Wall Street subsidy in the financial reform debate:

The first is that it makes it seem like the bailouts were the only problem with the financial sector. Let's do a thought experiment: imagine that in September 2008, Lehman Brothers went crashing into bankruptcy and...nothing happened. There was no panic in interbank lending or the money market mutual funds. The Federal Reserve didn't do emergency lending, and nobody suggested that Congress pass TARP. There was nothing but crickets out there in the financial press.

Even if that had happened, we'd still have needed a massive overhaul of the financial system. Think of all the other things that went wrong: Wall Street fueled a massive housing bubble that destroyed household wealth and generated bad debts that have choked the economy for half a decade. Neighborhoods were torn apart by more than 6 million foreclosures while bankers laughed all the way to the bank. A hidden derivatives market radically distorted the price of credit risk and led to the creation of instruments designed to rip off investors. Wall Street failed at its main job -- to allocate capital to productive ends in the economy. Instead, it went on a rampage that did serious harm to investors, households, and ultimately our economy. 

TBTF is the most egregious example of the out-of-control financial system, and it's a major problem that needs to be checked. But if emphasized too much, it makes it seem as if the problem is only how much damage a firm can do to the economy when it fails. In fact, the problem is much broader than that, and solving it requires transparency in the derivatives market, consumer protections, accountability in the securities Wall Street makes and sells, a focus on actual business lines, and regulation of shadow banking as a whole, not just last rites for individual firms.

This is important because the second problem is that some will take this report as evidence that reform is just right, or has even gone too far. And scanning the coverage, I see that the commentators who are applauding the GAO's conclusions are often the same people who have said that, for instance, liquidity rules in Dodd-Frank have gone too far, or that the Volcker Rule should be tossed out. This is even as the GAO points to these provisions as necessary reforms.

We can debate whether a subsidy for failing banks exists or how big it is, but the goal of regulation should not be to fine-tune that number. The subsidy is only a symptom of much larger problems with the financial system, and the point of regulation is to build a system that works. 

Finally, the third issue is that emphasizing the subsidy makes us think of ending TBTF as a binary, check-yes-or-no, pass-fail kind of test. Again, there are political reasons for this emphasis, but TBTF isn't a switch that can be flipped on or off. Addressing the problem is an ongoing process that will be carried out through the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), and that process can be either more or less robust.

It's good that the financial markets have confidence in the OLA, but the FDIC is still crafting the living wills and the details of how they will be implemented. Major questions and challenges still remain. For instance, a rule has not yet been written to determine how much unsecured debt firms are required to carry. And conservatives are already floating the idea that a successful OLA would be a "bailout" anyway

The success of an orderly liquidation process will depend on many different factors, but we should think of it not as a binary, but as a continuum -- a continuum on which one end has more capital and slimmer business lines to protect taxpayer dollars and keep the risks contained, and the other end has us crossing our fingers and hoping that the aggregate damage isn't too bad. [UPDATE: See more on this point from me here.]

The GAO report is welcome news. We've made progress on the most outrageous problem with the financial sector. But that doesn't mean the work is done by any means.

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
 
  

Header image via Thinkstock

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Daily Digest - July 30: Technology Builds Community, But Will It Limit Prosperity?

Jul 30, 2014Rachel Goldfarb

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Civic Tech and Engagement: How City Halls Can Help Construct Stronger Neighborhoods (Tech President)

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Susan Crawford says that local governments demonstrating responsiveness through technology can improve public trust.

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Civic Tech and Engagement: How City Halls Can Help Construct Stronger Neighborhoods (Tech President)

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Susan Crawford says that local governments demonstrating responsiveness through technology can improve public trust.

Health Insurers Press to Exempt Millions From ACA (The Hill)

Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Richard Kirsch explains the latest push by insurance companies to lower their own costs by limiting the consumer protections of the Affordable Care Act.

Financial Market Oversight, Economic Recoveries, and Full Employment: Some Crucial Linkages (On The Economy)

Jared Bernstein says that implementing Dodd-Frank is essential to achieve full employment. For how to deal with financial oversight, he recommends turning to Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal.

Sympathy for the Overdog (Slate)

The employees of Market Basket, a Northeast grocery chain, are protesting their CEO's ousting. Luke O'Neil reports that they credit him with their fair wages and benefits, and fear a backslide.

New on Next New Deal

Roosevelt Reacts: NLRB Holds McDonald's Accountable for Labor Violations

Roosevelt Institute President and CEO Felicia Wong and Senior Fellow Richard Kirsch praise yesterday's National Labor Relations Board ruling for its common-sense support for workers.

Through Innovation, People Will Live Longer and Earn Less

In his video speculation for the Next American Economy initiative, MIT professor Frank Levy predicts the rise of an anti-technology movement as the economy stays stagnant.

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Live at TNR: Dodd-Frank at Year Four

Jul 23, 2014Mike Konczal

Live at The New Republic, I have a piece describing Year Four of Dodd-Frank, which celebrates its birthday this week. The news coverage of the past year has had a "stuck, spinning its wheels" argument to it. I argue that this past year saw some major and important advancements, directions on where to go next, and also made what will be the biggest challenges going forward very clear. I hope you check it out.

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Live at The New Republic, I have a piece describing Year Four of Dodd-Frank, which celebrates its birthday this week. The news coverage of the past year has had a "stuck, spinning its wheels" argument to it. I argue that this past year saw some major and important advancements, directions on where to go next, and also made what will be the biggest challenges going forward very clear. I hope you check it out.

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
 
  

 

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Daily Digest - July 23: It's Been a Good Year for Financial Reform

Jul 23, 2014Rachel Goldfarb

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Ignore the Naysayers: Dodd-Frank Reforms Are Finally Paying Off (TNR)

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our weekday morning email featuring the Daily Digest.

Ignore the Naysayers: Dodd-Frank Reforms Are Finally Paying Off (TNR)

The past year has seen important successes, like higher capital requirements, writes Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal, and the next steps for financial reform are getting clearer.

We’re Arresting Poor Mothers for Our Own Failures (The Nation)

Bryce Covert points to the policy failures of welfare reform, which requires parents to work or look for work to receive benefits but hasn't provided for child care, leading to recent high-profile arrests.

Obama to Sign Bill Improving Worker Training (Time)

In the first significant legislative reform to job training in a decade, Maya Rhodan says the Obama administration and Congress put training programs on a more forward-looking path.

SEC Is Set to Approve Money-Fund Rules (WSJ)

The new rules target institutional investors over individuals, says Andrew Ackerman, aiming to train investors to accept fluctuations and prevent panicked mass sell-offs.

TaskRabbit Redux (New Yorker)

Adrienne Raphel writes that TaskRabbit's recent relaunch makes it more clear that for all their marketing, online tools for hiring labor or transportation are about commerce, not community.

New on Next New Deal

Dr. Strangelove and the Halbig Decision

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal points out the fallacy in right-wing claims that there is a "doomsday machine" in the Affordable Care Act: doomsday machines only work if you tell people about them.

Full-Time Employment May Give Way to a Free Agent Economy

In his speculation on the future for the Next American Economy project, Carl Camden, CEO of Kelly Services, suggests that temporary employment firms like his will become the purveyors of social services.

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