President Obama: Stay Progressive in the Fiscal Showdown Talks

Dec 18, 2012Richard Kirsch

President Obama must remember the message of election night and back away from cutting Social Security benefits.

President Obama must remember the message of election night and back away from cutting Social Security benefits.

That didn’t last nearly as long as I had hoped. I put on my Obama baseball cap – the one I picked up from a street vendor walking to the inauguration four years ago – a few weeks before the November election. I’ve worn it every day since, to both celebrate his victory and cheer on the president for keeping to a progressive promise in the fiscal negotiations. Part of that promise was telling the DesMoines Register that Social Security benefits should not be cut. But it looks like my cap is going back on the shelf if reports that Obama is willing to cut Social Security benefits prove to be true.

There are three things to keep in mind about the president agreeing to cuts in Social Security benefits. The first is that Social Security’s benefits are slim, while retirement savings for most Americans are even thinner. The second is that if we are going to address Social Security’s eventual shortfall, there’s a simple progressive alternative to cutting benefits. The third is that this concession is giving in to the corporate deficit hawks, each of  whom has huge personal retirement accounts. Let’s take them – very briefly – one at a time.

Social Security is what American seniors survive on. As Dean Baker reports, “The median income of people over age 65 is less than $20,000 a year. Nearly 70 percent of the elderly rely on Social Security benefits for more than half of their income and nearly 40 percent rely on Social Security for more than 90 percent of their income. These benefits average less than $15,000 a year.”

And most people don’t have savings to fall back on. Half of Americans have less than $10,000 in savings and nearly half of baby boomers are at risk of not having enough savings to pay for basic necessities and health care.

Point number two is if you are going to tackle the eventual Social Security shortfall – which has nothing to do with the fiscal talks since Social Security doesn’t contribute a dime to the deficit – there is a simple, progressive alternative to cutting benefits. Lifting the cap on payments into Social Security for income of greater than $110,100 would only impact 6 percent of wage earners and would extend the life of the trust fund for almost 75 years.

Finally, let’s look at the corporate CEOs who blithely talk cuts in Social Security, like Goldman Sach’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein, who told CBS News, "You're going to have to do something, undoubtedly, to lower people's expectations of what they're going to get." It’s easy for a guy who has $12 million in retirement assets to dismiss a cut in benefits of $1,000 and more as just lowered expectations. Other CEOs leading the campaign to cut benefits include Honeywell’s David Cote, with $78 million in his retirement account, and GE’s Jeffrey Immelt, with $55 million stashed away for his later years.

Hopefully the president will back away from cutting Social Security benefits. If not, we need Democratic leaders like Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to keep to his pledge to keep Social Security out of the fiscal talks. And if a fiscal package with the cuts is presented, Democrats in both houses should offer an amendment, substituting lifting the cap on 6 percent of upper-income Americans for cutting benefits for all our retirees. That’s the kind of choice we need Congress to face.

But Mr. President, let’s not get to that choice: I really like wearing my Obama cap. 

Richard Kirsch is a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, a Senior Adviser to USAction, and the author of Fighting for Our Health. He was National Campaign Manager of Health Care for America Now during the legislative battle to pass reform.

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Are High College Costs Redistributive?

Dec 11, 2012Mike Konczal

Aaron Bady has a fantastic piece on the boosters who argue that MOOCs and other forms of online education will fundamentally transform higher education, addressed as a response to Clay Shirky. There's a few important moves to watch when people make this line of argument. Many who prize the "disruptive innovation" of higher education usually concede that what it will mostly do is provide a cheaper but poorer alternative to the large number of non-elite public institutions that educate the majority of those who seek higher education. The talk is all "Watch out Harvard and Yale! This online education company is going to take you down like Napster took down the record companies." Then it quickly reverts to the idea of providing "access," which gets much of its power through the ongoing dismantling of mass public higher education.

Note that, given that online education's success will be a function of the weakness of public education, there's a huge incentive for for-profit higher education firms to participate in that dismantling project. And sure enough, there's a great new article by Sarah Pavlus at the American Independent, "University of Phoenix fought against community college expansion." There's "so much money to be made online, and [for-profit schools] didn’t want community colleges coming in at a much lower tuition rate,” she writes. Public institutions are attempting to innovate and provide better services to citizens, but for-profit schools are trying to stop them to bolster their own bottom lines.

This is why the debate about the actual quality of online education is important. Online education can succeed not by providing a better service at a cheaper price, but instead by just providing "access" if public education slowly becomes unavailable. If there's no public option, then the quality issue becomes moot - then it is just about providing the now missing access to meet the large demand our country has for higher-level education.

Also watch for when online education boosters make an argument of higher education decline rather than online success. They do a rhetorical move to argue that the problems in the non-profit private education institutions extend to public ones. Kevin Carey, for instance, argues that "college spending is the driving force behind affordability or lack thereof in the long run" before noting several paragraphs later that "Inflation-adjusted per-student spending at private research universities, in particular, increased sharply." He quickly notes that "private universities set the aspirational standards for the industry as a whole," but public higher education cost inflation is driven mostly by declining public support, not a competitive war with private schools.

As Josh Mason pointed out, this is the equivalent of saying that since the private savings vehicle of 401(k)s have turned out to be a bit of a bust, we should scale back the public retirement vehicle of Social Security. That's not the case at all! And, if anything, we should view the public option as a version that works.

Tuition as Redistribution

But maybe higher tuition isn't a real problem. Maybe higher costs are driven by the rich paying more to help out the poor in a private form of egalitarian redistribution. A few weeks ago, Evan Soltas at Bloomberg wrote a version of this argument, which Matt Bruenig picked up on his blog (and here as well). Soltas argues that the huge rise in the advertised ("sticker") price of colleges is misleading, because the actual cost people pay ("net cost") is much lower and has been increasing at a lower rate. Soltas argues that "what has happened is a shift toward price discrimination -- offering multiple prices for the same product. Universities have offset the increase in sticker price for most families through an expansion of grant-based financial aid and scholarships." Bruenig and Soltas both emphasize that the rich pay more while the poorest pay less. They use data from the most recent Trends in College Pricing.

There are a few critical points to bring up about this analysis. Contrary to Soltas, this is driven as much, if not more, by public policy, specifically the effect of of a significant expansion in public funding, notably in Pell Grants and military grants. (I believe Soltas' graph also uses data that includes the extensive network of tax credits, which add up to a lot of money; the cross-section graphs in Bruenig's graphs does not.) From Trends in Student Aid:

This is one way of providing public funding. Another would be to drive down tuition directly. I took up the idea of supporting public provisioning directly, instead of coupons that provide targeted support, in my recent New America paper. If there are market imperfections, incumbents can capture some of the subsidy while driving up the price for all those who aren't getting the coupons. Public provisioning, in these cases, lowers the cost for everyone.

Now if you look at the net price by income, you also see those in the top income bracket, here being those with incomes over $100K a year, paying more than the poor, those under $33,000. From Bruenig's piece:

Soltas argues that "the cost burden of college has become significantly more progressive since the 1990s. Students from wealthier families not only now pay more for their own educations but also have come to heavily subsidize the costs of the less fortunate." He argues that differences in price reflects an institutional goal of cross-subsidization, where private firms make the rich pay more to compensate the poor. This didn't strike me as obvious from the data or other resources. In general, price discrimination should be thought of as a transfer from consumers to producers' surplus. Meanwhile, businesses usually don't cross-subsidize, and as we saw from the Pell Grant information, a big driver of this is poor people's payments beng compensated through public funding.

Just to confirm that higher tuition wasn't redistribution, I emailed one of the authors of the study, Sandy Baum, who told me that "very few students pay more than the actual cost of their education. Affluent students are generally subsidized less than low-income students, but they aren't actually paying any part of the cost of education for low-income students. Taxpayers generally are subsidizing Pell Grant recipients. But that's quite different from students paying more than their educational costs to cross-subsidize low-income students."

Another technical note worth making: Bruenig's graph also assumes that the poor are attending the same institutions as those who are better off. But they are almost certainly attending schools part-time instead of full-time, and cheaper institutions compared to more expensive ones. One can see this by just looking at the sticker cost of tuition. The sticker price by income has large differences that are slowly increasing.

(Net room and board and other costs has a similar dynamic.)

 Making sure that the poor can access education through grants could work as a plan over the future, though we must understand that it is a plan, specifically government planning. There are other plans we could do as well.

 

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
  

Aaron Bady has a fantastic piece on the boosters who argue that MOOCs and other forms of online education will fundamentally transform higher education, addressed as a response to Clay Shirky. There's a few important moves to watch when people make this line of argument. Many who prize the "disruptive innovation" of higher education usually concede that what it will mostly do is provide a cheaper but poorer alternative to the large number of non-elite public institutions that educate the majority of those who seek higher education. The talk is all "Watch out Harvard and Yale! This online education company is going to take you down like Napster took down the record companies." Then it quickly reverts to the idea of providing "access," which gets much of its power through the ongoing dismantling of mass public higher education.

Note that, given that online education's success will be a function of the weakness of public education, there's a huge incentive for for-profit higher education firms to participate in that dismantling project. And sure enough, there's a great new article by Sarah Pavlus at the American Independent, "University of Phoenix fought against community college expansion." There's "so much money to be made online, and [for-profit schools] didn’t want community colleges coming in at a much lower tuition rate,” she writes. Public institutions are attempting to innovate and provide better services to citizens, but for-profit schools are trying to stop them to bolster their own bottom lines.

This is why the debate about the actual quality of online education is important. Online education can succeed not by providing a better service at a cheaper price, but instead by just providing "access" if public education slowly becomes unavailable. If there's no public option, then the quality issue becomes moot - then it is just about providing the now missing access to meet the large demand our country has for higher-level education.

Also watch for when online education boosters make an argument of higher education decline rather than online success. They do a rhetorical move to argue that the problems in the non-profit private education institutions extend to public ones. Kevin Carey, for instance, argues that "college spending is the driving force behind affordability or lack thereof in the long run" before noting several paragraphs later that "Inflation-adjusted per-student spending at private research universities, in particular, increased sharply." He quickly notes that "private universities set the aspirational standards for the industry as a whole," but public higher education cost inflation is driven mostly by declining public support, not a competitive war with private schools.

As Josh Mason pointed out, this is the equivalent of saying that since the private savings vehicle of 401(k)s have turned out to be a bit of a bust, we should scale back the public retirement vehicle of Social Security. That's not the case at all! And, if anything, we should view the public option as a version that works.

Tuition as Redistribution

But maybe higher tuition isn't a real problem. Maybe higher costs are driven by the rich paying more to help out the poor in a private form of egalitarian redistribution. A few weeks ago, Evan Soltas at Bloomberg wrote a version of this argument, which Matt Bruenig picked up on his blog (and here as well). Soltas argues that the huge rise in the advertised ("sticker") price of colleges is misleading, because the actual cost people pay ("net cost") is much lower and has been increasing at a lower rate. Soltas argues that "what has happened is a shift toward price discrimination -- offering multiple prices for the same product. Universities have offset the increase in sticker price for most families through an expansion of grant-based financial aid and scholarships." Bruenig and Soltas both emphasize that the rich pay more while the poorest pay less. They use data from the most recent Trends in College Pricing.

There are a few critical points to bring up about this analysis. Contrary to Soltas, this is driven as much, if not more, by public policy, specifically the effect of of a significant expansion in public funding, notably in Pell Grants and military grants. (I believe Soltas' graph also uses data that includes the extensive network of tax credits, which add up to a lot of money; the cross-section graphs in Bruenig's graphs does not.) From Trends in Student Aid:

This is one way of providing public funding. Another would be to drive down tuition directly. I took up the idea of supporting public provisioning directly, instead of coupons that provide targeted support, in my recent New America paper. If there are market imperfections, incumbents can capture some of the subsidy while driving up the price for all those who aren't getting the coupons. Public provisioning, in these cases, lowers the cost for everyone.

Now if you look at the net price by income, you also see those in the top income bracket, here being those with incomes over $100K a year, paying more than the poor, those under $33,000. From Bruenig's piece:

Soltas argues that "the cost burden of college has become significantly more progressive since the 1990s. Students from wealthier families not only now pay more for their own educations but also have come to heavily subsidize the costs of the less fortunate." He argues that differences in price reflects an institutional goal of cross-subsidization, where private firms make the rich pay more to compensate the poor. This didn't strike me as obvious from the data or other resources. In general, price discrimination should be thought of as a transfer from consumers to producers' surplus. Meanwhile, businesses usually don't cross-subsidize, and as we saw from the Pell Grant information, a big driver of this is poor people's payments beng compensated through public funding.

Just to confirm that higher tuition wasn't redistribution, I emailed one of the authors of the study, Sandy Baum, who told me that "very few students pay more than the actual cost of their education. Affluent students are generally subsidized less than low-income students, but they aren't actually paying any part of the cost of education for low-income students. Taxpayers generally are subsidizing Pell Grant recipients. But that's quite different from students paying more than their educational costs to cross-subsidize low-income students."

Another technical note worth making: Bruenig's graph also assumes that the poor are attending the same institutions as those who are better off. But they are almost certainly attending schools part-time instead of full-time, and cheaper institutions compared to more expensive ones. One can see this by just looking at the sticker cost of tuition. The sticker price by income has large differences that are slowly increasing.

(Net room and board and other costs has a similar dynamic.)

 Making sure that the poor can access education through grants could work as a plan over the future, though we must understand that it is a plan, specifically government planning. There are other plans we could do as well.

 

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Another Reason to Kill the Debt Ceiling: Conservative Think Tanks' Responses to Default

Dec 5, 2012Mike Konczal

House Republicans are looking to weaponize the debt ceiling again, while the Obama administration is trying to make removing the threat of default part of any agreement.

Here's one reason why the debt ceiling needs to go: the conservative intellectual infrastructure cheered on a potential default. I had imagined that there would be a good cop/bad cop dynamic to the right. Very conservative political leaders would be the bad cop, saying that they weren't afraid to default on the debt, while conservative think tanks would play a version of the good cop, warning of the dire consequences of a default for the economy if their bad cop friend didn't get his way.

For instance, here's bad cop Sen. Pat Toomey (R-PA) saying that the markets "would actually accept even a delay in interest payments on the Treasuries," especially "if it meant that Congress would right this ship, address this fiscal imbalance, and put us on a sustainable path, and that the bond market would rally if it saw we were making real progress towards this." Missing interest payments is fine; in fact, it is great for the country if it is used to pass the Ryan Plan.

Financial analysts, to put it mildly, disagreed. JP Morgan analysts wrote that "any delay in making a coupon or principal payment by Treasury would almost certainly have large systemic effects with long-term adverse consequences for Treasury finances and the US economy."

Here's where the think tanks are fascinating. You could image them saying "our partner Toomey is nuts, we can't control him, and you better do what he says or there's going to be real damage." But that's not what they did. It's best to split the work they did on the debt ceiling in two directions:

1. Technical Default Ain't No Thang. The first is arguing, like Toomey, that a "technical default" wouldn't matter, and in fact it could be a great thing if the Ryan Plan passed as a result. How did James Pethokoukis, then of Fortune and now of AEI, deal with a Moody's report arguing a "short-lived default" would hurt the economy? Pethokoukis: "I guess I would care more about what Moody’s had to say if a) they hadn’t missed the whole financial crisis, b) didn’t want to see higher taxes as part of any fiscal fix and c) if they made any economic sense." Default doesn't matter because Pethokoukis doesn't want taxes to go up, and there's no economic sense because of an interview he read in the Wall Street Journal.

Others went even further, arguing that the real defaulters are those who, umm, don't want to default on the debt. Here's the conservative think tank e21 with a staff editorial arguing that "policymakers need to stay focused on the real default issue: whether the terms of the debt limit increase this summer will be sufficiently tough to ensure that the nation’s debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilized and eventually sharply reduced." All these people who want a clean debt ceiling increase are causing the real default issue. As someone who used to do a lot of credit risk modeling, this is my favorite: "Indeed, those demanding the toughest concessions today actually have a strong pro-creditor bias." S&P disagreed with whoever wrote that editorial and increased the credit risk (downgraded) based on the threat of this technical default.

Heritage wrote a white paper saying that you could just "hold the debt limit in place, thereby forcing an immediate reduction in non-interest spending averaging about $125 billion each month," and that "refusing to raise the debt limit would not, in and of itself, cause the United States to default on its public debt." Dana Milbank noted that these kinds of shuffling plans would still leave the government short and likely cause a recession. Milbank: "Without borrowing, we’d have to cut Obama’s budget for 2012 by $1.5 trillion. That means even if we shut down the military and stopped writing Social Security checks, the government would still come up about $200 billion short." Cato also jumped in with the technical default crowd here.

But that was the reaction from the number-crunching analysts. What about the bosses?

2. Civilization Hangs in the Balance of the Debt Ceiling Fight. Here's the president of AEI, Arthur C. Brooks, in July 2011: "The battle over the debt ceiling...is not a political fight between Republicans and Democrats; it is a fight against 50-year trends toward statism...No one deserves our political support today unless he or she is willing to work for as long as it takes to win the moral fight to steer our nation back toward enterprise and self-governance."

Even better, the president of the Heritage Foundation, also in July 2011, compares Democrats to Japan during World War II and then argues: "We must win this fight. The debate over raising the debt limit seems complicated, but it is really very simple. Look beyond the myriad details of the awkward compromises, and you see an epic struggle between two opposing camps....Congress should not raise the debt limit without getting spending under control."

So the the conservative intellectual infrastructure, which consumes hundreds of millions of dollars a year, looked at the possibility of a debt default and determined it was both inconsequential and also the only way to stop statism in our lifetimes. No wonder the time period around the debt ceiling in 2011 was such a disaster for our economy, killing around 250,000 jobs that should have been created. There's no reason to assume all the same players won't play an even worse cop this time around.

There's no good reason for the debt ceiling, and now there are really bad consequences for its existence. Time to end it.

Follow or contact the Rortybomb blog:
  

House Republicans are looking to weaponize the debt ceiling again, while the Obama administration is trying to make removing the threat of default part of any agreement.

Here's one reason why the debt ceiling needs to go: the conservative intellectual infrastructure cheered on a potential default. I had imagined that there would be a good cop/bad cop dynamic to the right. Very conservative political leaders would be the bad cop, saying that they weren't afraid to default on the debt, while conservative think tanks would play a version of the good cop, warning of the dire consequences of a default for the economy if their bad cop friend didn't get his way.

For instance, here's bad cop Sen. Pat Toomey (R-PA) saying that the markets "would actually accept even a delay in interest payments on the Treasuries," especially "if it meant that Congress would right this ship, address this fiscal imbalance, and put us on a sustainable path, and that the bond market would rally if it saw we were making real progress towards this." Missing interest payments is fine; in fact, it is great for the country if it is used to pass the Ryan Plan.

Financial analysts, to put it mildly, disagreed. JP Morgan analysts wrote that "any delay in making a coupon or principal payment by Treasury would almost certainly have large systemic effects with long-term adverse consequences for Treasury finances and the US economy."

Here's where the think tanks are fascinating. You could image them saying "our partner Toomey is nuts, we can't control him, and you better do what he says or there's going to be real damage." But that's not what they did. It's best to split the work they did on the debt ceiling in two directions:

1. Technical Default Ain't No Thang. The first is arguing, like Toomey, that a "technical default" wouldn't matter, and in fact it could be a great thing if the Ryan Plan passed as a result. How did James Pethokoukis, then of Fortune and now of AEI, deal with a Moody's report arguing a "short-lived default" would hurt the economy? Pethokoukis: "I guess I would care more about what Moody’s had to say if a) they hadn’t missed the whole financial crisis, b) didn’t want to see higher taxes as part of any fiscal fix and c) if they made any economic sense." Default doesn't matter because Pethokoukis doesn't want taxes to go up, and there's no economic sense because of an interview he read in the Wall Street Journal.

Others went even further, arguing that the real defaulters are those who, umm, don't want to default on the debt. Here's the conservative think tank e21 with a staff editorial arguing that "policymakers need to stay focused on the real default issue: whether the terms of the debt limit increase this summer will be sufficiently tough to ensure that the nation’s debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilized and eventually sharply reduced." All these people who want a clean debt ceiling increase are causing the real default issue. As someone who used to do a lot of credit risk modeling, this is my favorite: "Indeed, those demanding the toughest concessions today actually have a strong pro-creditor bias." S&P disagreed with whoever wrote that editorial and increased the credit risk (downgraded) based on the threat of this technical default.

Heritage wrote a white paper saying that you could just "hold the debt limit in place, thereby forcing an immediate reduction in non-interest spending averaging about $125 billion each month," and that "refusing to raise the debt limit would not, in and of itself, cause the United States to default on its public debt." Dana Milbank noted that these kinds of shuffling plans would still leave the government short and likely cause a recession. Milbank: "Without borrowing, we’d have to cut Obama’s budget for 2012 by $1.5 trillion. That means even if we shut down the military and stopped writing Social Security checks, the government would still come up about $200 billion short." Cato also jumped in with the technical default crowd here.

But that was the reaction from the number-crunching analysts. What about the bosses?

2. Civilization Hangs in the Balance of the Debt Ceiling Fight. Here's the president of AEI, Arthur C. Brooks, in July 2011: "The battle over the debt ceiling...is not a political fight between Republicans and Democrats; it is a fight against 50-year trends toward statism...No one deserves our political support today unless he or she is willing to work for as long as it takes to win the moral fight to steer our nation back toward enterprise and self-governance."

Even better, the president of the Heritage Foundation, also in July 2011, compares Democrats to Japan during World War II and then argues: "We must win this fight. The debate over raising the debt limit seems complicated, but it is really very simple. Look beyond the myriad details of the awkward compromises, and you see an epic struggle between two opposing camps....Congress should not raise the debt limit without getting spending under control."

So the the conservative intellectual infrastructure, which consumes hundreds of millions of dollars a year, looked at the possibility of a debt default and determined it was both inconsequential and also the only way to stop statism in our lifetimes. No wonder the time period around the debt ceiling in 2011 was such a disaster for our economy, killing around 250,000 jobs that should have been created. There's no reason to assume all the same players won't play an even worse cop this time around.

There's no good reason for the debt ceiling, and now there are really bad consequences for its existence. Time to end it.

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Should Plummeting Interest Rates Change Deficit Hawks' Arguments?

Dec 5, 2012Mike Konczal

Several deficit reduction plans came out at the end of 2010, including a proposal of the co-chairs of the Simpson-Bowles comission and another by Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin. Since then, the economic recovery has been sluggish, with unemployment stubbornly high. The Republicans threatened what they called a "technical default" during the debt ceiling fight, a move which led to a ratings downgrade for the United States and months of subpar growth. Rather than balancing the budget, the deficit was 8.7 percent of GDP in 2011, and is projected to be 7.3 percent of GDP for 2012.

What else has happened? Borrowing costs for the United States have plummeted. While real interest rates for borrowing 10 years out were still positive in late 2010 when these plans came out, they have since gone negative and stayed there. Investors are paying us to borrow money for the next 10 years.

If you were concerned about our nation's deficits in late 2010 and you follow this crucial market signal, you should be significantly less worried now, right? It's important to note that this fall in our borrowing costs hasn't been incorporated into any of the debt discussion happening right now, discussions which still use frameworks created in 2010.

Take Version 2.0 of the Domenici-Rivlin Plan, released on Monday. Defenders argue that this plan calls for stimulus right away, and even has an "economic growth" checkbox in its slideshow to prevent immediate austerity. However, there are two big things in Version 2.0 that don't incorporate collapsing interest rates.

1. It Cuts Its Stimulus Plan by 80 Percent. When I brought this up on Twitter, several people noted that Version 2.0, much like Version 1.0, contains stimulus. However, it wasn't noted that it recommends significantly less stimulus in the second version, even though borrowing costs are significantly cheaper and getting to full employment is equally crucial for dealing with our deficits.

The first version recommends a payroll tax holiday of $650 billion. The new version calls for an income tax rebate of just $120 billion dollars (line 34). That's 80 percent less stimulus than in the original version, even though the price of providing stimulus has plummeted. Is getting to full employment suddenly less of a priority? We are still quite a ways away from there.

2. It Reuses "Down Payment" and Credibility Theories. A popular theory in 2010 was that any short-term stimulus needed to be paired with long-term deficit reduction. Why? Not for political reasons, like that being the only way to get either through Congress. It was because of strictly economic reasons. Without deficit reduction, the upfront stimulus would panic the financial markets, raising interest rates and canceling out the stimulus. (This ignores that rates would rise because the economy was getting stronger, but forget that.)

Here's Version 1.0, recommending "a short-term jump-start to growth and a commitment to long-term deficit reduction that makes stimulus credible." In Version 2.0 we get a similar claim: "Of course, this and any other policies that add to the short-term deficit should be paired with a long-term debt reduction agreement rather than be enacted in isolation." The authors also think that removing the fiscal cliff requires a "down payment" to satiate the markets for the time being.

Once again, it isn't clear what macroeconomic theory is animating the "of course" here other than a vague sense of credibility. To whatever extent that theory made sense in 2010, it's significantly less, ahem, credible now. The end of 2010 saw an increase in stimulus through extensions of the Bush tax cuts, unemployment insurance, and the payroll tax without any long-term deficit reduction, and there's no evidence it caused a market panic. Indeed, one of the sadder moments for President Obama's economic team was them walking through confidence fairy arguments during the debt ceiling fight in summer 2011, the logical end results of this credibility argument.

If we can pass stimulus right now, why don't we do it? Certainly Version 2.0 doesn't think Medicare changes must go with, say, their plans to adjust the COLA of Social Security. I'd say it's because making it clear that these are two separate issues with very different solutions keeps the Very Serious People from using manufactured short-term crises and mass unemployment to reengineer social insurance programs to do the things they want them to do. Regardless of whether you like those ideas, there's no reason to hold our current unemployed hostage in the process. And unfortunately for them, the capital markets for U.S. debt, one of the most liquid and transparent markets in the history of modern capitalism, agree. I'm still not hearing good reasons to ignore this big market movement from those still worried about the deficit as the major priority.

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Several deficit reduction plans came out at the end of 2010, including a proposal of the co-chairs of the Simpson-Bowles comission and another by Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin. Since then, the economic recovery has been sluggish, with unemployment stubbornly high. The Republicans threatened what they called a "technical default" during the debt ceiling fight, a move which led to a ratings downgrade for the United States and months of subpar growth. Rather than balancing the budget, the deficit was 8.7 percent of GDP in 2011, and is projected to be 7.3 percent of GDP for 2012.

What else has happened? Borrowing costs for the United States have plummeted. While real interest rates for borrowing 10 years out were still positive in late 2010 when these plans came out, they have since gone negative and stayed there. Investors are paying us to borrow money for the next 10 years.

If you were concerned about our nation's deficits in late 2010 and you follow this crucial market signal, you should be significantly less worried now, right? It's important to note that this fall in our borrowing costs hasn't been incorporated into any of the debt discussion happening right now, discussions which still use frameworks created in 2010.

Take Version 2.0 of the Domenici-Rivlin Plan, released on Monday. Defenders argue that this plan calls for stimulus right away, and even has an "economic growth" checkbox in its slideshow to prevent immediate austerity. However, there are two big things in Version 2.0 that don't incorporate collapsing interest rates.

1. It Cuts Its Stimulus Plan by 80 Percent. When I brought this up on Twitter, several people noted that Version 2.0, much like Version 1.0, contains stimulus. However, it wasn't noted that it recommends significantly less stimulus in the second version, even though borrowing costs are significantly cheaper and getting to full employment is equally crucial for dealing with our deficits.

The first version recommends a payroll tax holiday of $650 billion. The new version calls for an income tax rebate of just $120 billion dollars (line 34). That's 80 percent less stimulus than in the original version, even though the price of providing stimulus has plummeted. Is getting to full employment suddenly less of a priority? We are still quite a ways away from there.

2. It Reuses "Down Payment" and Credibility Theories. A popular theory in 2010 was that any short-term stimulus needed to be paired with long-term deficit reduction. Why? Not for political reasons, like that being the only way to get either through Congress. It was because of strictly economic reasons. Without deficit reduction, the upfront stimulus would panic the financial markets, raising interest rates and canceling out the stimulus. (This ignores that rates would rise because the economy was getting stronger, but forget that.)

Here's Version 1.0, recommending "a short-term jump-start to growth and a commitment to long-term deficit reduction that makes stimulus credible." In Version 2.0 we get a similar claim: "Of course, this and any other policies that add to the short-term deficit should be paired with a long-term debt reduction agreement rather than be enacted in isolation." The authors also think that removing the fiscal cliff requires a "down payment" to satiate the markets for the time being.

Once again, it isn't clear what macroeconomic theory is animating the "of course" here other than a vague sense of credibility. To whatever extent that theory made sense in 2010, it's significantly less, ahem, credible now. The end of 2010 saw an increase in stimulus through extensions of the Bush tax cuts, unemployment insurance, and the payroll tax without any long-term deficit reduction, and there's no evidence it caused a market panic. Indeed, one of the sadder moments for President Obama's economic team was them walking through confidence fairy arguments during the debt ceiling fight in summer 2011, the logical end results of this credibility argument.

If we can pass stimulus right now, why don't we do it? Certainly Version 2.0 doesn't think Medicare changes must go with, say, their plans to adjust the COLA of Social Security. I'd say it's because making it clear that these are two separate issues with very different solutions keeps the Very Serious People from using manufactured short-term crises and mass unemployment to reengineer social insurance programs to do the things they want them to do. Regardless of whether you like those ideas, there's no reason to hold our current unemployed hostage in the process. And unfortunately for them, the capital markets for U.S. debt, one of the most liquid and transparent markets in the history of modern capitalism, agree. I'm still not hearing good reasons to ignore this big market movement from those still worried about the deficit as the major priority.

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FDR's 47 Percent: Will the Democrats Finally Heed Their Voices?

Dec 3, 2012David Woolner

President Obama should use the fiscal cliff to shift the debate away from deficits and take on the inequality that's undermining our democracy.

It has been well said that "the freest government, if it could exist, would not be long acceptable, if the tendency of the laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands, and to render the great mass of the population dependent and penniless…"

President Obama should use the fiscal cliff to shift the debate away from deficits and take on the inequality that's undermining our democracy.

It has been well said that "the freest government, if it could exist, would not be long acceptable, if the tendency of the laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands, and to render the great mass of the population dependent and penniless…"

We believe in a way of living in which political democracy and free private enterprise for profit should serve and protect each other—to ensure a maximum of human liberty not for a few but for all…

Today many Americans ask the uneasy question: Is the vociferation that our liberties are in danger justified by the facts?

...Their answer is that if there is that danger it comes from that concentrated private economic power which is struggling so hard to master our democratic government.—Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938

In his remarks on the so-called “fiscal cliff,” and in numerous campaign speeches, President Obama has repeatedly remarked that “we can’t just cut our way to prosperity,” and that “if we’re serious about reducing the deficit, we have to combine spending cuts with revenue. And that means asking the wealthiest Americans to pay a little more in taxes.” The president has also said that he is “not wedded to every detail” of his current plan to reduce the deficit and that he is open to compromise. But he also has made it plain, as he did in his recent remarks at the White House, that he will refuse to accept any approach that isn’t balanced; that he is “not going to ask students and seniors and middle-class families to pay down the entire deficit while people like me making over $250,000 aren’t asked to pay a dime more in taxes.”

For the millions of Americans who remain out of work, or are struggling with hourly wages that when adjusted for inflation stand where they were in 1978, this is welcome news. But the president’s focus on taxes and the deficit is only part of the story. What the country really needs, according to most economists, is more stimulus, for the best way to reduce the deficit is to expand the economy, which would of course result in more government revenue.

The president has certainly made reference to this, and he has included a modest $50 billion in stimulus spending in his recent budget proposal to Congress, but for the most part the public discourse on how to avoid the “fiscal cliff” and fix our economy has been centered not on jobs or the vast structural inequality that now separates the top 1-2 percent from the rest of us, but on the deficit. This is unfortunate, for it means, in essence, that the country’s economic agenda is still very much in the hands of the conservative right; that we are still focused not on the cause of our economic woes—a collapsed economy brought on by the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression—but on the by-product: the vast fall-off in federal, state, and local revenue that naturally came about as a result of this collapse.

A far better exercise would be to move away from the right’s obsession with the deficit and open up a conversation with the American people about a far more critical issue facing the nation: the ever-widening gulf between the rich and the rest of us and the very real consequences that this disparity in income has had on our economy and indeed on the very nature of our democracy.

Roughly three-quarters of a century ago, when faced with a similar set of circumstances—including a conservative right that was fond of labeling his policies socialist—Franklin Roosevelt did not shy away from addressing the conditions that led to the collapse of the world’s economy. He well understood—as did the millions of Americans who lived in or on the threshold of poverty—that “the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.” He also understood that “the Federal debt, whether it be twenty-five billions or forty billions, can only be paid if the Nation obtains a vastly increased citizen income…The higher the national income goes the faster will we be able to reduce the total of Federal and state and local debts. Viewed from every angle, today's purchasing power—the citizens' income of today—is not at this time sufficient to drive the economic system of America at higher speed.”

Taking note of this—and in a reference to the bottom half of the U.S. population that today sounds all too familiar—FDR observed in a speech on the perils of monopoly that:

47 per cent of all American families and single individuals living alone had incomes of less than $1,000 for the year; and at the other end of the ladder a little less than 1 1/2 per cent of the nation's families received incomes which in dollars and cents reached the same total as the incomes of the 47 per cent at the bottom…

This clearly was unacceptable, he went on, for:

No people, least of all a democratic people, will be content to go without work or to accept some standard of living which obviously and woefully falls short of their capacity to produce. No people, least of all a people with our traditions of personal liberty, will endure the slow erosion of opportunity for the common man, the oppressive sense of helplessness under the domination of a few, which are overshadowing our whole economic life.

Hence, for Roosevelt it was economic plight of the average American—not the deficit—that was the key not only to the restoration of our economy, but also to the health and well-being of our democratic system of government; even to our very way of life.

The debate over the so-called fiscal cliff and the showdown between President Obama and Congress over what to do about it has attracted a great deal of attention from the media. But rather than fall into another round of endless bickering with the budget hawks about the deficit, the president should use this opportunity to remind the American people—as FDR did all those years ago—that an economy and a political system built on fundamental inequality is simply not sustainable. If we really want to help the 47 percent our highest priority should be to adopt policies based on the fundamental idea that “political democracy and free private enterprise for profit should serve and protect each other,” not just the wealthy few at the top.

David Woolner is a Senior Fellow and Hyde Park Resident Historian for the Roosevelt Institute. He is currently writing a book entitled Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden and the Search for Anglo-American Cooperation, 1933-1938.

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New Deal Numerology: The Long Way Down

Nov 29, 2012Tim Price

This week's numbers: 16 million; 10; $2,200; $1.25 trillion; 53%

16 million... is a memetic number. That’s how many hits Google produces for “fiscal cliff,” making it far more common than more accurate terms like the fiscal slope or the austerity bomb. In the spirit of Grand Bargains, can we agree on “the fisterity cliffsplosion”?

This week's numbers: 16 million; 10; $2,200; $1.25 trillion; 53%

16 million... is a memetic number. That’s how many hits Google produces for “fiscal cliff,” making it far more common than more accurate terms like the fiscal slope or the austerity bomb. In the spirit of Grand Bargains, can we agree on “the fisterity cliffsplosion”?

10... is a delayed number. That’s how many years it would take for all of the scheduled cuts to be fully phased in. So feel free to relax and enjoy New Year’s Eve without having to worry that the ball dropping in Times Square is a visual metaphor for the economy.

$2,200... is an uncut number. That’s how much extra the average family will pay in taxes if all the Bush tax cuts expire. The president’s team has made note of this with its #My2K hashtag, a fun callback to the days when Americans obsessed about fake problems with computer clocks rather than the debt clock.

$1.25 trillion... is a delimited number. That’s how much Congress may have to raise the debt limit to prevent yet another standoff in February. Democrats insist this should all be part of the same deal, but Republicans prefer to take time to savor each of their manufactured crises individually.

53%... is a disagreeable number. That’s how many people say the blame will fall on House Republicans if a deal isn’t reached. The question isn’t why President Obama keeps saying he hopes they’ll agree to compromise, but why he’s not being sarcastic about it.

Tim Price is Deputy Editor of Next New Deal. Follow him on Twitter @txprice.

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The Simpson-Bowles Consensus Isn't Common Sense. It's Nonsense.

Nov 28, 2012Jeff Madrick

Capping federal spending at 21 percent of GDP is arbitrary, short-sighted, and wrong for America.

Capping federal spending at 21 percent of GDP is arbitrary, short-sighted, and wrong for America.

The Simpson-Bowles budget balancing plan seems to have become the common-sense standard for dealing with America’s future budget deficits. I’d say this move toward the right is dangerous to the future of the nation and essentially cruel—far more dangerous than the level of the deficit over the next 15 years. The commission, formally known as the Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, appointed by President Obama, achieves its deficit reduction by reducing government spending to do two-thirds of the job and raising taxes to do only one-third of the job. Even 50-50 would not be fair in such a low-tax nation. The commission proposed cuts in Social Security benefits of 15 percent for medium earners, for example.

But easily the most short-sighted objective is to hold federal spending to 21 percent of Gross Domestic Product into the future. How did they get this number? It is roughly the average level of federal spending since 1970. This is not a reasonable standard—it is not even a way to think about the issue. So where did the idea originally come from? The answer: the right-wing Heritage Foundation.

Now our most respected elder statesmen of the economy, Paul Volcker and Warren Buffett, are endorsing the 21 percent level in recent editorials. It may have been missed in Buffett’s piece, which endorsed a 30 percent tax on the rich, and correctly so. But he said it plain as day: “Our government’s goal should be to…spend about 21 percent of G.D.P.”

Oh my. Did they do any analysis at all about what that level would mean for retired, sick, and middle-income-to-poor Americans? Did it occur to them how vastly the U.S. economy has changed over those years? There are many more retirees, health care is more expensive and more extensive, the U.S. has chosen to fight expensive wars, and its infrastructure and educational needs are dire.

The words of the wise oracles should not be taken seriously. One wonders whether Volcker would have run the Federal Reserve or Buffett picked stock on such skimpy analysis. They present no evidence, nor do I think they have done any research or even reading that shows that a 21 percent spending level will make the economy more efficient than, say, a 24 percent level of spending. 

And they beat their chests as the exemplars of responsibility in an otherwise irresponsible America. Moreover, Pete Peterson, of course, is now financing a road tour for Bowles and Simpson to fight their great moral battle to get America’s budget under control—as a reminder, not by raising taxes significantly but by cutting social entitlements significantly. America cannot be run by men like these. America’s great moral battle is for social justice and adequate federal investment.

The heroic and correct analysis of the Simpson-Bowles plan has been done by Paul Van de Water of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Some think of the CBPP as left-wing, but it is only mildly so. It makes deficit reduction a top priority, and its analysis is typically excellent. 

Van de Water concludes that keeping federal spending at 21 percent of GDP would require deep cuts in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid over time, as well as virtually all other federal programs. He wrote this before the Budget Control Act and the sequester we now face, but its principles still apply.

Moreover, he reminds us that the Brookings Institution held panels on the future budget, and in general, centrists on those panels agreed that spending as a percent of GDP should be 23 to 25 percent 20 years from now. He thinks the Simpson-Bowles plan is simply wrong for America. In truth, Social Security is inadequate today, and Medicaid tragically so. The latter in particular needs building up.

And then the 21 percenters generally have the audacity to demand more investment in education and infrastructure. How?

Centrists had better get together and remind America, with analysis, pragmatism, and a keen sense of justice and America’s future, how deeply wrongheaded most of the basic principles of Simpson-Bowles are. This thinking has led to today’s fiscal cliff, and as a blueprint for the future it is both damaging to the economy and cruel for most Americans.

Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow Jeff Madrick is the Director of the Roosevelt Institute’s Rediscovering Government initiative and author of Age of Greed.

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How Did "Fix the Debt" Become "Protect the Bush Tax Cuts"?

Nov 27, 2012Mark Schmitt

A group devoted to reducing the deficit shouldn't embrace the irresponsible tax cuts that created most of it.

A group devoted to reducing the deficit shouldn't embrace the irresponsible tax cuts that created most of it.

“Fix the Debt,” as you've probably noticed from the Internet ads that are now as ubiquitous as the old Netflix pop-ups, is the newest high-profile effort by Peter G. Peterson and allies to build a public movement for long-term deficit reduction. Fix the Debt appears to be an ambitious public relations and grassroots lobbying effort layered on top of the other major Peterson-funded anti-deficit groups, all of them pushing for a “grand bargain” on taxes and spending, ideally before the “fiscal cliff” (or what I prefer to call the “fiscal reset,” because it's a chance to start over and reconsider bad choices from the 2000s). These include the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the Concord Coalition, the Comeback America Initiative (former Peterson Foundation president David Walker's new project), as well as groups such as the Business-Industry Political Action Committee.

Although Fix the Debt's co-chairs are Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, of the failed Simpson-Bowles commission, the organization has no specific deficit reduction plan. Its basic principles are that debt reduction is urgent and that it should be “comprehensive.” “Everything should be on the table” is the closest thing to a motto. That compares favorably to the Republican attitude, circa 2011, that everything should be on the table except taxes. Fix the Debt has enlisted several prominent Democrats in addition to Bowles, notably former Pennsylvania governor Ed Rendell.

So far, so good. No doubt the long-term budget gap needs to be narrowed and the ratio of debt to GDP stabilized, and it's better to chart that path sooner rather than make disruptive changes later. The evidence I see indicates that long-term fiscal stability is primarily a problem of system-wide health cost inflation and historically insufficient revenues – but that just affects my idea of a solution, not the long-term goal.

But there's one exception: When it comes to taxes, Fix the Debt has a less open-minded position than it seems: Their “core principle” is “comprehensive and pro-growth tax reform, which broadens the base, lowers rates, raises revenues, and reduces the deficit.” That could be okay, too – but everything depends on the baseline. If the Bush tax cuts are allowed to expire on January 2, in accordance with the law, then the next step would surely be to lower some of the rates that would come back into effect, principally for the middle class, and also to “broaden the base,” such as by bringing taxes on capital gains in line with other rates and thus eliminating the “carried interest loophole,” the “hedge fund loophole,” and all the others that play on that unwarranted tax preference. But that doesn't seem to be what Fix the Debt is thinking about. They seem to hold an unspoken core principle that the grand bargain must be achieved before the fiscal reset on January 2. That, in turn, implies that any deal would “lower rates” from the already very low tax rates of the Bush tax cuts. That's the essence, for example, of Fix The Debt leader Maya MacGuineas's Washington Post op-ed last week, which declared as a certainty that “Going over the cliff would be the worst possible outcome.”

It's also the argument of a paper posted prominently on the website of MacGuineas's Commitee for a Responsible Federal Budget, which challenges a study by the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation showing just how difficult it would be to achieve all the goals of lowering tax rates, raising revenues, and reducing the deficit. CRFB claims that the Joint Tax Committee study erred by starting the exercise using the “current law baseline” – that is, assuming that all the Bush tax cuts would expire. From there, letting rates go back up will have already raised a lot of revenue, some loopholes will have already been narrowed (including the preference for investment income), and there will be some limits on deductions for high earners. CRFB insists that comprehensive tax reform is possible if and only if you begin with the “current policy baseline” – that is, assume the Bush tax cuts continue and work from there, or do the deal before the cuts expire. It's a very complicated argument, but what it comes down to is this: Letting the tax cuts expire by law would actually achieve many of the goals of tax reform, as I wrote in October. But if the tax reform is already half-completed, there's less room for classic tax reform in a grand bargain.

And thus, Fix the Debt and its partners find themselves twisted in a knot. Because “comprehensive tax reform” is such a central component of their vision, they have to root for the Bush tax cuts, because there's not much room for reform otherwise. But supporting the Bush tax cuts, as a baseline, is not “fixing the debt.” It's the opposite, since the Bush tax cuts make up almost all of the long-term projected deficit, as this chart from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities shows:

It's also worth noting that Fix The Debt's approach to taxes is not the same as the Simpson-Bowles commission. Simpson-Bowles started from the assumption that the Bush tax cuts would expire. Insisting that the Bush tax cuts form the starting point for negotiations was the position, instead, of Mitt Romney, Paul Ryan (it was one reason he opposed Simpson-Bowles), and the current House Republicans.

I'm not sure why Fix the Debt put itself in a position where it now seems more concerned with protecting the Bush tax cuts than actually reducing the long-term deficit. Maybe it's that the devotion to the fantasy of a grand bargain that includes something called “tax reform” drove them there. Maybe it's that it's necessary to maintain the nominal support from Republicans and business leaders that they boast. But whatever the cause, it's where they seem to be. And a group devoted to fiscal responsibility has no business protecting one of the two most irresponsible fiscal choices in recent history.

Mark Schmitt is a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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The GOP's Holiday Gift Guide: Pain for the Poor, Ponies for the Rich

Nov 21, 2012Tim Price

Republicans are using the fiscal cliff to extract payback for all the "gifts" President Obama has given to Americans.

Republicans are using the fiscal cliff to extract payback for all the "gifts" President Obama has given to Americans.

Before Americans have even finished digesting their Thanksgiving turkey, the holiday shopping season will have officially begun. But according to Mitt Romney, Christmas came early for those who voted for Barack Obama. The failed Republican presidential nominee and latter-day Scrooge told donors last week that President Obama had won reelection by “giving targeted groups a big gift.” And what generous stocking-stuffers they were! For the young and the poor, health coverage under the Affordable Care Act. For Hispanics, an executive order halting deportation of the children of undocumented immigrants. For women, free contraception for use in all their filthy lady activities. If Malia and Sasha don’t find a pair of baby unicorns under the White House Christmas tree this year, they have a right to feel jealous.

Romney’s comments met with disapproval from fellow Republicans who hope to have a future in elective office, but the truth is that they reflect an understanding of the American public and its relationship with government that is widely shared among conservatives. Paul Waldman argues that it fits right in with their “makers vs. takers” ideology, the notion that the country is divided between “the brave individualists needing nothing from anyone, and the blood-sucking parasites who rely on government.” But Republicans don’t just want to reset policy to some sort of neutral state where everyone gives and receives his or her fair share (slow down there, Karl Marx). Instead, they seem to view the fiscal cliff as an opportunity to impose austerity measures that would redistribute the gifts to their Nice List and punish those who have been spoiled by Obama’s socialist Santa. 

The fiscal cliff is in fact better described as an “austerity bomb,” a term coined by TPM’s Brian Beutler and echoed by Paul Krugman. Despite what the cliff terminology might suggest, the problem isn’t that the federal deficit is about to explode, but that conservatives who have spent years demanding swift and substantial deficit reduction are about to get exactly what they wanted. If this mix of scheduled tax increases and spending cuts is allowed to take effect, it will carve $560 billion out of the budget next year – so why are deficit scolds suddenly terrified of the consequences? Krugman argues that they’re implicitly conceding that “Keynesians were right all along, that slashing spending and raising taxes on ordinary workers is destructive in a depressed economy, and that we should actually be doing the opposite.”

But are Republicans really worried about the plight of the working man? You wouldn’t know it based on the alternatives they’ve proposed, which involve swapping one set of austerity measures for a slightly different set of austerity measures. Their real concern is what the fiscal cliff will mean for their friends and supporters, not what it will mean for the broader economy. Sure, the poor will take the hit first, as is their lot in life, but taxes will go up on rich people, too! That’s money coming straight out of the 2014 campaign coffers. And what about those poor defense contractors who will suffer from cuts to the Pentagon’s budget? They have mouths to feed, too.

The terms that Republicans have set for the fiscal cliff negotiations provide clear evidence of this favoritism. Chastened by President Obama’s reelection, they keep claiming they’re open to compromise, but they steadfastly refuse to raise tax rates on the rich. Instead, they insist any new revenue must come from “closing loopholes,” a hoary Beltway cliché that means nothing in particular, and they’ll only concede that much if Democrats agree to “reform entitlements,” which is even less specific but more ominous. Oh, and they also want “changes” to the Affordable Care Act to be on the table. In fact, if Barack Obama would just go ahead and resign from office, it would be a real show of good faith and bipartisan spirit.

Proposing to cut Social Security benefits or raise the retirement age as part of a fiscal cliff deal is a non sequitur at best. With all due respect to financial masterminds like Lloyd Blankfein, it’s hard to believe that anyone could be told that Congress is about to pull the rug out from under the fragile recovery and honestly conclude that the solution is to make old people work longer. It’s the equivalent of the president being told that we’re on the verge of nuclear war and replying, “I’ll have the soup.” As Jeff Madrick has explained at length, Social Security is not in crisis, and there are plenty of easy fixes available for its future financial shortfall. (Medicare is a thornier problem, but one that probably shouldn’t be dealt with on a timer.) Senator Mark Begich, for instance, has proposed to cover the gap and pay for more generous benefits by eliminating the payroll tax cap. But don’t expect that plan to be taken very seriously by the Very Serious People, because it asks the rich to sacrifice more instead of inflicting some character-building pain on everyone else.

Aside from being unnecessary, such cuts would have a disproportionate impact on the poor. The right’s claim that Social Security wasn’t designed to handle increased life expectancies is based on a serious misunderstanding of history and human biology, but it is true that life expectancy has risen dramatically – for the rich. Workers on the lower rungs of the economic ladder haven’t been so lucky, so a higher retirement age is just a massive benefit cut for them. Of course, any such changes would only be phased in for younger workers, who (purely coincidentally) don’t vote Republican, not current retirees who do. That will teach those spoiled little punks. Er, I mean, preserve the promise of Social Security for future generations.

The same logic, if you can call it that, applies to demanding changes to the Affordable Care Act. The current law will save $109 billion over the next 10 years, so in theory, the deficit hawks should love it, right? Well, there are two problems with that theory. The first is that those cost savings are based on CBO projections, which, like Nate Silver’s electoral analysis, fall into that category of “liberal math” that Republicans find inherently suspect. The other is that the ACA achieves those savings while helping poor people -- that’s what makes it a gift, according to Romney. But deficit reduction isn’t supposed to make life easier; it’s supposed to be tough love that forces people to fend for themselves in a harsh and unforgiving world. Like exercise, the pain means it’s working. Or maybe you just tore a tendon. You should probably check with your doctor, assuming you can afford health insurance.

This barely concealed impulse to punish the undeserving is the source of Republicans’ internal conflict over the fiscal cliff and the biggest hurdle they must overcome in their efforts to become viable contenders for the White House again. They may not see it as punishment; to them, it’s just a teaspoon of unpleasant medicine that will eventually make the country much healthier. But things like government-funded health care, education, and retirement security only look like gifts from the perspective of the man who has everything. What Republicans see as unaffordable luxuries, the rest of us see as essential to a basic standard of living. Until they realize that, we might be able to reach a compromise on the fiscal cliff, but we’ll never really find common ground.

Tim Price is Deputy Editor of Next New Deal. Follow him on Twitter @txprice.

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Three Principles for Restoring Progressive Taxation

Nov 19, 2012Mark Schmitt

As part of our series "A Rooseveltian Second Term Agenda," advice on revamping the tax code to raise the revenue we need.

As part of our series "A Rooseveltian Second Term Agenda," advice on revamping the tax code to raise the revenue we need.

Our current tax system is a toxic legacy of the George W. Bush years. It loomed over Obama's first four years, bearing deficits that limited the scope of economic stimulus, drove inequality to astonishing levels, and led directly to the debt limit showdown of the summer of 2011 that forced us into even more dangerous policies. President Obama's second term offers a long overdue opportunity to restore the promise of progressive taxation and revenues that are adequate to our long-term economic priorities. It requires both short-term and long-term action.

The greatest failure of the tax system is not that it’s too complicated or inefficient or that there are too many “special-interest loopholes,” as House Speaker John Boehner put it on the day after the election. It's that it doesn't raise enough money and it encourages all sorts of manipulation because of the differential rates for investment income and income from work. These are not things that developed over time, as if by some natural process – they are the product of specific decisions made in 2001 and 2003 by Republican-controlled Congresses that used the budget reconciliation process to avoid any bipartisan compromise.

Here are some principles that the administration should hold to in restoring adequate and progressive taxation:

1. Start from the law, not current tax policy. Under the law, the Bush tax cuts expire on January 2, 2013 and revert to their levels at the prosperous end of the 1990s. This expiration along with several temporary tax cuts that expire at the same time and the budget sequester devised to escape the House GOP blackmail on the debt ceiling in 2011 is what's known as “the fiscal cliff.” There will be an effort to negotiate a deal on taxes and spending before we hit the cliff out of fear that expiration of all the cuts at once would tip the country back into recession. But the effect won't be felt at once, and there's plenty of time to negotiate a new round of cuts once the law as written goes into effect. There is no reason to negotiate based on rates that are set to expire within weeks or days.

Under the law, capital gains rates will rise to 20 percent from 15 percent, dividends will be taxed at the same rate as regular income, and two provisions that limit personal deductions and exemptions for the wealthy will come back into effect. All tax rates will rise, but the tax code will instantly be fairer, by every definition, than it was in December. From that baseline – which is not some accident; it's what the law calls for – we can have a debate about which rates should be permanently lowered. There's a strong argument, for example, for bringing the bottom rate back down to 10 percent, given that these are the households that were hit hardest during the recession and saw few gains even during the prosperous years before 2008.

2. Don't try to define “the rich” with arbitrary thresholds. In its first four years, the Obama administration's tax policy was hamstrung by its commitment to the $250,000 line – that no household with taxable income lower than a quarter of a million dollars should face any kind of tax increase and any increase should apply only to the income above $250,000. Later, the line became a million dollars as the administration tried to craft what it called “The Buffett Rule” to remedy Warren Buffett's recognition of the absurdity that he paid a lower tax rate than his secretary. These new thresholds would be grafted onto the tax code on top of the existing rate brackets. For example, households with incomes below the quarter-million line would keep the preferential rates for capital gains and dividends, while it would go up for those above it. These thresholds would add a new level of complexity to the tax code, sharply reduce the revenues that could be gained, and reinforce the impression that taxes are a sort of punishment for the rich. It's a lot simpler, more efficient, and infinitely fairer to say that a single person who makes, say, $80,000 from capital gains alone should pay the same rate, no more and no less, than a comparable household that earns $80,000 from work. Right now, the first household would pay less. With the same rates for all income, rates can be held down and we can maintain the low-end cuts, such as the 10 percent rate for middle-class households, and gain enough revenue for the future. Artificial new thresholds, which would apply to some forms of income and not others, will make this much more difficult.

3. Consider one new source of revenue – and make it a “Pigovian” one.  Even an ideal income tax system, one in which income from any source is taxed in the same way and distorting deductions are kept to a minimum, is unlikely to raise sufficient revenues to support the level of investment the country needs in the long run. Adding one additional source of revenue will not only help to close the revenue gap, but it can serve vital purposes as well. (Such taxes, which have a dual purpose of raising revenue and reducing some undesirable activity, such as smoking, are known as “Pigovian,” after the Cambridge economist Arthur Pigou.) The two leading candidates would be a tax on carbon and a very small tax on financial transactions. The former would have some of the same effect as a cap-and-trade system to reduce emissions that cause climate change, with less complexity, and could also fund clean energy research and job creation. The latter would generate revenue from the still thriving financial industry, while putting a little bit of friction into transactions and reducing the payoff – and the risk – created by strategies that rely on massive, fast trading. While those strategies weren't the main cause of the 2008 financial meltdown, they do play a role in creating instability (such as the “flash crash” of 2010). Either of these, or both, would helpfully supplement the income tax, the payroll tax (which supports Social Security and Medicare), the corporate income tax, and federal excise taxes. 

Mark Schmitt is a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.

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